They Say He\u27s Gay : The Admissibility of Evidence of Sexual Orientation by Nicolas, Peter
University of Washington School of Law
UW Law Digital Commons
Articles Faculty Publications
2003
"They Say He's Gay": The Admissibility of Evidence
of Sexual Orientation
Peter Nicolas
University of Washington School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at UW Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles by an authorized administrator of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu.
Recommended Citation
Peter Nicolas, "They Say He's Gay": The Admissibility of Evidence of Sexual Orientation, 37 Ga. L. Rev. 793 (2003),
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles/296
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 37 SPRING 2003 NUMBER 3
ARTICLES
"THEY SAY HE'S GAY": THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF EVIDENCE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION
Peter Nicolas*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, there has been a steady stream of high-profile
cases involving, either directly or indirectly, issues of sexual
orientation. Matthew Shepard, a gay student at the University of
Wyoming, was murdered by two men who unsuccessfully attempted
to invoke the "gay panic defense."1 Thousands of gay servicemem-
bers have been discharged from the military based on their sexual
orientation.2 Diane Whipple, a lesbian in San Francisco, was killed
* Assistant Professor, University of Washington School of Law. The author wishes to
thank Amanda J. Beane, Richard Kaiser, Adrienne McEntee, Nancy McMurrer, Brooke
Nelson, Cheryl Nyberg, Mary Whisner, and the editors of the Georgia Law Review for
extremely valuable research, feedback, and assistance. The author also wishes to thank
Professor Dan M. Kahan of Yale Law School for valuable insight into evidence law and policy.
See State v. McKinney, Crim. Action No. 6381 (2d Jud. Dist. Ct., Albany County, Wyo.
Oct. 30, 1999).
" See, e.g., Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (involving challenge to
Department of Defense policy by openly gay Naval midshipman).
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by a neighbor's dog,' and counsel for the defense brought up the
victim's sexual orientation at trial. 4 Tom Cruise brought a defama-
tion suit against a gay pornography actor who publicly stated that
Cruise was gay and involved in a relationship with him.5
The press is relatively free to report all the titillating details
about such cases, without regard to the logical relevance such
details have to the case or the fact that their source is reporting the
information secondhand. Yet ultimately, these news stories are all
about trials that require the introduction of evidence that must
conform to longstanding, formal rules.
Thus, when the forum is shifted from the court of public opinion
to an actual courtroom, the unfiltered details that we read or hear
about in the popular press must be sifted through the rules of
evidence to weed out those details which, in the view of the drafters
of the rules, are irrelevant, prejudicial, or of suspect reliability.
However, any attempt to present the facts of these cases in a
manner that conforms with the rules of evidence raises challenging
doctrinal questions. These questions become all the more apparent
when one considers that the modern rules of evidence were devel-
oped at a time when issues of sexual orientation were rarely
discussed publicly, let alone litigated.
For example, when, if ever, is the sexual orientation of a victim,
party, or witness "relevant" under the rules of evidence? Even if
plausibly relevant, when should such evidence be excluded as
prejudicial? Is a person's sexual orientation a form of "sexual
predisposition," and thus evidence of the same, subject to exclusion
under the rape-shield rule? Can a judge adjudicating a custody
battle take judicial notice of the "fact" that being raised by a gay
parent is detrimental to a child, or the "fact" that being raised by a
gay parent is not detrimental to a child?
Moreover, assuming that evidence of a person's sexual orienta-
tion is relevant and not deemed prejudicial, how exactly does one go
about proving that orientation? Is a lay witness qualified to give his
opinion, based on his observations of a person, as to that person's
8 See People v. Knoller, No. 181813 (Super. Ct. for City & County of S.F. Mar. 27, 2001).
' John Gallagher, Homophobia for the Defense, ADVOCATE, May 14, 2002, at 34-37.
s See Cruise v. Slater, No. BG249690 (Super. Ct. for County of L.A. May 2, 2001).
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sexual orientation? Is a declaration by a person that he is gay
hearsay? And if so, does it fall into any of the recognized exceptions
to the hearsay rule? Is a person's revelation of her sexual orienta-
tion to her physician or psychotherapist privileged? Moreover,
evidence of sexual orientation itself aside, can a person invoke either
of the spousal privileges when called as a witness against his same-
sex partner?
These questions and others relating to the intersection between
sexual orientation and the rules of evidence are given only perfunc-
tory treatment in the case law, and virtually no consideration in the
academic literature. This Article seeks to fill the existing gap. Part
II of this Article discusses the ways in which the sexual orientation
of a victim, party, or witness is relevant within the meaning of
Federal Rule of Evidence 401 and its state-law analogues,6 as well
as when such evidence, although relevant, is nonetheless excluded
due to its potential prejudicial impact.7 Part III of this Article
examines the hearsay rule and its exceptions to determine when, if
ever, a person's assertion that he is gay can be admitted into
evidence.' Part IV of this Article discusses the applicability of the
spousal privileges to same-sex couples,9 the protection afforded to
conversations that gays and lesbians have with their physicians and
psychotherapists about their sexual orientation,"0 and one's ability
to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination when asked about
his sexual orientation." Part V of this Article examines the rules
governing the qualifications of witnesses to give opinion testimony,
12
including the admissibility of expert testimony on the "gay panic
defense" 3 and the ability of lay witnesses to give their opinion as to
a person's sexual orientation. 4 Part VI of this Article discusses
6 Because most state court rules of evidence are modeled after the federal rules, this
Article focuses on the text and interpretation of the federal rules, noting where appropriate
significant variations in state practice.
7 See infra notes 18-342 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 343-441 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 458-92 and accompanying text.
'0 See infra notes 442-46 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 447-57 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 493-548 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 528-48 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 493-527 and accompanying text.
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substitutes for evidence, 5 including judicial notice of facts about
gays and lesbians" as well as legal presumptions about gays and
lesbians. 17
This Article concludes that the questions raised in many of these
cases, although novel and often with little or any precedent, can be
answered by examining the policies underlying the implicated rules
of evidence. Furthermore, judges, in ruling on the admissibility of
evidence regarding a person's sexual orientation, should exercise
caution to ensure that their rulings do not reinforce existing,
inaccurate stereotypes about gays and lesbians or create a risk that
jurors will decide cases based on an improper use of such evidence.
II. THE RELEVANCE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION
A. BACKGROUND ON RELEVANCE, PREJUDICE, CHARACTER EVIDENCE,
AND THE RAPE-SHIELD RULE
The ordinary starting point for determining the admissibility of
any item of'evidence is to assess its relevancy."8 Federal Rule of
Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence." 9 Rule 401 can be thought of as
consisting of two prongs, a materiality prong and a probative worth
prong, both of which must be satisfied for a piece of evidence to be
deemed "relevant.,
20
The materiality prong is encompassed by the language in the rule
referring to "any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
15 See infra notes 549-90 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 549-73 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 574-90 and accompanying text.
'a See, e.g., United States v. Schneider, 111 F.3d 197, 202 (1st Cir. 1997); United States
v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 519 (2d Cir. 1977).
' FED. R. EVID. 401.
" Although the text of the rule no longer contains the common law term "materiality,"
see FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's note, the phrase is nonetheless convenient in
distinguishing between the two different aspects of relevancy under the federal rules. See,
e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDERTHE RULES: TEXT,
CASES, AND PROBLEMS 62 (4thed. 2000); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185 (John W. Strong ed.,
5th ed. 1999).
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the action," which requires an analysis of the underlying substan-
tive claim or offense to determine the elements and any defenses."1
For example, in a proceeding brought by an employee injured on the
job pursuant to a state worker's compensation statute, evidence that
the employee was acting in a negligent manner when he was injured
would be immaterial, and hence irrelevant, because such statutes
ordinarily provide compensation without regard to fault. Thus, the
employee's contributory negligence is not a recognized defense, and
evidence supporting that defense is accordingly not "of conse-
quence."22 Relevance, therefore, is not an inherent characteristic of
an item of evidence, but instead a relational concept that turns on
the relationship between an item of evidence and a matter properly
proved in the case.23
In addition, the credibility of witnesses is always deemed
material.24 Furthermore, evidence that otherwise might not be
material may nonetheless be admitted in rebuttal if the other party
"opens the door" by first introducing evidence on that point. 5
The probative worth prong sets an extremely low standard,
requiring that the evidence only have "any tendency" to make the
existence of a material fact "more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence."26 As the rulemakers point out, "[a]
brick is not a wall," and "[i]t is not to be supposed that every witness
can make a home run," making a low standard appropriate.27
However, having "relevant" evidence within the meaning of Rule
401 is only a necessary threshold, and not a sufficient condition, for
admitting evidence. Although Rule 402 clearly states that irrele-
vant evidence is inadmissible,2" it does not quite say that the
opposite is true. Rather, relevant evidence is presumptively
21 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
401.04(3)(b), at 401-32 to 401-34 (2d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2002) (emphasis added); see also
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 4.2, at 174 (2d ed. 1999).
2 ERIC D. GREEN ET AL., PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 13 (3d ed.
2000).
23 FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's note.
21 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 401.04(4)(b), at 401-38 to 401-40.
2' MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.2, at 175-76.
26 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 401.04(2)(c)(i), at 401-22.1; MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.2, at 170-71.
21 FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's note.
2 FED. R. EVID. 402 ('Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.").
2003] 797
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admissible, unless "otherwise" excludable under the rules of
evidence.29
Rule 403 is chief among the rules under which relevant evidence
might "otherwise" be excluded; it provides for the exclusion of
evidence, although relevant, "if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."'
It is thus said that "[Rule] 401 giveth, but [Rule] 403 taketh away,"
in that the fairly liberal standard of Rule 401, which is satisfied by
evidence having even slight probative worth, is offset by Rule 403,
which provides for the exclusion of evidence when its probative
worth is outweighed by certain dangers and practical consider-
ations.31 In effect, Rule 403 requires the judge to conduct a cost-
benefit analysis in which she weighs the probative worth of the
evidence against any undesirable side effects of admitting the
evidence,32 although the requirement that the evidence be excluded
only where its probative force is "substantially outweighed" by other
considerations tilts the balance in favor of admissibility in most
cases."3 Moreover, in deciding whether to exclude evidence pursuant
to Rule 403, courts consider the availability of alternative forms of
proof that might be less prejudicial,34 as well as the efficacy of giving
a limiting instruction in lieu of excluding the evidence.35
Because virtually all evidence is by its nature "prejudicial" to the
party against whom it is admitted in that it negatively impacts that
party's position in the case (indeed, that is why the opposing party
usually offers the evidence), Rule 403 provides that prejudice alone
will not suffice to exclude the evidence; rather, the prejudice must
2 Id. CAll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.").
so FED. R. EVID. 403.
3' MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 20, at 82-83.
2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 403.02(1)(a), at 403-06.
83 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.9, at 190 (emphasis added).
' Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 184 (1997); see also FED. R. EVID. 403
advisory committee's note.
'5 FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
[Vol. 37:793798
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be "unfair." 6 Thus, "[u]nfair prejudice under Rule 403 does not
mean the damage to a defendant's case that results from the
legitimate probative force of the evidence." 7  Rather, "unfair
prejudice" is defined as "an undue tendency to suggest decision on
an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional
one."3 Under this provision, evidence can be excluded where it is
inflammatory or sensational, unfairly puts the party in a negative
light, or appeals to the jury's prejudices. 9 In the context of a
criminal case involving evidence offered against the defendant, the
concept "speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence
to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from
proof specific to the offense charged."4 °
Because the focus of Rule 403 is on the effect that admitting the
evidence will have on the jury's decisionmaking process, it does not
concern itself with potential harm to nonparties, such as witnesses,
who may be placed in a bad light in the eyes of the jury or the
community.4 ' Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a)(3) does, however,
address potential harm to witnesses, providing that "[t]he court
shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to... protect
witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment."42
Rule 403 is written in general terms, and trial court judges are
given broad leeway in applying its balancing test; it is subject to
review only for abuse of discretion and is rarely reversed on
appeal. 4' However, certain types of evidence are offered with
sufficient regularity that the drafters of the Federal Rules of
Evidence enacted a series of rules, specifically Rules 404 through
"a WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 403.04(1)(a), at 403-33; MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.10, at 194.
37 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 404.21(3)(b), at 404-68 (emphasis added).
FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note (emphasis added).
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.10, at 195.
40 Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997).
4 See FED. R. EVID. 412(b) advisory committee's note (noting that Rule 412 differs from
Rule 403 in that it "puts 'harm to the victim' on the scale in addition to prejudice to the
parties").
" FED. R. EVID. 611(a)(3); accord United States v. Colyer, 571 F.2d 941, 946 n.7 (5th Cir.
1978); State v. McDonough, 507 A.2d 573, 575 & n.1 (Me. 1986).
'a MUELLER &KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.9, at 193-94; WEINSTEIN &BEROER, supra
note 21, § 403.02(2)(d), at 403-21 to 403-24.
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412, which constrain the discretion of judges by categorically
excluding certain types of evidence when offered for particular
purposes.
One such categorical rule of exclusion deals with the admission
of "character" evidence. Rule 404(a) generally provides that
"[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not
admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity there-
with. '' 45 The term "character" refers to "a person's disposition or
propensity to engage or not engage in various forms of conduct,"
such as a propensity to be truthful, dishonest, reckless, careful,
peaceable, or violent.46
The theory behind Rule 404 is that, although a person's propensi-
ties are a useful measure of likely behavior patterns over a period
of time, they are less accurate when used to decide what actually
happened on a particular occasion because people don't always act
in accordance with their propensities.' Thus, such evidence "is not
rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said
to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to
prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair
opportunity to defend against a particular charge."48
44 See FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's note ("[S]ome situations recur with
sufficient frequency to create patterns susceptible of treatment by specific rules. Rule 404
and those following it are of that variety; they also serve as illustrations of the application of
the present rule as limited by the exclusionary principles of Rule 403.").
45 FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.11, at 201-02. Character differs from
reputation in that character is what a person is, whereas reputation refers to what other
people think a person is. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 404.02(1), at 404-08.
However, evidence of a person's reputation is one way of attempting to prove his character.
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, at 246 n.3.
41 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.11, at 203.
" Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948); FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory
committee's note:
Character evidence ... tends to distract the trier of fact from the main
question of what actually happened on the particular occasion. It subtly
permits the trier of fact to reward the good man and to punish the bad
man because of their respective characters despite what the evidence in
the case shows actually happened.
Id.; see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.11, at 203-04:
Freely admitting evidence of past conduct would also divert the jury's
attention from the issue of what he did on the occasion in dispute to what
he did at other times in the past. A defendant would be forced not only to
answer the allegations in the indictment or complaint but to defend his
800
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Notwithstanding the general bar on the admission of "character"
evidence set forth in Rule 404(a),4" there are several ways of
circumventing the rule. The first is through a series of explicit
exceptions set forth in the Federal Rules, which essentially provide
that character evidence may in certain circumstances be offered to
show action in conformity therewith.
The first explicit exception is set forth in Rule 404(a)(1), which
provides that in criminal cases,50 the accused may offer evidence of
a "pertinent" trait of his own character-meaning one that is
somehow relevant 5 1-to support an inference that it was unlikely
that he committed the offense.52 This includes, for example,
evidence of a criminal defendant's peaceable disposition when
charged with having committed a violent crime.53 Once the
defendant offers evidence of a pertinent trait, however, he opens
himself to rebuttal evidence by the prosecution on that same trait
of character.54
Normally, the prosecution is barred from offering evidence of the
defendant's character to show action in conformity therewith under
Rule 404(a)(1), unless the defendant has first raised the issue of his
character.5 However, the Federal Rules provide two exceptions to
this general rule. First, Rules 413, 414, and 415 implicitly amend
Rule 404(a)(1) in civil and criminal cases involving sexual assault or
child molestation; they allow for the admission of evidence of the
defendant's prior acts of sexual assault or child molestation for the
purpose of allowing the jury to draw a propensity inference from
prior conduct to the present case, even though the defendant has not
raised the issue of his own character in this regard.' Second, if the
entire personal history.
Id.
'9 FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
' Although not explicitly set forth in the text of the rule, the fact that Rule 404(a)(1) and
Rule 404(a)(2) make reference to the "accused" and the "victim" are thought to limit these
exceptions to criminal cases. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 404.11(1), at 404-17 to
404-19.
W' EINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 404.11(2)(a), at 404-21.
52 FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
3 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.12, at 205.
" FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
' MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.12, at 206.
' Id. § 4.35, at 311. These rules should not allow for the admission of any evidence
20031 801
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defendant introduces evidence of a character trait of the victim
pursuant to Rule 404(a)(2), as discussed below,57 he opens himself
to the introduction by the prosecution of evidence of the same trait
of his own character. 58
.The second explicit exception is set forth in Rule 404(a)(2), which
provides that, in criminal cases, the defendant may offer evidence
of a pertinent trait of character of the victim to show action in
conformity therewith.59 For example, in a homicide or assault case,
evidence of the victim's character trait of violence or aggression may
be introduced to support the defendant's claim that he acted in self-
defense. Such evidence is thought to make it more likely that the
victim was using unlawful force at the time of the incident, thus
justifying the defendant's act in self-defense.6' If the defendant
introduces such evidence, he opens himself to rebuttal evidence by
the prosecution on that same character trait of the victim, and as
discussed above,"' on the same trait of his own character. 2
Moreover, although the prosecution normally cannot introduce
evidence of a pertinent trait of the victim's character until the
defense has first introduced such evidence,63 the prosecution in a
homicide case is allowed to introduce such evidence if the defendant
presents any evidence that the victim was the first aggressor.64
Standing alone, Rule 404(a)(2) could be construed in cases
involving date rape as allowing evidence of the victim's character for
consenting to sex with other people into evidence to support a
propensity inference that the victim likely consented on the occasion
in question. 65  However, Rule 412 effectively modifies Rule
related to the defendant's prior instances of consensual homosexual activity, even if he was
convicted under sodomy laws that cover consensual activity, because the definition of an
"offense of sexual assault!' refers to instances of sexual contact without consent. FED. R. EVID.
413(d) (emphasis added).
' See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
59 FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
6o WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 404.11(3)(a), at 404-29.
a' See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
62 FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
63 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.13, at 212.
4 FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).65MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.32, at 295.
[Vol. 37:793802
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404(a)(2),6 providing that, with certain exceptions, evidence offered
to prove "that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior"
or to prove "any alleged victim's sexual predisposition" is not
admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding "involving alleged
sexual misconduct."67 The policy behind the rule is that such
evidence has fairly low probative value on the issue of consent, but
can be used to harass and embarrass victims, making them less
likely to report rapes or pursue prosecutions.68 Rule 412 applies
without regard to whether the alleged victim is a party to the
litigation. 9 It does not, however, apply to cases not "involving
alleged sexual misconduct."70
The phrase "sexual behavior" refers to all activities that involve
actual physical conduct, such as sexual intercourse or contact; those
activities that imply sexual intercourse or sexual contact, such as
evidence of use of contraceptives, birth of an illegitimate child, or a
venereal disease; and even activities of the mind, such as fantasies
or dreams71 and viewing pornography.72 The phrase "sexual
predisposition" refers to any evidence that "may have a sexual
connotation for the factfinder," such as evidence relating to the
"victim's mode of dress, speech, or life-style."73
However, in criminal cases, there are the following three
exceptions to the general rule set forth in Rule 412 under which this
evidence is admissible: evidence of specific instances of sexual
behavior by the victim offered to prove that a person other than the
accused was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence;
evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior7 4 by the alleged
victim with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct
offered by the accused to prove consent or by the prosecution; and
Id.
e FED. R. EVID. 412(a).
' MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.32, at 295-96.
61 FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
I ld.
" FED. R. EVID. 412(a) advisory committee's note.
72 Wolak v. Spucci, 217 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2000).
7' FED. R. EVID. 412(a) advisory committee's note.
7' This exception includes not only specific sexual activities, but also statements in which
the victim expressed an intent to engage in sexual intercourse with the accused, or voiced
sexual fantasies involving the accused. FED. R. EVID. 412(b) advisory committee's note.
20031 803
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evidence the exclusion of which would violate the defendant's
constitutional rights.7 5 And in civil cases, evidence of any victim's
sexual behavior or sexual predisposition is admissible if its proba-
tive value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim
and of unfair prejudice to any party, with evidence of the victim's
reputation admissible only if the victim has first placed that
reputation in controversy. 6
A second way of circumventing Rule 404 is to offer evidence of a
person's character trait not to show that a person acted in confor-
mity with that character trait on a particular occasion, but instead
because such evidence goes to an element of a crime, claim, or
defense.7 This might occur in a wrongful death case in which the
issue of damages is an element of the claim and the victim's
character may be relevant to the issue of damages. For example,
the victim may have had a character for excessive drinking that
shortened his life expectancy or reduced his likelihood of being
gainfully employed and thus affected his expected future earnings. 8
Another example is a defamation action in which truth is raised as
a defense, such as where the defamation action is premised on a
statement that the plaintiff is a thief, and evidence is offered to
show that the statement is true. 9
A third way of circumventing Rule 404 is via Rule 404(b), which
acknowledges that "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts8" is
75 FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1).
76 FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2).
77 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.20, at 245-49; WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 21, § 404.10(2), at 404-12 to 404-13; see also FED. R. EVID. 404(a) advisory
committee's note ("Character may itself be an element of a crime, claim, or defense .... No
problem of the general relevancy of character evidence is involved, and the present rule
therefore has no provision on the subject.").
Is MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 20, at 478-79; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note
21, § 404.10(2), at 404-14 to 404-15.
9 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 20, at 478.
o Such "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" need not be criminal nor unlawful, and the acts
may have occurred either before or after the conduct at issue in the case. MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.15, at 216; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, §
404.20(2)(a), at 404-36 to 404-37. Moreover, the other act need not have resulted in a
conviction or a formal charge, and indeed can be admitted even if the defendant was brought
up on charges and acquitted, or pleaded nolo contendere. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra
note 21, § 4.15, at 217-18; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 404.21(2)(b), at 404-53 to
404-54. Before admitting such evidence, the court must make a finding, pursuant to Rule
104(b), that a reasonable jury could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the
804 [Vol. 37:793
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not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith," but that such evidence may be
admissible in other instances where it is not being used to support
a character inference, including as "proof of motive, opportunity,
81intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 2 identity,83 or absence of
mistake or accident. ' s4  To be admitted under this proviso, the
evidence must be relevant to an issue other than character or the
defendant's propensity to commit the charged offense, and it also
must satisfy the balancing test of Rule 403.85
In addition to making use of Rule 404(a)(2) to show the victim's
propensity for violent behavior, as discussed above, 8 there are two
ways under Rule 404(b) in which such evidence may be admitted.
First, evidence of prior threats or hostile behavior by the victim may
be introduced under Rule 404(b) to prove the victim's intent or plan
defendant committed the other crime, wrong, or act. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S.
681, 689-91 (1988); see also FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
Evidence of prior incidents often is admitted under Rule 404(b) to prove intent, the idea
being that after being involved in a number of similar incidents, the defendant must have a
mental state that is inconsistent with innocence, accident, or inadvertence. WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 21, § 405.22(1)(a), at 404-70 to 404-75. However, such evidence is not
admissible if the defendant's intent is not a genuine issue in the case, as where the defendant
stipulates that the perpetrator acted with the requisite mental state but denies that he was
the perpetrator, MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.17, at 229-30, or presumably,
where the crime charged requires no showing of any particular mental state, as in strict
liability crimes such as statutory rape. See Louisiana v. Frentz, 354 So. 2d 1007, 1009 (La.
1978); Wisconsin v. Rushing, 541 N.W.2d 155, 161 (Wis. 1995); cf. Missouri v. Ermatinger, 752
S.W.2d 344, 345-49 (Mo. 1988) (finding evidence of victim's consent irrelevant because consent
is not issue when alleged victim is minor).
Evidence of prior incidents is admitted under Rule 404(b) to prove knowledge, where
the defendant claims that he was unaware that a criminal act was being perpetrated. The
idea is that the likelihood of repeated instances of behavior, even if originally innocent, will
have resulted in the defendant's having the requisite state of knowledge by the time of the
crime. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 404.22(2), at 404-93 to 404-97.
' Evidence of other crimes may be admitted to show the defendant's identity as the
perpetrator of the crime. Id. at 404-108.1 to 404-108.5; see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 21, § 4.17, at 227. Often, this is accomplished by establishing a distinctive modus
operandi, sometimes referred to as a "signature," that the defendant has employed in prior
crimes, and showing that the present crime displays a similar "signature." MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.17, at 232-33; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, §
404.22(5)(c), at 404-121 to 404-123.
U FED. R. EVID. 404(b). This list is meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive. MUELLER
& KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.15, at 214; id. § 4.18, at 233-37; WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 21, § 405.20(1), at 404-34.
8 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 405.21(1)(a), at 404-46.5.
" See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
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to harm the defendant, which could support a claim of self-defense.87
Second, the defendant can offer evidence of the victim's prior
instances of violent behavior, coupled with evidence that the
defendant had knowledge of such prior instances, to support a self-
defense claim and an assertion that the defendant acted reasonably
based on his knowledge of how the victim behaved in the past.8
A fourth way of circumventing Rule 404(a) is to persuade the
court that the evidence is not that of character, but instead that of
habit. Unlike character evidence, which normally cannot be
admitted to prove action in conformity therewith, Rule 406 provides
for the admission of evidence of a person's habit to prove action in
conformity with that habit.8 9 Habit evidence differs from character
evidence in that the former is a regular, semiautomatic or unreflec-
tive response to a repeated specific situation.' An example of
"habit" includes going down a particular stairway two stairs at a
time. 9'
Assuming that evidence of a person's character or trait of
character is admissible for one of the reasons set forth above, Rule
405 regulates the manner in which evidence of the person's
character or trait of character may be proven. As a general rule,
Rule 405(a) allows for proving character only by way of reputation
or opinion testimony as to a person's character, not by way of
reference to specific instances of conduct.2
For a witness to give reputation testimony, a foundation must be
laid that the witness is familiar with that person's reputation in the
relevant community, which may include his residence or where he
works or some other organizational setting, and that knowledge
'7 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.18, at 236.
' Id. at 236-37. In these latter two instances, the defendant is not limited to reputation
or opinion testimony, but also may introduce evidence of specific instances of conduct. See
infra notes 95-105 and accompanying text (describing situations in which evidence of specific
instances of conduct are admissible because specific character trait is element of charge,
claim, or defense).
'9 FED. R. EVID. 406 ("Evidence of the habit of a person... is relevant to prove that the
conduct of the person . . .on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit.");
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 406.02(1), at 406-5.
90 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.21, at 249-51; WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 21, § 406.02(2), at 406-5 to 406-7.
91 FED. R. EVID. 406 advisory committee's note.
2 FED. R. EVID. 405(a).
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must be drawn during a period reasonably close to the time of the
conduct at issue and before the charge against him became publi-
cized.9" For a witness to instead testify as to his opinion of the
person's particular character trait, there first must be a showing
that he has an adequate familiarity with the person to form such an
opinion.9
4
In two instances, Rule 405 explicitly allows for reference to
specific instances of conduct. First, after a witness has given
reputation or opinion testimony, "[o]n cross-examination, inquiry is
allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct."'95 "The theory
is that, since the reputation witness relates what he has heard, the
inquiry tends to shed light on the accuracy of his hearing and
reporting,"9 6 and is thus designed to test the witness's knowledge
and standards for good reputation." If the witness says he is
familiar with the prior specific, bad act that he is asked about, then
that casts doubt on the witness's judgment; if instead he says he is
not familiar with the prior specific act, then that suggests that his
opinion or knowledge of the person's reputation is not fully in-
formed. 8
The second instance in which evidence of specific instances of
conduct is permitted is "[iln cases in which character or a trait of
character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or
defense."99 Thus, in a defamation action in which truth is asserted
" MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.19, at 238-39; WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 21, § 405.03(1)(a)-(b), at 405-6 to 405-9. Although such evidence is technically
hearsay--since it represents a distilled version of statements by persons in the community
about an individual offered to prove the truth of those statements-it falls within an
exception for "[rleputation of a person's character among associates or in the community."
FED. R. EVID. 803(21); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.19, at 239-40; WEINSTEIN
& BERGER, supra note 21, § 405.03(1)(c), at 405-9.
9 FED. R. EVID. 405(a); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.19, at 240.
' FED. R. EVID. 405(a).
9 FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee's note.
9 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 405.03(2)(a), at 405-11.
96 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.19, at 242. In order to ensure that the
questioner on cross-examination is not simply trying to throw a skunk into the jury box by
asking about specific instances of prior conduct, the case law requires that the questioner
have a good-faith basis for posing the question, and that the question is not simply based on
rumor of such a prior instance of conduct. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 481
(1948).
" FED. R. EVID. 405(b).
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as a defense, the plaintiff's character may be an element of the
defense, as the defendant is entitled to prove the truth of an
allegedly defamatory statement. In so doing, the defendant may
offer evidence of specific instances of conduct bearing on the
plaintiff's character trait at issue in the allegedly defamatory
statement. 100 Similarly, in wrongful death cases, the character of
the decedent often is viewed as an element of damages; thus specific
evidence of his work habits, drunkenness, adultery, and other such
forms of behavior is often received on the issue of likely future
earnings as well as the emotional loss to survivors.'0 ' Finally, in
child custody cases, the fitness or character of each parent for good
parenting is a central issue, thus making evidence of specific
instances of conduct admissible.1 0 2
A third instance in which evidence of specific instances of conduct
is permitted-one not explicitly set forth in Rule 405-is where the
evidence is being admitted pursuant to Rule 404(b), which expressly
allows for evidence of specific instances of conduct.' Similarly,
where evidence of prior acts of sexual assault or child molestation
are offered pursuant to Rules 413 through 415,104 the use of evidence
of specific prior instances of conduct is expressly permitted by those
rules. 05
One noteworthy exception to the general rule set forth in Rule
405 is where evidence normally admissible under Rule 404(a)(2) is
excluded by Rule 412, but then allowed under one of the exceptions
to Rule 412. In the exceptions set forth for criminal cases, the
evidence must be of specific instances of conduct, and cannot be in
the form of reputation or opinion testimony unless excluding such
evidence would violate the defendant's constitutional rights.' 6
'0o MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.20, at 248.
-01 Id. at 248-49.
102 Id. at 249.
'0' FED. R. EVID. 404(b); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.19, at 238. Indeed,
it appears that Rule 404(b) evidence must be proven through prior specific instances of
conduct, and it cannot be proven through reputation or opinion testimony. See id. § 4.35, at
314.
'04 FED. R. EVID. 413-415.
"6 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.35, at 314. It appears that under Rules
413.415, evidence must be proven through prior specific instances of conduct, and cannot be
proven through reputation or opinion testimony. See id.
'0 FED. R. EVID. 412(b) advisory committee's note.
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Moreover, evidence of the victim's reputation in civil cases is
admissible only if the victim has first placed that reputation into
controversy.
10 7
B. RELEVANCE TO SUPPORT A DEFENSE IN HOMICIDE CASES
One of the more common fact patterns involving a proffer of
evidence of a person's sexual orientation is in homicide cases in
which the defendant seeks to impute responsibility for his conduct
to the victim's alleged homosexuality. The typical fact pattern
involves the victim making either an aggressive or a nonaggressive
homosexual advance, and the defendant responding by killing the
victim. Although frequently referred to loosely as the "gay panic
defense," there are actually three variants of the defense based on
insanity,0 8 provocation, 9 and self-defense,110 each with different
elements.
In its purest and original form, the phrase "gay panic defense" or
"homosexual panic defense" is slang for a psychiatric disorder
known as Homosexual Panic Disorder."' The clinical psychiatrist
Edward J. Kempf identified the behavior in a study of World War I
'07 FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2).
"o See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255-56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (holding
that evidence that defendant met victim thirty minutes before defendant murdered victim,
and believed during this meeting that victim was trying to engage in homosexual act, is
admissible); People v. Parisie, 287 N.E.2d 310, 313-14 (I1. App. Ct. 1972) (holding that jury's
finding that defendant, who raised defense of insanity based on "homosexual panic," was sane
was not against manifest weight of evidence); Commonwealth v. Shelley, 373 N.E.2d 951, 953
(Mass. 1978) (holding that evidence was correctly submitted to jury where defendant and
Commonwealth agreed that defendant suffered dissociative reaction during killing, but where
Commonwealth argued reaction was result of drunkenness and defendant argued it was
result of homosexual panic).
" See, e.g., People v. Page, 737 N.E.2d 264, 275 (Ill. 2000) (holding that evidence that
victim made sexual advance toward defendant on night of murder would not have entitled
defendant to voluntary manslaughter instruction).
HO See, e.g., Williamsonv. State, 692 P.2d 965, 967-68,971 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (holding
that testimony of defense witness that he had homosexual encounter with victim was
admissible as probative of defendant's self-defense testimony portraying defendant as
innocent victim of attempted assault).
... Christina Pei-Lin Chen, Note, Provocation's Privileged Desire: The Provocation
Doctrine, "Homosexual Panic," and the Non-Violent Unwanted Sexual Advance Defense, 10
CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POLY 195,201-02 (2000); Kara S. Suffredini, Note, Pride and Prejudice:
The Homosexual Panic Defense, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 279, 288 (2001).
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soldiers who were committed to a psychiatric institution, terming
the behavior "acute homosexual panic" and defining the disorder as
"a panic due to the pressure of uncontrollable sexually perverse
cravings."" 2
According to Kempf, there are two character traits required for
a diagnosis of Homosexual Panic Disorder: the individual must
have a pronounced fear of his own homosexuality, and this terror
must coexist with the individual's fear of heterosexuality.' In his
work, Kempf concluded that these traits became most pronounced
and uncontrollable in same-sex environments." 4 At the same time,
Kempf found that the impulses were not triggered by the sexual
advances of another person; rather, his patients reported difficulty
controlling their own heightened sense of homosexual drives in this
environment."1 5
However, once the panic state is triggered, the manifested
symptoms do not suggest that the person afflicted with the panic
will engage in crimes like murder or assault; indeed, none of
Kempf's patients reported an ability to engage in violence."6
Instead, the individual turns inward with feelings of self-loathing;
experiences "periods of introspective brooding, self-punishment,
suicidal assaults, withdrawal, and helplessness"; and according to
one study, is unable to function "at all.""' Thus, Homosexual Panic
Disorder is marked by an individual's desire to punish and blame
himself for his psychic inability to resolve the conflict between his
sexual drives and fears."' Moreover, the disorder was characterized
112 Suffredini, supra note 111, at 288 (citing EDWARD J. KEMPF, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 477
(1920)).
I1 d.
"' Id. Kempf attributed the disorder to the fact that his patients had been grouped
together in a same-sex environment for a prolonged period during World War I. Id.
116 Id. Other literature notes similar conditions that precipitate the disorder. According
to Robert Campbell's Psychiatric Dictionary, the panic state is triggered by "separation from
a member of the same sex to whom the individual has become emotionally attached." Id.
(quoting ROBERT J. CAMPBELL, PSYCHIATRIC DICTIONARY 328 (6th ed. 1989)).
"e Id. at 289 (citing Gary David Comstock, Dismantling the Homosexual Panic Defense,
2 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 81, 84 (1992)).
117 Id.
"a Id.
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in the literature not as a temporary episode, but instead as an "on-
going illness."1 9
Yet there are several ways in which Homosexual Panic Disorder,
as used in the legal system today, differs from its roots in Kempf' s
research. First, as described in Kempf' s work, a sexual advance by
the victim should render a person with Homosexual Panic Disorder
helpless to act, not aggressive and violent as the cases suggest.
Second, while one of the elements of Homosexual Panic Disorder is
that the defendant himself is a latent homosexual, in many cases in
which the defense is raised, the defendant never asserts that he is
a latent homosexual.12 Third, another element of Homosexual
Panic Disorder is that the defendant has an aversion to heterosexu-
ality, yet in most cases the defendants are involved in heterosexual
relationships or try to establish their identification with heterosexu-
ality by describing their aversion to homosexuality.12' Fourth, while
Homosexual Panic Disorder is supposed to be long-term in nature,
when raised as a defense, most defendants refer to it as a temporary
violent episode.' 22
Most cases invoking Homosexual Panic Disorder as a defense are
really insanity defenses based on Acute Aggression Panic Disorder,
a different disorder in which the person suffers from a predominat-
ing aggressive drive. 2 ' Yet this distinction is largely academic, as
the psychiatric literature and the legal system have accepted the
conflation of Homosexual Panic Disorder with the symptoms of
Acute Aggressive Panic Disorder. 124
Over time, the defense of "homosexual panic" has been trans-
formed from just an insanity defense into a second variant of the
defense, a provocation or diminished capacity defense. 125 Such a
defense differs from an insanity defense in that an insanity defense,
119 Id.
20 See Suffredini, supra note 111, at 292-94 (citing Commonwealth v. Shelley, 373 N.E.2d
951 (Mass. 1978)); see also People v. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 253, 253-57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967);
State v. Thornton, 532 S.W.2d 37, 39-44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
12 Suffedini, supra note 111, at 297.
' Id. at 298.
' Burton S. Glick, Homosexual Panic: Clinical and Theoretical Considerations, 129 J.
NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 20, 28 (1959); Suffredini, supra note 111, at 289-91.
.2 Suffredini, supra note 111, at 291-92.
125 Chen, supra note 111, at 201.
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if successful, means a finding that the defendant is not guilty of the
offense because he was not responsible for his criminal conduct due
to a mental disease or defect," 6 while a defense of provocation or
diminished capacity calls for reducing but not eliminating the
defendant's culpability. This defense usually produces a sentence
reduction from murder to manslaughter, if the defendant shows that
he acted in a state of "extreme mental or emotional disturbance for
which there is [a] reasonable explanation or excuse."' 27
The provocation or diminished capacity defense, although often
referred to as the homosexual panic defense, is technically the
nonviolent homosexual advance defense (NHA). 2 The latter differs
from the former in that, under the former, "the external stimulus
merely precipitated the homosexual panic that triggered the acute
psychotic reaction and temporary insanity that caused the latent
homosexual to kill."'29 In other words, "the mental disorder of
homosexual panic caused the killing" under the former, while under
the latter, "the homosexual advance itself provokes the understand-
able loss of normal self-control that incites uncontrollable homicidal
rage in any reasonable person, regardless of homosexual tenden-
cies.""3° The stated logic behind this second variant of the defense
is that:
mhe law views the provocative act of the homosexual
advance to be sufficient to engender reason-erasing
anger in ordinary law-abiding citizens . . . anger
prompted by a nonviolent homosexual advance is a
"human weakness" deserving of the understanding and
mercy of the jury. The killer who is provoked by such an
US MODELPENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (2001).
'" Id. § 210.3(1)(b).
'2 Chen, supra note 111, at 202-03.
'29 Id. at 203.
Id.; see also People v. Page, 737 N.E.2d 264, 275 (111. 2000):
While [the gay panic] cases likewise involve fact scenarios where the
victims made homosexual advances toward the defendants, the defen-
dants' theories of voluntary manslaughter were based on the unreason-
able belief in the need for self-defense, not on serious provocation, which
is the theory advanced by defendant in this case.
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act is thus thought to be less blameworthy than the
calm, cool, and calculated killer. 131
In these first two variants of the defense, the alleged homosexual
advance that prompted the killing is a nonviolent advance, and it is
either a psychiatric disorder of the defendant or his "reasonable"
response due to ordinary "human weakness" that prompts him to
kill. Yet a third variant of the defense is true self-defense, such as
when the defendant claims that he killed the victim when the latter
tried forcibly to rape him. A person is justified in using force upon
another person if he believes that the force is immediately necessary
to protect himself against the exercise of unlawful force by the
other.132 Deadly force, however, is unjustifiable unless a person
believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against
serious bodily injury, death, or forcible rape.1 33
When any of these three variants of the gay panic defense are
invoked, the defendant typically seeks to offer evidence of the
victim's homosexuality. The evidence proffered takes the form of
evidence that the victim owned gay pornography," 4 testimony as to
the victim's reputation as a homosexual, 3 5 testimony as to specific
prior instances of consensual homosexual conduct on the victim's
part, 3 evidence that the victim visited gay-oriented websites on his
'8' Scott D. McCoy, Note, The Homosexual-Advance Defense and Hate Crimes Statutes:
Their Interaction and Conflict, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 629, 642-43 (2001).
'32 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (2001).
'33 Id. §§ 3.04(2)(b), 3.11(2).
'" See, e.g., Page v. State, 657 P.2d 850, 852 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (addressing
admissibility of titles of pornographic books and magazines owned by victim); State v. Lovin,
454 S.E.2d 229, 236 (N.C. 1995) (addressing admissibility of two pornographic video tapes).
' See, e.g., People v. Limas, 359 N.E.2d 1194, 1198-99 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (addressing
appropriateness of attorney's questions concerning witnesses' knowledge of victim's sexual
activities); People v. Parisie, 287 N.E.2d 310, 324-25 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (addressing
admissibility of evidence that victim had reputation as overt homosexual); State v. Laws, 481
S.E.2d 641,642-43,646 (N.C. 1997) (addressing admissibility of evidence ofvictim's"'general
reputation ... in terms of his sexual reputation' "); State v. Carter, No. 82 CA 22, 1983 WL
4862, at *5-6 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 18, 1983) (addressing improper introduction of reputation
testimony); State v. Farmer, No. 03CO1-9206-CR-00196, 1993 WL 247907, at '1 (Tenn. Crim.
App. July 8, 1993) (addressing victim's reputation of engaging in activities with young men);
State v. Bell, 805 P.2d 815, 816 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (addressing admissibility of testimony
of nine witnesses concerning victim's reputation).
" See, e.g., State v. Flowers, 574 So. 2d 448, 451-52 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (addressing
admissibility of evidence that victim offered young men rides and made aggressive sexual
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computer, 13 7 or evidence of other prior homosexual advances by the
victim toward other persons.
3 1
Such evidence is often excluded by courts for a variety of reasons.
First, many courts characterize evidence of a person's homosexuality
as a form of character evidence, 39 invoking Rule 405 to reject
evidence of specific prior instances of homosexual conduct because
a person's homosexuality can only be proven through reputation or
opinion testimony. 40 Second, even where reputation evidence of the
victim's homosexuality is offered, courts reject such evidence on the
ground that the witness failed to lay a proper foundation to qualify
to testify as to the victim's reputation. ' 4
Such evidence is also often rejected for being "irrelevant" under
either the materiality or probative worth prong of relevance. Under
the materiality prong, such evidence is rejected when offered to
support a claim of diminished capacity or provocation on the ground
that no such defense exists as a matter of law. 142 For example, in
the highly publicized Matthew Shepard trial, the court refused to let
the defendants offer evidence of "homosexual rage syndrome" by
finding that Wyoming law did not recognize either the diminished
advances); Purtell v. State, 761 S.W.2d 360, 368-69 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (addressing
admissibility of testimony that victim had anonymous homosexual encounter in public
restroom); Bell, 805 P.2d at 816 (addressing admissibility of testimony that victim grabbed
witness).
"8 See, e.g., Washington v. Munguia, 26 P.3d 1017, 1020 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001)
(addressing admissibility of evidence that victim had visited gay-oriented Internet sites on
his computer).
'm See, e.g., United States v. Whalen, 940 F.2d 1027, 1034 (7th Cir. 1991) (addressing
admissibility of victim's specific prior homosexual acts).
' The few courts that have considered the issue have refused to allow parties to
circumvent the restrictions on character evidence by recharacterizing evidence of homosexu-
ality or homosexual advances as habit rather than character evidence. See Flowers, 574 So.
2d at 452 (holding that testimony as to three similar, but not identical, acts did not rise to
level of habit); cf. State v. Gaines, 926 P.2d 641, 650-51 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that
testimony from defendant's ex-wife that defendant sucked her big toe during intercourse on
five occasions during the year they were married could not be admitted as habit evidence to
support inference that defendant committed rape in which he was alleged to suck on victim's
big toe).
"4 United States v. Bautista, 145 F.3d 1140, 1152 (10th Cir. 1998); Flowers, 574 So. 2d
at 451-52; Purtell, 761 S.W.2d at 368-70.
.. People v. Erickson, 883 P.2d 511, 513-14 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); People v. Parisie, 287
N.E.2d 310, 324-25 (111. App. Ct. 1972); State v. Carter, No. 82 CA 22, 1983 WL 4862, at *5-6
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 18, 1983).
'42 State v. Dietrich, 567 So. 2d 623, 632-33 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
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capacity or temporary insanity variants of the gay panic defense.'43
Similarly, such evidence is irrelevant when the court finds the
defense of self-defense to be unavailable to the defendant because
the facts he has alleged would not justify a reasonable person
resorting to deadly force, as where the victim merely made a
nonaggressive sexual advance.'44
Under the probative worth prong, several courts have drawn a
distinction in self-defense cases between evidence of the victim's
character for making violent sexual advances and mere evidence of
the victim's homosexuality; the victim's homosexuality has no
probative worth regarding the victim's propensity to engage in
violent, homosexual attacks on others, and no probative worth in
showing the defendant's claim that it is more probable that the
victim attempted to sexually assault the defendant. '45 Where such
evidence is admitted, it usually involves evidence of the victim's
reputation for making aggressive and violent homosexual
advances. 46
Arguably, a distinction can be drawn between the self-defense
variation of the defense and the provocation and insanity variations.
In the latter two, it is the victim's homosexuality and his propensity
to make nonaggressive, nonviolent sexual advances that sets off the
defendant, thus presumably making evidence of the victim's
' See State v. McKinney, Crim. Action No. 6381 (2d Jud. Dist. Ct., Albany County, Wyo.
Oct. 30, 1999) (order concerning "rage" defense) C"he defense is, in effect, either a temporary
insanity defense or a diminished capacity defense, such as irresistible impulse, which are not
allowed in Wyoming, because they do not fit within the statutory insanity defense con-
struct.").
'" See State v. Bell, 805 P.2d 815, 817 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
" See, e.g., United States v. Bautista, 145 F.3d 1140, 1152 (10th Cir. 1998); Page v. State,
657 P.2d 850, 853 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); People v. Limas, 359 N.E.2d 1194, 1199 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1977); Broome v. State, 687 N.E.2d 590, 600-01 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Pletka, 310
N.W.2d 525, 528 (Iowa 1981); State v. Flowers, 574 So. 2d 448, 451-52 (La. Ct. App. 1991);
State v. Laws, 481 S.E.2d 641, 647 (N.C. 1997); State v. Lovin, 454 S.E.2d 229, 236 (N.C.
1995); State v. Mungia, 26 P.3d 1017, 1021 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001); see also United States v.
Woodyard, 16 M.J. 715, 720 (A.F.C.M.R. 1983) (noting defendant's argument that admitting
gay-oriented magazines to support inference that defendant engaged in forcible acts of
sodomy is akin to admitting defendant's possession of Playboy to support inference of
opposite-sex rape, or possession of Car & Driver to support inference of auto theft).
' See, e.g., Williamson v. State, 692 P.2d 965,972 (Alaska 1984); People v. Rowland, 262
Cal. App. 2d 790, 796-97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
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homosexuality relevant. In the former, by contrast, only evidence
of aggressive, violent sexual advances would be relevant.
Finally, courts often note that such evidence, if admitted, would
be unfairly prejudicial, and thus hold that the evidence would be
excludable under Rule 403.141 In any event, when evidence of the
victim's homosexuality is admitted to support any of the variants of
the gay panic defense, the prosecution is permitted to respond with
evidence of the victim's heterosexuality, as Rule 404(a)(2) allows for
such rebuttal evidence. 148
Thus far, the discussion has focused on when the victim's sexual
orientation may be relevant. But when the defendant raises the
insanity or provocation variations of the defense, evidence of the
defendant's own history of engaging in consensual homosexual
activity also becomes relevant, as this evidence might "tend to refute
the claimed 'sense of outrage' " that goes along with such a
defense. 14' However, where the defense is one of self-defense rather
than provocation or insanity, evidence of the defendant's homosexu-
ality becomes irrelevant, 150 as the claim under self-defense is not a
sense of outrage or anger about homosexuality itself, but rather an
effort to defend oneself from a violent rape, thus paralleling the like
distinction between admitting evidence of the victim's homosexual-
ity in provocation and insanity cases but not in self-defense cases.
Deviating from the standard practice of defendants bringing up
the victim's homosexuality in homicide cases to support their
various defenses, in one case, the prosecution successfully brought
in evidence of the defendant's homosexuality to support its case
under the theory of "homosexual overkill." 1 ' In State v. Dressler,'52
147 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Deagle, 412 N.E.2d 911, 914 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980); State
v. Lovin, 454 S.E.2d 229, 236 (N.C. 1995).
" See, e.g., State v. Greene, 967 P.2d 106, 111 (Ariz. 1998) (citing State v. Rivera, 733
P.2d 1090, 1101 (Ariz. 1987)); State v. Rivera, 733 P.2d 1090, 1100-01 (Ariz. 1987) (allowing
state to introduce testimony by victim's wife and friends that he was "normal heterosexual").
14 People v. Mitchell, 265 N.W.2d 163, 169 (Mich. 1978), overruled on other grounds by
McDougal v. Schanz, 597 N.W.2d 148 (Mich. 1999); accord People v. Lang, 782 P.2d 627, 644
(Cal. 1989); People v. Zatzke, 202 P.2d 1009, 1010-11 (Cal. 1949); Fitzgerald v. State, 601 P.2d
1015, 1020 (Wyo. 1979).
"o Mitchell, 265 N.W.2d at 166-67, 169; Tobler v. State, 688 P.2d 350, 354 (Okla. 1984).
"' The theory of homosexual overkill is discussed in the forensic pathology literature. See
Michael D. Bell, M.D. & Raul I. Vila, M.D., Homicide in Homosexual Victims: A Study of 67
Cases from theBroward County, Florida, Medical Examiner's Office (1982-1992), with Special
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the prosecution called, over the defendant's objection to any mention
of his homosexuality, a forensic scientist to testify about "homosex-
ual overkill."5 ' The defendant, a gay man, was charged with a
crime in which he severely mutilated the victim.'54 According to the
prosecution's expert, "overkill crimes contain an element of homosex-
uality." '55 In his view, if there was homosexual pornography found
at the scene or in possession of the perpetrator (as there was in this
case), it would further lend support to the "homosexual overkill"
theory.56 The court found admissible evidence tending to show that
the defendant was gay, such as prior instances of homosexual
conduct and homosexual pornography, on the ground that evidence
that he was gay would support the state's homosexual overkill
theory.' In Dressler v. McCaughtry," a federal habeas court
agreed this evidence was admissible under the state's version of
Rule 404(b), as it was admissible to show motive, intent, and plan
to murder the victim, as well as lack of an accident.' The court
reasoned that the evidence was relevant because someone who
possesses photographs of homosexual acts coupled with depictions
of extreme violence is more likely to commit a crime exhibiting the
characteristics of homosexual overkill, and the violent pictures tend
to prove the defendant's fascination with death and mutilation,
Emphasis on "Overkill", 17(1) AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 65, 65-69 (1996). The
article cites several other articles that have found that "[h]omicides involving homosexual
victims are often said to be more violent than heterosexual homicides," and that "in the
'majority of cases [there is] overkill: wounding far beyond that required to cause death."' Id.
at 65. However, the study looked only at the sexual orientation of the victim, not at that of
the assailant. Id. at 69. In a letter responding to the article, two other physicians wrote,
"overkill is generally defined as a phenomenon in which the multiplicity of wounds far
outnumbers that required to cause death. Elements of sexuality, released rage, and intimate
bonds between victim and perpetrator frequently exist." Mark L. Taff, Gay Homicides and
"Overkill", 17(4) AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 350, 350-52 (1996). They further note
that prosecutors often employ the phrase "overkill" and other emotionally charged words to
sway the opinions of jurors. Id.
152 No. 92-2049-CR, 1993 WL 469759, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 1993).
'53 Id. at *2-3.
154 Id. at *1.
'5 Id. at *3.
"5 id.
157 Id. at *4-5.
"s 238 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2001).
'59 Id. at 913-14.
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which is probative of motive, intent, or plan. 6 0  Hence, the court
found that the pictures of the homosexual acts, given the state's
homosexual overkill theory, clearly went to motive. 6'
C. RELEVANCETO SHOW PROPENSITYTO SEXUALLYASSAULT CHILD OR
ADULT OF THE SAME GENDER
In some sexual assault cases involving an adult male defendant
and an adult male victim, prosecutors seek to offer evidence of the
defendant's homosexuality. Prosecutors argue that this evidence is
relevant because if the defendant is gay, this makes it more likely
that he is a person who would commit a same-sex sexual assault
than if he were a heterosexual, an argument that some courts
accept. 162 Often, these courts get around the bar on character
evidence in Rule 404(a)"' by finding that it satisfies one of the Rule
404(b) exceptions, 6 4 such as intent to commit forcible sodomy, ' 5 or
that the defendant "opened the door" to this evidence by asserting
at trial that he was heterosexual. '6
'6o Id. at 914.
161 Id.
'a See, e.g., State v. Ford, 926 P.2d 245,250 (Mont. 1996) (finding that, because defendant
was charged with raping someone of same gender, evidence of homosexuality would be
probative of whether defendant fit profile of someone who would commit such act, noting that
given nature of crime, not all members of society would fit perpetrator's profile).
'6 See FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
'6 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
" See, e.g., United States v. Whitner, 51 M.J. 457, 461 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (finding
defendant's possession of magazines and videotapes involving homosexual activity relevant
to show intent, motive, plan, or method); United States v. Woodyard, 16 M.J. 715, 720
(A.F.C.M.R. 1983) (finding that defendant's possession of magazines of nude males engaged
in homosexual acts was evidence of the accused's intent to commit sodomy); United States v.
Marcey, 9 C.M.A. 182, 186-87 (1958) ("[A] person who practices homosexuality is likely to
assault for the purpose of satisfying his perverted sexual cravings, and proof of previous
deviations from the sexual norm is a valuable ingredient in establishing specific intent in
subsequent offenses of the same kind.").
" See, e.g., Florence v. State, 755 So. 2d 1065, 1071-72 (Miss. 2000) ("rhe defense
challenged [the defendant's] capacity to commit a male-on-male sexual assault, something the
vast majority of the population finds hard to conceive or envision. The presence of sexually
explicit materials, depicting male homosexuality, in [the defendant's] house has some
tendency to make his homosexual tendencies more probable."); Kolb v. State, 542 So. 2d 265,
270 (Miss. 1989) (finding that defendant on trial for sexually assaulting child of same sex
opened door to evidence of his homosexuality by testifying on direct examination that he was
not homosexual).
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In child sexual assault cases involving a male defendant and a
male child, prosecutors also sometimes seek to offer evidence of the
defendant's homosexuality, arguing that such evidence is relevant
to show the defendant's propensity to seek out children of the same
gender with whom to have sex.' 7 Courts are split on the relevance
of such evidence. A few courts find that evidence of the defendant's
sexual orientation has some relevance, accepting the inference that
a person who is attracted to adults of the same sex is more likely to
sexually assault a child of the same sex.'68 Many courts, however,
find this evidence irrelevant. One court, for example, held that
"[h]aving a homosexual encounter with a consenting adult is
completely different from assaulting a sleeping child ... the fact
that one has intercourse with another adult is not proof of the
identity of one who commits a sexual assault on a child." 6 ' Courts
have also reasoned that "[i]t is no more reasonable to assume that
a preference for same gender adult sexual partners establishes a
proclivity for sexual gratification with same gender children than it
is to assume that preference for opposite gender adult sexual
partners establishes a proclivity for sexual gratification with
'" Blakeney v. State, 911 S.W.2d 508, 513 (Tex. App. 1995).
16 See id. (expressing skepticism about logical leap from attraction to adult males to
propensity to seek out male children for sex, but holding that Ureasonable persons could differ
when determining whether to accept an inference that a bisexual or homosexual is likely to
seek out same-sex child partners"); see also Roberson v. State, 447 S.E.2d 640, 643 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1994) ('Evidence of homosexuality (and indications of such sexual preferences) are
admissible to show a defendant's bent of mind toward the sexual activity with which he was
charged."); Williams v. State, 420 S.E.2d 781, 782 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) ("In the case sub judice,
there is evidence that the victim was the subject of a homosexual act. Under these
circumstances, we cannot say that evidence of defendant's bi-sexual nature is totally
irrelevant."); State v. Taylor, 663 So. 2d 336, 340-41 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that
defendant's sexual orientation has "some relevance" in that it shows that defendant is
interested in having sex with male, which victim was in this case).
" State v. Rushing, 541 N.W.2d 155, 162 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995); see also id. at 163 (Myse,
J., concurring):
The State's theory is that because [the defendant] is a homosexual, he is
likely to have committed this homosexual act. This evidence is inadmissi-
ble because it is character evidence demonstrating the character trait of
homosexuality, which the State attempts to use to prove [the defendant]
committed a specific homosexual act.
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opposite gender children, 170 and that "[t]he belief that homosexuals
are attracted to prepubescent children is a baseless stereotype. 17'
Even when courts find that such evidence is arguably relevant,
however, many nevertheless exclude it as improper character
evidence introduced against the defendant to support an inference
that he acted in conformity with a character trait.172 Courts usually
reject efforts to circumvent this general rule via Rule 404(b). 173
Moreover, courts often exclude such evidence under Rule 403,
finding that it poses the risk that the jury will convict the defendant
due to animus against homosexuals rather than on the basis of the
evidence in the case. 1
74
One situation where courts usually will admit evidence like
magazines, videotapes, and books depicting homosexual conduct is
not to support a character inference that the defendant's homosexu-
370 State v. Ellis, 820 S.W.2d 699, 702 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
'7 State v. Bates, 507 N.W.2d 847, 852 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); see also State v. Lee, 525
N.W.2d 179, 183 (Neb. 1994) (finding evidence that defendant possessed pornographic
material depicting adult homosexual activity is not, standing alone, relevant to support
charge that defendant engaged in pedophilic homosexual felatio); State v. Tizard, 897 S.W.2d
732, 744-45 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (finding evidence that defendant had videotapes and
booklet depicting sexually explicit acts between males not relevant to showing intent to
commit same-sex sexual battery).
172 See, e.g., Blakeney v. State, 911 S.W.2d 508, 515 (Tex. App. 1995); State v. Rushing,
541 N.W.2d 155, 160-61 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
171 See, e.g., Guam v. Shymanovitz, 157 F.3d 1154,1157-58 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting
effort to use defendant's possession of homosexual magazines to show knowledge of how to
engage in homosexual sex, reasoning that knowledge is not element of offense); Rushing, 541
N.W.2d at 161 (rejecting effort to use evidence of defendant's prior consensual homosexual
experiences to show intent, reasoning that statute barred intercourse with persons below
certain age without regard to defendant's intent). But see United States v. LeProwse, 26 M.J.
652,655-56 (A.C.M.R. 1988) (noting defendant's possession of homosexual magazines relevant
to negate lack of intent); Williams v. State, 420 S.E.2d 781,782-83 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (noting
that such evidence is "admissible to prove intent, motive, plan, scheme and bent of mind").
114 See, e.g., Shymanovitz, 157 F.3d at 1160 (excluding such evidence under Rule 403
because "the jury's inference that [the defendant] was gay could in all likelihood have caused
it also to infer that he deviated from traditional sex norms in other ways, specifically that he
engaged in illegal sexual conduct with minors," and that "the introduction of this evidence
also suggested that he might be interested in or even engage in other sorts of sexual activity
that the jurors would perceive as deviant"); State v. Taylor, 663 So. 2d 336, 341 (La. Ct. App.
1995) (excluding such evidence on ground that it was likely to mislead and confuse jury);
Blakeney v. State, 911 S.W.2d 508, 515-16 & n.5 (Tex. App. 1995) (noting that introducing
such evidence "could only serve to send to the jury the message that all homosexual men are
also molesters of little boys," and that "such practices are considered improper, immoral, and
highly offensive by segments of the population and hence testimony linking Appellant to such
conduct could have unduly prejudiced some of the jurors against the Appellant").
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ality increased the likelihood of a same-sex assault, but instead
where they are part of the res gestae, or connected to the events at
issue in the case. Thus, for example, where the defendant is
accused of sexually assaulting a minor, pornographic homosexual
pictures that the defendant showed to the minor are admissible
because they were used to seduce the child, and therefore can be
used to connect the defendant to the crime. 175 However, in such
instances, the jury needs to be given a limiting instruction that the
evidence is not to be used to draw a propensity inference, but only
to corroborate the victim's testimony. 176
D. RELEVANCE TO SHOW CONSENT OF VICTIM IN SAME-SEX SEXUAL
ASSAULT CASES
In cases in which the defendant is on trial for committing sexual
assault on someone of the same gender, defendants will often seek
to introduce evidence that the victim is gay, theorizing that it tends
to support their claim that the intercourse was consensual. The
proffered logic is that the act in question was a homosexual act and
that the victim's homosexuality makes it more likely that he would
have consented to the act. 177  Most courts refuse to admit such
evidence on the issue of consent, finding that their rape-shield rules
apply with equal vigor where a man is a victim of rape by another
man as they do where a female is the victim.' Courts reason that
'1 Shymanovitz, 157 F.3d at 1157 n.3 (citing United States v. Yazzie, 59 F.3d 807, 811
(9th Cir. 1995) (finding gay-oriented materials admissible when used as "instruments" of
offense, to wit, when used to arouse child); United States v. Woodyard, 16 M.J. 715, 720
(A.F.C.M.R. 1983); see also State v. Lee, 525 N.W.2d 179, 183-84 (Neb. 1994); State v. Tizard,
897 S.W.2d 732, 743-44 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); State v. King, 429 P.2d 914, 159-16 (Wash.
1967). Similarly, where the defendant is accused of kidnapping someone of the same gender
and attempting to sexually assault him, a gay-oriented magazine found in the defendant's car
is admissible where it corroborates the victim's testimony that the person who kidnapped him
had that magazine on the passenger seat, and thus goes to identity. State v. Weidenhof, 533
A.2d 545, 552 (Conn. 1987).
178 Id. at 552-53.
171 See United States v. Grant, 49 M.J. 295,297 (C.A.A.F. 1998); Kvasnikoffv. State, 674
P.2d 302, 304 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); People v. Murphy, 919 P.2d 191, 192-93 (Colo. 1996);
People v. Hackett, 365 N.W.2d 120, 126-27 (Mich. 1984); Commonwealth v. Quartman, 458
A.2d 994, 997 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); State v. Whaley, No. 03CO1-9101-CR-00025, 1992 WL
167342, at "1, *5-6 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).
17' See, e.g., Kvasnikoffv. State, 674 P.2d 302, 306 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); State v. Hart,
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evidence of the victim's sexual orientation goes to the victim's
"sexual predisposition" within the meaning of the rape-shield rule, 179
or alternatively that it is so closely related to past sexual conduct
that it is akin to offering such evidence. 8 ' This interpretation of
"sexual predisposition" makes sense because evidence of pregnancy,
venereal disease, or use of contraceptives are covered by the phrase
"sexual behavior" since they imply sexual conduct. 1 ' Yet at least
one state court has held otherwise, finding that its rape-shield rule,
on its face, only applies to rape cases involving a male defendant
and a female victim.18 2
The rape-shield rule aside, many courts conclude that the
evidence is "irrelevant" under Rule 401, reasoning that a person's
homosexuality or his history of engaging in consensual homosexual
acts has no bearing on the question of whether he consented on a
subsequent occasion involving a different person.' Moreover, in
sexual assault cases involving an underage victim, courts find such
evidence irrelevant because consent is not a valid defense if the
victim is a minor.'84 Furthermore, many courts exclude such
evidence under Rule 403, finding that the evidence might play to
jury biases and cause the jury to decide the case on an improper
678 N.E.2d 952,953-54 (Ohio 1996); Commonwealth v. Quartman, 458 A.2d 994,995 n.2 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1983).
179 See, e.g., United States v. Grant, 49 M.J. 295, 297 (C.A.A.F. 1998); Gretzinger v. Univ.
of Haw. Profl Assembly, No. CV-94-00684-BMK, 1998 WL 403357, at *2 n.2 (9th Cir. July 7,
1998) ('Evidence regarding sexual orientation is covered by Rule 412"); see also FED. R. EVID.
412 advisory committee's note (stating that, unless specified exceptions are met, "evidence
such as that relating to the alleged victim's ... life-style will not be admissible.").
'go People v. Murphy, 919 P.2d 191, 195 (Colo. 1996).
'a' FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note; see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra
note 21, § 4.33, at 305 ("Evidence of the complainant's sexual orientation is rarely appropriate
because the underlying policies of FRE 412 apply as well in the case of homosexual
assaults."). Courts have rejected efforts to draw a distinction between the status of being gay
and specific sexual activities, reasoning that the status refers to the person's sexual activities
with persons of the same gender. People v. Kemblowski, 559 N.E.2d 247, 250 (111. App. Ct.
1990).
182 See, e.g., State v. Dixon, 668 S.W.2d 123, 125 (Mo. 1984).
's See, e.g., United States v. Grant, 49 M.J. 295, 297 (C.A.A.F. 1998); Blackmon v.
Buckner, 932 F. Supp. 1126, 1128 (S.D. Ind. 1996); People v. Hackett, 365 N.W.2d 120, 126-27
(Mich. 1984). See also State v. Whaley, 1992 WL 167342, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).
'" See, e.g., State v. Ermatinger, 752 S.W.2d 344, 345-49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Common-
wealth v. Battista, No. 3940-93, 1995 WL 864097, at *1, *3 (Pa. Ct. Coin P1. Apr. 19, 1995).
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basis. 8 '5 However, the courts also hold that, notwithstanding the
rape-shield rule, the prosecution can "open the door" to evidence of
the victim's sexual orientation if it offers evidence suggesting that
the victim is a heterosexual and thus unlikely to have consented."16
There remain some questions as to the scope of the rape-shield
rule. One question is whether the rule excludes evidence of a
victim's sexual predisposition or prior sexual behavior where offered
not to support an inference that the victim consented, but instead
to support the defendant's "mistake of fact" (and thus lack of
criminal intent) defense that based on the victim's reputation, he
reasonably believed that the victim consented." 7 Most courts,
however, have rejected this argument, reasoning that knowledge of
the victim's prior reputation is not a legally valid basis for forming
a reasonable belief that the victim consented.'" Moreover, even
where this argument is viable, evidence of the victim's reputation is
irrelevant if there is no evidence in the record that the defendant
was aware of that reputation at the time the alleged sexual assault
took place.
18 9
Another open question is what sort of cases are covered by the
rape-shield rule. Rule 412 provides that it applies in "any civil or
'm See, e.g., Kvasnikoff v. State, 674 P.2d 302, 305-06 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983):
Mhe jury might presume consent simply as a result of their own
prejudices or hostilities against homosexuals .... The trial judge in this
case was understandably concerned that the main issue in the trial would
become the sexuality of the victim rather than the conduct of the
defendant on the occasion in question.
Id.; see also Tobler v. State, 688 P.2d 350, 354 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984).
"N See, e.g., People v. Murphy, 919 P.2d 191, 195 (Colo. 1996); State v. Lang, 403 S.E.2d
677,678 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Rodgers, No. 01-C-019011CR00312, 1991 WL 155715,
at *2-3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 16, 1991).
"e Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43, 46-48 (4th Cir. 1981).
l See, e.g., People v. DeSantis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 628, 659 (Cal. 1992):
Knowledge of past consensual gay sex alone is not sufficient to establish
a reasonable belief in consent. There must be evidence during the
encounter in question which reasonably led to a belief in consent. The
evidence would become relevant only if it were combined with [other]
factors ... such as prior activity demonstrating particular communicative
behavior or special circumstances giving the evidence higher probative
value.
Id.; see also Commonwealth v. McGregor, 655 N.E.2d 1278, 1279-80 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).
." State v. Whaley, NO. 03C01-9101-CR-00025, 1992 WL 167342, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App.
July 21, 1992).
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criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct," 9 ° and the
advisory committee notes make clear that this includes rape, civil
sexual battery, and sexual harassment cases, but does not include
defamation cases. 1 ' Beyond that, the scope of the rule is unclear.
Consider, for example, the murder cases discussed above in which
the defendant claims that he acted in self-defense to repel a sexual
assault by the victim.' Is that a case "involving alleged sexual
misconduct"? Strictly speaking, the answer would seem to be yes,
as the language of the rule does not specify that the sexual miscon-
duct has to be that of the defendant, only that the case "involv[e]"
such misconduct. Yet the few courts that have considered the
matter have found the rape-shield statute to be inapplicable in such
cases, and that such evidence is admissible, subject to the strictures
of Rules 404(a)(2) and 405(a).'93
Parties also have sought to offer evidence of the victim's sexual
orientation in sexual assault cases involving a male defendant and
a female victim, with interesting results. In one case, the prosecu-
tion sought to offer evidence that the victim was a lesbian, reasoning
that such evidence would tend to rebut the defendant's claim that
she consented to a heterosexual encounter, but the court excluded
the evidence, reasoning that the rape-shield rule "leaves no room for
introduction of reputation or specific act evidence from any party"
and that it "prohibits anyone from introducing evidence of the
victim's sexual history."'194 Given the rationale for the rape-shield
rule, this ruling makes some sense, because the rule is designed to
protect the victim from having her sexual history dragged out, and
this protection should extend to efforts by overzealous prosecutors
who are more concerned with obtaining a conviction than they are
with the victim's privacy. But a sensible interpretation would allow
a victim to waive the protection of the rule. Indeed, several courts
190 FED. R. EVID. 412.
' FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
192 See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
" People v. Miller, 981 P.2d 654, 657-58 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999); see also Williamson v.
State, 692 P.2d 965, 972 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) ('Concern for the sensibilities of the victim
deserves substantially less weight in a murder case where the issue is self-defense and where
the jury must determine who was the initial aggressor.").
"s4 People v. Kemblowski, 559 N.E.2d 247, 250 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (first emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
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have allowed female victims of heterosexual rape to testify that they
are lesbians, and therefore were unlikely to have consented on the
occasion in question, but also allowed the defendant to rebut with
evidence that the victim has engaged in heterosexual conduct.
195
These courts reasoned that the defendant's Confrontation Clause
rights require that he be given the opportunity to present such
evidence, an exception recognized in Rule 412(b)(1)(C). 1
Where evidence involving the victim's sexual orientation provides
a possible motive for the victim to fabricate the charges against the
defendant, the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights usually
require that he be permitted to offer such evidence.' 9' However, if
evidence of the motive to fabricate the charges can be made without
making reference to the victim's sexual orientation, courts will
exclude the sexual history evidence. '
Finally, in civil cases, the standards of Rule 412 are less strin-
gent, providing for the admission of evidence if its probative value
substantially outweighs the harm to any victim and unfair prejudice
to any party.'" Thus, for example, in a case in which the plaintiff
sues the defendant for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
the defendant may be permitted to offer evidence of the plaintiff's
"9 See, e.g., State v. Lessley, 601 N.W.2d 521, 526-28 (Neb. 1999); State v. Williams, 477
N.E.2d 221, 228 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
' Meaders v. United States, 519 A.2d 1248, 1256-57 (D.C. 1986) (Gallagher, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("It is almost too obvious to mention that-where
consent is the issue (as here)-if the complaining witness offers on direct examination, among
other things, that she is a lesbian, this may seriously impair a defense of consent to the
charged rape."); Lessley, 601 N.W.2d at 526-28; Williams, 477 N.E.2d at 228; see also U.S.
CONST. amend. VI. But see Meaders v. United States, 519 A.2d 1248, 1253-54 (D.C. 1986).
" See United States v. Carter, 47 M.J. 395, 396-97 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1998) (suggesting
that, were adequate foundation laid, defendant could introduce evidence that victim was in
homosexual relationship with her roommate, and that victim fabricated charge of rape
against him because roommate walked in on them and she did not want it to negatively
impact her relationship with roommate); Johnson v. Virginia, 385 S.E.2d 223, 227 (Va. Ct.
App. 1989) (allowing defendant, male pastor at church, charged with raping two girls, to offer
evidence that alleged victims decided to fabricate charges against him as means of preventing
him from intervening, at request of one of girls' mothers, to terminate their relationship);
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.33, at 302.
"" See, e.g., Ohio v. Hart, 678 N.E.2d 952, 955 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (allowing defendant
to offer evidence that his stepchildren were biased against him, and thus they fabricated
charges of sexual assault because he disciplined them harshly; but not allowing evidence of
reason for discipline, which was that stepchildren had engaged in homosexual conduct).
'99 FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2).
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sexual orientation to show that the victim's alleged distress had a
source not attributable to the defendant's conduct, which mitigates
the damages.2" Nonetheless, even in civil cases, care must be taken
to ensure that the evidence is not used "for purposes of exploiting
stereotypes or subjecting a party or witness to gratuitous embar-
rassment and invasion of privacy."201
E. RELEVANCE TO IMPEACH THE CREDIBILITY OF A WITNESS
Often, a party will ask questions or introduce extrinsic evidence
designed to impeach a witness's credibility, a practice recognized
and permitted by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Federal Rule of
Evidence 607 provides that "[t]he credibility of a witness may be
attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness,"20 2
and Federal Rule of Evidence 611(b) provides that the proper scope
of cross-examination includes "matters affecting the credibility of
the witness. 2 3 Of course, the mere fact that a witness is gay or
associates with gay people cannot, standing alone, be used to
impeach his credibility as a witness. 24 However, there are several
instances when the sexual orientation of a party or a witness is
raised in the context of impeaching the witness under one of the
recognized forms of impeachment.
One common form of impeaching a witness is by showing that the
witness is somehow biased:
Bias is a term used in the "common law of evidence" to
describe the relationship between a party and a witness
that might lead the witness to slant, unconsciously or
otherwise, his testimony in favor of or against a party.
o Gretzinger v. Univ. of Haw. Profl Assembly, No. 97-15123, 1998 WL 403357, at *2 (9th
Cir. July 7,1998).
"o Blackmon v. Buckner, 932 F. Supp. 1126, 1128 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (excluding evidence of
plaintiff's prior consensual homosexual encounters to prove consent in § 1983 suit against
jail officials for failing to protect plaintiff from sexual assault).
FED. R. EVID. 607.
20 FED. R. EVID. 611(b).
2o United States v. Nuccio, 373 F.2d 168, 171 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Auguste,
No. ACM S27276, 1987 CMR LEXIS 309, at *4 (A.F.C.M.R. Apr. 8,1987); State v. Lewis, 602
A.2d 618, 622 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992); State v. Miller, 485 S.W.2d 435, 440-41 (Mo. 1972).
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Bias may be induced by a witness' like, dislike, or fear of
a party, or by the witness' self-interest.
2°
The Supreme Court has held that "[p]roof of bias is almost always
relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibil-
ity, has historically been entitled to assess all evidence which might
bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness' testimony."
2 1
Proof of bias may be shown by, inter alia, a personal relationship
between the witness and a party based on friendship, family ties,
sexual involvement, or common membership in clubs or organiza-
tions.2 7 Bias cari be proven not only by asking the witness on cross-
examination about the alleged bias, but also through the introduc-
tion of extrinsic evidence of that bias, such as documentary evidence
or witness testimony.0 8
Consequently, where a witness has a current homosexual
relationship with one of the parties, courts have typically held that
the opposing party should be permitted to bring up that fact in order
to show that the witness may be biased.20 9 Moreover, courts allow
witnesses to be asked whether they made a homosexual advance
toward a party that was rebuffed, reasoning that the refusal of the
advance may have created hostility and thus bias against that
party.21 Similarly, courts have allowed a party to introduce
m' United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984).
Id. at 51-52. The Court held that Rules 607 and 611(b) implicitly recognize a right to
impeach parties for bias. Id. at 51.
207 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 6.20, at 533 nn. 1-4; WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 21, § 607.04(5), at 607-36 to 607-38; see also Abel, 469 U.S. at 52.
s Abel, 469 U.S. at 52.
See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 201 F.3d 953, 964 (7th Cir. 2000); Tinker v. United
States, 417 F.2d 542, 544 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Johnson, 20 M.J. 610, 610
(A.F.C.M.R. 1985); State v. Wargo, 680 P.2d 206, 209 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); Doepel v. United
States, 434 A.2d 449, 457 n.8 (D.C. 1981); Stanley v. State, 648 So. 2d 1268, 1269 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1995); State v. Wells, No. 94-CA-2255, 1995 WL 502249, at 05 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug.
23, 1995); State v. Eben, 610 N.E.2d 1109, 1112-13 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); Denton v. State, No.
03-96-00006-CR, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 4981, at *42-43 (Tex. App. 1998) (citing Vaughn v.
State, 888 S.W.2d 62, 74-75 (Tex. App. 1994)); Kirk v. Commonwealth, 464 S.E.2d 162, 166
(Va. Ct. App. 1995); see also State v. Woodard, 769 A.2d 379, 382-83 (N.H. 2001) (prosecution
permitted to show that victim's mother was in lesbian relationship with defendant as way of
explaining why she did not immediately report abuse of daughter by defendant).
210 See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States
v. Nuccio, 373 F.2d 168, 171 (2d Cir. 1967); Arias v. State, 593 So. 2d 260, 264 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1992).
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evidence that a witness harbors hostility toward the defendant
because he has somehow interfered with the witness's homosexual
relationship with another person." Also, one court has permitted
a party to offer evidence of a witness's sexual orientation where the
witness was a lesbian and the party was a major supporter of a
political candidate with antigay views.212 Although the probative
worth of such evidence may be deemed to outweigh any risk of
prejudice,2 1 3 where feasible, courts have rightly sought ways to avoid
potential prejudice by allowing parties to demonstrate bias without
allowing them to bring up the sexual nature of the relationship.
Courts instead allow testimony that the two people are "close,"214
were "very close friends, 215 had a "close relationship,"216 or courts
simply avoid reference to gender where possible. 21 7
An unusual variation on this form of impeachment took place in
the San Francisco "dog mauling" trial, in which Diane Whipple, a
lesbian, was killed by a neighbor's dog.218 Counsel for the defense
twice brought up the victim's sexual orientation at trial.1 9 In one
instance, she raised the issue to show a motive for the prosecution
withholding certain exculpatory evidence from the jury by asking,
"[Wihat is the prosecution's excuse for keeping this evidence from
you?... Maybe he wants to curry favor with the homosexual and
211 See, e.g., Blackmon v. Buckner, 932 F. Supp. 1126, 1129 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (allowing
defendant prison official to prove that witness had bias against him because he had separated
witness from his homosexual lover in prison); Zawacki v. State, 753 N.E.2d 100, 101-03 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2001) (allowing defendant to prove that victim had motive to falsely accuse him of
sexual assault because he refused to allow his daughter to have lesbian relationship with
her).
112 Santos, 201 F.3d at 964. But see Smith v. Mankato State Univ., Nos. C2-95-98, C2-95-
99, 1995 WL 450811, at 03-4 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1995) (refusing to permit party suing
university for investigating him for improprieties from questioning affirmative action officer,
who had investigated allegations that plaintiff had made homophobic remarks about her
sexual orientation).
2"' See, e.g., Kirk, 464 S.E.2d at 166.
2.. Quark, Inc. v. Harley, No. 96-1061, 1998 WL 161035, at *4 (10th Cir. Mar. 4, 1998).
218 Demps v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 1426, 1429 (11th Cir. 1986).
216 Chumbler v. Commonwealth, 905 S.W.2d 488, 492 (Ky. 1995).
217 Hughey v. State, 729 So. 2d 828, 831 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that defendant
could raise fact that witness had incentive to steal for prostitution, but not for homosexual
prostitution, where witness allegedly accused defendant of stealing in order to cover up his
own theft of money for homosexual prostitutes).
218 People v. Knoller, No. 181813 (Super. Ct. for City & County of S.F. Mar. 27, 2001).
219 John Gallagher, Homophobia for the Defense, ADVOCATE, May 14, 2002, at 34-37.
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gay folks who were picketing ... and demanding justice for Diane
Whipple."2 ' It also appears as though the issue was used to
impeach the decedent's surviving partner, who had a parallel
wrongful death action.22' The attorney stated, "Sharon Smith has
every right to sue for the wrongful death of her girlfriend. But she
has no right to come here with false testimony and try to frame
Marjorie Knoler for murder." '2 Evidently, the basis for impeaching
Smith was that she stood to gain financially in the wrongful death
action, and a conviction in the criminal case would support her civil
claim.
A second common form of impeaching a witness is to contradict
him. In other words, one may show that something the witness said
is not true, casting doubt not just on the specific testimony given by
the witness on that point, but more generally raising questions
about the witness's overall veracity. 23 But under the collateral-
matter rule a witness cannot be contradicted through the introduc-
tion of extrinsic evidence on "collateral" matters, meaning that the
evidence is not admissible unless it also would tend to prove some
other point, such as bearing on a substantive issue in the case;
indicating bias, a defect in capacity, or untruthful disposition (all
methods of impeachment that could normally be proven through
extrinsic evidence); or refuting a so-called "telltale" fact about which
the witness simply could not be mistaken were he being truthful.224
Thus, where a witness denies being gay or having a homosexual
relationship with a particular person, extrinsic evidence of the
witness's homosexuality is not admissible to contradict him under
the collateral-matter rule unless it is otherwise relevant in the
case.
225
220 Id. at 34. The defense did not, however, point out that the prosecutor himself was gay.
Id.
" CNN, Jury Reaches Partial Verdict in Dog Mauling Case (Mar. 20, 2002), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2002ILAW/03/20/dog.mauling.trial/index.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2003);
see also Smith v. Knofler, No. 319532 (Super. Ct. for City & County of S.F. Mar. 12, 2001).
22 Id.
22 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 6.43, at 598-99; WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 21, § 607.06(1), at 607-72 to 607-74.
224 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 6.47, at 614-18.
2n See State v. Porretto, 468 So. 2d 1142, 1148 (La. 1985).
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A third common method of impeaching a witness is to introduce
evidence of the defendant's prior felony convictions, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a).22 This method of impeachment is
grounded in the common law, which provided that convicted felons
were incompetent to be witnesses, and has developed into a modern
rule which allows them to testify, but allows evidence of their
criminal records to come in on the theory that persons with a
criminal past are less likely to testify truthfully than law-abiding
citizens.22 7 However, recognizing that bringing in prior convictions
poses special risks for a criminal defendant-as the impeachment
evidence may cause the jury to convict the defendant for being a bad
person unworthy of sympathy-the rule for criminal defendants as
witnesses is weighted in favor of excluding such evidence.22
Moreover, for any type of witness, convictions that are more than
ten years old are not admissible unless a much stricter standard is
satisfied.229
One factor in deciding whether or not to admit a prior conviction
under Rule 609(a)(1) is the nature of the prior crime and its bearing
on veracity. 20 Certain crimes, like sex offenses and prostitution
convictions, are thought to have little if any bearing on veracity, and
thus are more likely to be excluded.2"' Moreover, where the "crime"
is that of consensual homosexual sodomy, there is a risk that
introducing evidence of such a conviction will result in unfair
28 FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 609.02(1), at 609-8.
Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) provides:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that a
witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the
witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted
of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect
to the accused.
FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1); see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 6.31, at 562.
n See FED. R. EVID 609(b) (excluding evidence of such convictions "unless the court
determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported
by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect").
24 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 6.31, at 562-63 (citing Gordon v. United
States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967)).
231 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 6.31, at 563 & nn.6-7.
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prejudice against the party based on his evident sexual orientation.
Thus, although a few courts appear to have allowed impeachment
for a prior conviction of consensual homosexual sodomy,23 2 other
courts refuse to allow such convictions to be used to impeach a
witness, reasoning that doing so is "an ugly tactic that is prohibited
by [Rule] 403,'' 233 and that it is "a highly inflammatory and prejudi-
cial matter brought in to degrade the defendant in the eyes of the
jury. 23
4
F. RELEVANCE TO SHOW DEFENDANT'S MOTIVE TO COMMIT CRIME
Although motive is not normally an element of a crime, it may be
relevant either to proving the defendant's intent to commit, or
identifying the defendant as, the one who committed the crime.3 5
It shows that the defendant had a reason to commit the act charged,
from which it may be inferred that the defendant did in fact commit
the act.236
Thus, in murder or assault cases, courts have admitted evidence
of a homosexual relationship between the accused and the victim as
relevant to motive or intent for an emotionally motivated murder or
assault.237 Similarly, evidence that the defendant had a homosexual
relationship with a third person who was married to or otherwise
involved in a relationship with the victim is likewise relevant to
show motive.2 8
232 Stowe v. Bowlin, 531 S.W.2d 955, 957-58 (Ark. 1976); Minnesota v. Schweppe, 237
N.W.2d 609, 615 (Minn. 1975).
23 United States v. Person, No. 97-4599, 2000 WL 223336, at *3 (4th Cir. Feb. 28, 2000).
' United States v. Provoo, 215 F.2d 531, 534 (2d Cir. 1954) (involving allegation of
sodomy for which subject was arrested but never tried).
23 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supru note 21, § 4.17, at 227.
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 404.22[3], at 404-101 to 404-105.
See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 381 A.2d 258, 259-60 (D.C. 1977); Welborn v. State,
372 S.E.2d 220, 220-21 (Ga. 1988); State v. Schweppe, 237 N.W.2d 609, 615 (Minn. 1975);
Gilpin v. State, No. A14-90-00700-CR, 1991 WL 84067, at "1-2 (Tex. Crim. App. May 23,
1991).
' See, e.g., Guthrie v. State, 637 So. 2d 35, 35-36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); People v.
Rozo, 708 N.E.2d 1229, 1232 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); Chumbler v. Commonwealth, 905 S.W.2d
488, 492-93 (Ky. 1995); see also Scroggins v. State, 401 S.E.2d 13, 21 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991),
overruled on other grounds by Dunagan v. State, 502 S.E.2d 726 (Ga. 1998) (allowing evidence
of homosexual relationship between defendants to support charge of affray, reasoning that
emotional relationship may have affected their conduct). The crime of"affray" refers to "[tihe
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Furthermore, some courts hold that evidence of the defendant's
homosexuality is relevant to support the state's claim that the
motive for the killing was the victim's threat to expose the defen-
dant as a homosexual, reasoning that the fact that the defendant is
gay lends support to such a theory.2"9 However, one court has
rejected such evidence, reasoning that only evidence that the victim
threatened the defendant with exposure of an allegation that he was
a homosexual matters, with the truth of that allegation being of
slight additional probative value to motive while being extremely
prejudicial.240
Evidence of homosexuality also has arisen in some rather
uncommon fact scenarios. For example, one case held that evidence
of the defendant's homosexuality coupled with evidence that the
victim, a relative with whom he lived, had barred him from
engaging in homosexual activity while living in the home, was
relevant to show motive to kill the victim.
24
'
Although courts recognize that a jury may use the evidence for an
impermissible purpose, such as to suggest that the defendant is an
immoral or bad person and inviting conviction on that basis, most
courts find that the evidence is nevertheless admissible for use in
supporting a potential motive for the crime. Courts find that the
risk of prejudice is minimized by a limiting instruction 242 or
ensuring that the evidence is presented in a way that is not unduly
inflammatory.243
fighting, by mutual consent, of two or more persons in some public place, to the terror of
onlookers." BLACKWs LAW DICTIONARY 60 (7th ed. 1999).
m See State v. Statewright, 300 So. 2d 674,678 (Fla. 1974); State v. Ross, 395 S.E.2d 148,
150-51 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); see also State v. Roberts, 622 A.2d 1225, 1236 (N.H. 1993)
(finding, in prosecution for witness tampering, evidence of defendant's homosexual
relationship with underage witness relevant to his motive for trying to remove him as witness
in order to avoid prosecution for statutory rape).
" United States v. Ham, 998 F.2d 1247, 1250-53 (4th Cir. 1993). The government's
relevancy argument was that, by proving the accusations to be true, the government could
show that the victim was truly a threat to the defendant and not a mere nuisance. Id. at
1252.
241 State v. Brecht, 421 N.W.2d 96, 98-99, 105-06 (Wis. 1998).
142 See, e.g., Guthrie v. State, 637 So. 2d 35, 36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Brecht,
421 N.W.2d 96, 105-06 (Wis. 1998).
"3 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 381 A.2d 258, 259-60 (D.C. 1977).
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G. RELEVANCE TO DEFENSE OF TRUTH IN A DEFAMATION CASE
As a general rule in defamation actions, truth is a complete
defense to liability.244 Thus, where a plaintiff such as Tom Cruise
alleges that a person defamed him by stating or writing that he is
gay, evidence that he is in fact gay is a complete defense to
liability.45 and is relevant evidence as it supports the claimed
defense. Moreover, such evidence is not barred by the character
propensity rule; the evidence is not offered to show that the person
acted in conformity with that character trait on a particular
occasion, but offered rather to support the defense of truth.2 46 In
such cases, proof of the plaintiff's sexual orientation need not be
made solely by reputation or opinion evidence, but also may be made
using evidence of specific instances of conduct that demonstrate the
plaintiff's sexual orientation.
47
In light of greater social acceptance of gay people in recent years,
it may come as somewhat of a surprise that labeling someone gay
can be deemed defamatory, yet no court has held that it is not.
However, differing degrees of social acceptance of gay people have
split the courts on the question whether a statement that someone
is gay is defamation per se or defamation per quod.2 48 The former
244 See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489-90 (1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
TORTS § 581A (1977) (One who publishes a defamatory statement of fact is not subject to
liability for defamation if the statement is true.").
2" See Prince v. Out Publ'g, Inc., No. B140475, 2002 WL 7999, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan.
3, 2002) C'Mhe only aspect that is 'of and concerning' plaintiff is that he was at a party and
that he is gay. As to this aspect of plaintiff's case, defendants have a complete defense to the
libel causes of action: truth, since plaintiff acknowledges that he is in fact gay."); Froelich v.
Adair, 516 P.2d 993, 995 (Kan. 1973) (in suit in which defendant's former husband sued her
for defamation for stating that he was gay and that particular individual was his lover, wife
entitled to obtain evidence relevant to truth of her statements from alleged lover); Dominick
v. Index Journal Co., No. 99-CP-24-370, 2001 WL 1763977, at *3 (S.C. Mar. 15, 2001) C['1o
the extent [his] cause of action for defamation is based on any alleged inference ... that he
is gay, the [defendant] has an absolute defense because he is.").
"4 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
247 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
24 Compare Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991), and Nacinovich
v. Tullet & Tokyo Forex, Inc., 685 N.Y.S.2d 17, 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999), and Privitera v.
Town of Phelps, 435 N.Y.S.2d 402, 404 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), and Head v. Newton, 596
S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex. App. 1980) (citing Buck v. Savage, 323 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. App. 1959)),
with Regehr v. Sonopress, Inc., No. 2:99CV69815, 2000 WL 33710902, at *4 (D. Utah Apr. 14,
2000), and Q-Tone Broad. Co. v. Musicradio of Md., Inc., No. CIV. A. 93C-09-021, 1994 WL
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means that the statement is "defamatory in and of itself and is not
capable of an innocent meaning," '249 and the latter means
"[d]efamation that either (1) is not apparent but is proved by
extrinsic evidence showing its injurious meaning or (2) is apparent
but is not a statement that is actionable per se." ' The main
difference between the two is that special damages need to be
proven for defamation per quod, but not for defamation per se.251
Defamation per se benefits the plaintiff by presuming certain
damages, such as loss of reputation, and the plaintiff need not prove
that the statements were defamatory within the context in which
they were made.252
Historically, defamation was actionable per se only if the
defamatory remark imputed a criminal offense; a venereal or
loathsome and communicable disease; conduct that is incompatible
with the exercise of a lawful business, trade, profession, or office; or
unchastity by a woman.2 53 And the Restatement of Torts has left
open the issue of whether a statement that someone is gay should
be deemed defamation per se.254 Most of the courts holding that a
false imputation of homosexuality is defamatory per se focus on the
fact that sodomy, particularly same-sex sodomy, is a criminal
activity,255 and hold that the imputation that someone is gay implies
that he commits the crime of sodomy, thus making it fall within the
historical defamation per se category of imputing a criminal
offense.2s Other courts hold that it is merely defamation per quod
555391, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 1994), and Donovan v. Fiumara, 442 S.E.2d 572, 580
(N.C. Ct. App. 1994), and Key v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., 598 N.E.2d 207, 209 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1990), and Lehman v. Wellens, No. 86-1665,1987 WL 267191, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr.
8, 1987).
11 BLACK S LAW DICTIONARY 427 (7th ed. 1999).
No Id.
"' See, e.g., United Ins. Co. of Am. v. Murphy, 961 S.W.2d 752,755 (Ark. 1998); Donovan,
442 S.E.2d at 575.
5'2 Hayes, 832 P.2d at 1024.
223 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 569-54 (1938).
2' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 574 (1977).
' The United States Supreme Court has recently granted certiori for a case challenging
the constitutionality of such laws. See Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. 2001), cert.
granted, 123 S. Ct. 661 (2002).
See, e.g., Nazeri v. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo. 1993):
Despite the efforts of many homosexual groups to foster greater tolerance
and acceptance, homosexuality is still viewed with disfavor, if not outright
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on several grounds. Some courts rely on state law no longer
criminalizing sexual conduct between consenting adults of the same
sex.257 One court reasons that the label "gay" or "homosexual" refers
only to status and does not necessarily connote sexual conduct at
all.25" And some courts reason that it is offensive to gay people to
label a false accusation of homosexuality defamatory per se. For
example, one court declared, "A court should not classify homosexu-
als with those miscreants [such as thieves, murderers and prosti-
tutes] who have engaged in actions that deserve the reprobation and
scorn which is implicitly a part of the slander/libel per se classifica-
tions. 259
H. RELEVANCE TO DAMAGES IN WRONGFUL DEATH AND PERSONAL
INJURY CASES
Perhaps even more surprising than defamation cases are
wrongful death and personal injury cases in which the defendants
seek to introduce evidence regarding the victim's sexual orientation
as relevant to the issue of damages.6 0 One might wonder how a
victim's sexual orientation could be relevant to the issue of damages.
In such cases, there are two components to the damages claim.
contempt, by a sizeable proportion of our population. Moreover, engaging
in deviant sexual intercourse with another person of the same sex is still
a class A misdemeanor in this state.
Id.; Head v. Newton, 596 S.W.2d 209,210 (Tex. App. 1980) (citing Buck v. Savage, 323 S.W.2d
363 (Tex. App. 1959) C'[T]he statement that someone was a 'queer' is slanderous per se
because it imputes the crime of sodomy.")).
' See, e.g., Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Lehman v.
Wellens, No. 86-1665, 1987 WL 267191, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 1987).
' See, e.g., Donovan v. Fiumara, 442 S.E.2d 572, 577 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).
2" Hayes, 832 P.2d at 1025. Such courts also note social trends of greater tolerance and
acceptance of gays and lesbians. See Hayes, 832 P.2d at 1025:
For a characterization of a person to warrant a per se classification, it
should, without equivocation, expose the plaintiff to public hatred or
contempt. However, there is no empirical evidence in this record
demonstrating that homosexuals are held by society in such poor esteem.
Indeed, it appears that the community view toward homosexuals is mixed.
Lehman, 1987 WL 267191, at *1 (noting state laws prohibiting employment and housing
discrimination based on sexual orientation).
2'0 Roby v. Kingsley, 492 So. 2d 789, 792 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Brandon ex rel. Estate
of Brandon v. County of Richardson, 624 N.W.2d 604, 626 (Neb. 2001); Mears v. Colvin, 768
A.2d 1264, 1268 (Vt. 2000).
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First, there are economic losses, such as lost future wages and
additional expenses resulting from the injury.261 Second, there are
noneconomic losses, including pain and suffering and loss of
enjoyment of life.2"2 In estimating damages for economic losses, an
expert economist evaluates such factors as the victim's likely wages,
household services, life expectancy, and his probability of being
employed.263  To determine a victim's likely wages, economists
consult statistical tables that report median wages based on age and
gender.264 To estimate household services, experts often use studies
that show the dollar value of household contributions based on age,
gender, and number of children.265 Life expectancy tables show life
expectancy based on age, gender, and race.266 Further statistics
based on age and gender estimate the likelihood of participating in
and remaining in the labor force.267
Noneconomic losses, such as pain and suffering and loss of
enjoyment of life, cannot be estimated by experts such as econo-
mists.2 Pain and suffering damages can include actual physical
pain, fright, anxiety, and indignity.269 Loss of enjoyment of life may
call for the jury to subjectively evaluate the victim's hobbies,
interests, and number of friends.27 Sometimes jurors are asked to
use their "collective enlightened conscience" in determining such
awards.271 Furthermore, many jurisdictions allow jurors to use a
"per diem" method, or the jury determines an award of injury for
pain and suffering based on a specific unit of time, and applies that
to the total amount of time plaintiff has been and will be injured.272
26 WILIAM GARY BAKER & MICHAEL K. SECK, DETERMINING ECONOMIC LOSS IN INJURY
AND DEATH CASES § 1.04 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2001).
"2 Id. § 1.05.
SId. §§ 1.13, 1.15, 1.17-.19.
2d. §§ 7.10.11.
2 Id. §§ 9.02-.05.
Id. §§ 11.06, 12.
Id. §§ 13.02, 13.04.
2 Id. § 1.05.
Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries
Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV. 773, 781 (1995).
270 1 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND INJURY § 3:41 (3d
ed. 1992).
271 Geistfeld, supra note 269, at 782 (citing GRAHAM DOUTHWAITE, JURYINSTRUCTIONS ON
DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS §§ 6-17 (2d ed. 1988)).
272 Id.
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Although few cases have addressed the issue, one can imagine a
number of ways in which defendants might try to argue that sexual
orientation is a determinative factor in calculating, and reducing,
economic loss. Wages, the value of household services, mortality
rates, and employment retention- all might vary with sexual
orientation. For example, a defendant might point to statistics that
state that gay men are more likely than straight men to contract
HIV,27 or that gay people are more likely to have drinking prob-
lems, 274 smoke,2 75 or use illicit drugs,276 all of which would affect life
expectancy and employment participation and retention. 7  A
defendant also might argue that a gay person is less likely to have
children, which could affect the value of household services.
Moreover, a defendant could argue that gay youth are more likely
to engage in risky behaviors278 or attempt suicide.279 Finally, the
simple fact of discrimination and the lack of statutory protection 280
might reduce a victim's likelihood of retaining employment, as
future earnings of the decedent or the injured person are relevant
to the issue of damages in wrongful death actions and personal
injury actions.28 '
For the noneconomic portion of the damages award, a defendant
might point to real or likely estrangement from family because of
273 Joseph A. Cantania et al., The Continuing HIV Epidemic Among Men Who Have Sex
with Men, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 907, 907 (2001).
"' Carrie Jaffe et al., The Prevalence of Alcoholism and Feelings of Alienation in Lesbian
and Heterosexual Women, J. GAY & LESBIAN PSYCHOTHERAPY, Winter 2000, at 25; Barbara
G. Valanis et al., Sexual Orientation and Health, 9 ARCHIVES OF FAM. MED. 843, 849-50
(2000).
275 Ronald D. Stall et al., Cigarette SmokingAmong Gay and Bisexual Men, 89 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1875, 1875 (1999); Valanis et al., supra note 274, at 849-50.
27 William F. Skinner, The Prevalence and Demographic Predictors of Illicit and Licit
Drug Use Among Lesbians and Gay Men, 84 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1307, 1309 (1994).
... See generally Paul Cameron et al., Does Homosexual Activity Shorten Life?, 83
PSYCHOL. REP. 847 (1998) (claiming homosexual activity could shorten life expectancy by
twenty to thirty years).
27s Robert Garofalo et al., The Association Between Health Risk Behaviors and Sexual
Orientation Among a School.based Sample of Adolescents, PEDIATRICS, May 1998, at 895.
"" James Orlando, Homosexuality is a Risk Factor for Teen Suicide, in TEEN SUICIDE 19-
20 (2000). But see Delia M. Rios, The Extent of Homosexual Teen Suicide is Exaggerated, in
TEEN SUICIDE 88-90 (2000).
m See H.R. 2692, 107th Cong. (2001) (prohibiting employment discrimination on basis of
sexual orientation in proposed bill).
28' WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 401.08(7), at 401-62.3.
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sexual orientation, thus reducing loss of consortium awards
sometimes given to a victim's family.282 Or perhaps a defendant
would simply hope that the jury would arrive at its own conclusion
that the life of a gay person is worth less than the life of a heterosex-
ual person.
When an individual victim is known to be an alcoholic2. 3 or HIV
positive,28 4 such evidence has been admitted by courts as relevant to
damages. The question is whether statistics showing that gay
people are more likely to be alcoholics or HIV positive, or be
estranged from their families, can be used as a way of reducing
damages.
As discussed above,28 5 life expectancy and wage tables are usually
based on age, race, and gender.2 6 Such differentials result in
different damage awards based on the use of "status" categories. 287
That is, the categories ignore the individual conduct of the victim.
While the use of such categories has been criticized,2 8 no case law
discusses its relevancy to damages. Using sexual orientation as a
factor to determine life expectancy or lost wages involves similar
issues. A defendant might argue that the victim's status is relevant,
while a plaintiff would want the jury to consider only the victim's
actual conduct.
282 See, e.g., Voelker v. Frederick Bus. Prop. Co., 465 S.E.2d 246, 251-52 (W. Va. 1995)
(finding evidence of beneficiary8 relationship to decedent relevant to issue of damages).
' Humble v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 441 F.2d 816, 819 (6th Cir. 1971) (allowing
physician testimony regarding decedent's alcoholism to show that decedent's capacity to work
was seriously impaired at times); Appel v. Quilantang, 629 So. 2d 1004, 1004-05 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1993); Kraus v. Taylor, 710 A.2d 1142, 1143-44 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (finding
plaintiff' s alcoholism relevant to issue of life expectancy where plaintiff submitted actuarial
tables to jury); Perkins v. Olson, No. 15269-3-111, 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 1033, at *6 (Wash.
Ct. App. July 1, 1997); Kramer v. J.I. Case Mfg. Co., 815 P.2d 798, 806-07 (Wash. Ct. App.
1991).
' Agosto v. Trusswal Sys. Corp., 142 F.R.D. 118, 120 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding HIV-
related information relevant to life expectancy). But see Sacramona v. Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc., 152 F.R.D. 428, 431 (D. Mass. 1993) (refusing to order plaintiff who admitted to having
risky lifestyle to submit to blood test, finding possibility that plaintiff might be HIV positive
too attenuated to be relevant to issue of life expectancy and damages).
m See supra notes 264-67 and accompanying text.
286 See WILLIAM GARY BAKER & MICHAEL K. SECK, DETERMINING ECONOMIC LOSS IN
INJURY AND DEATH CASES §§ 11.05-.06 (2d ed. 1993).
' See Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U.
PA. L. REV. 463, 482 (1998).
2W Id.
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Two examples show how, in calculating damages, juries might be
asked to consider general statistics about a segment of a population,
and not a victim's individual circumstances. First, life expectancy
tables that use race as a factor show a lower life expectancy for
African-Americans."" Yet social science studies generally show that
a higher mortality'rate for African-Americans is based on socio-
economic conditions.2" Homicide, for example, is a leading cause of
death for African-American men. 91 However, not all African-
Americans are exposed to this increased risk of mortality.
Second, wage earning tables based on gender show lower lifetime
earnings for women.292 Some believe that such differentials are
based on workplace discrimination and the glass-ceiling phenome-
non.293 Yet, not all women earn less than their male counterparts.
Determining the relevance of a victim's sexual orientation to the
issue of damages would pose a similar conflict between making
generalizations and analyzing circumstances individual to the
victim. That is, to argue that a victim's sexual orientation is
relevant to his or her life expectancy or capacity to earn wages, a
defendant likely would point to general studies and statistics.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, would want to argue that the jury
should only consider those circumstances that actually exist in the
victim (i.e., his actual health or prior wage earnings). Arguing that
a gay victim has a statistically higher chance than his heterosexual
counterpart of contracting HIV and therefore a statistically lower
life expectancy, the argument might go, is based on stereotypes and
negative assumptions. Instead, a plaintiff would want the jury to
look at the victim's actual behaviors and HIV status. However, the
routine use of race and gender in wage earning and life expectancy
2" WILLIAM GARY BAKER & MICHAEL K. SECK, DETERMINING ECONOMIC LOSS IN INJURY
AND DEATH CASES § 12.02 (2d ed. 1993).
no See, e.g., Sharon A. Jacksonet al., The Relation of Residential Segregation to All.Cause
Mortality: A Study in Black and White, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, Apr. 2000, at 615 (concluding
that minority residential segregation may influence mortality risk).
2' Homicide A Major Factor In Shorter Life Expectancy For Blacks: Study, JET, Oct. 15,
2001, at 36.
29 BAKER & SECK, supra note 286, §§ 11.05-.06. Notably, wage earning tables are usually
only used where the wage earning history of a plaintiff cannot be concretely established.
WILLIAM GARY BAKER & MICHAEL K SECK, DETERMINING ECONOMIC LOSS IN INJURY AND
DEATH CASES § 7.18 (2d ed. 1993).
' See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 287, at 482.
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tables294 lends support to a defense position that sexual orientation,
too, is a status that affects potential earnings and mortality,
regardless of actual conduct. If the use of race and gender to
determine a victim's likely lifetime earnings or life expectancy
reflects deep bias and assumptions in our culture,295 then it could be
just as likely that sexual orientation is another layer in the
calculation. Arguably, in the case of sexual orientation, the
prejudicial nature of the admission outweighs the probative value.
The few cases that have considered the issue have uniformly
rejected the admission of evidence of the victim's sexual orientation
on the issue of damages. In Mears v. Colvin,296 the defendant in a
wrongful death action, over the plaintiff's objection, introduced
testimony that the plaintiff (the decedent's wife) was having a
lesbian affair, and was planning on divorcing him.29 7 On appeal the
court noted that evidence of an extramarital affair, like evidence of
the decedent's relationship with his children, is relevant to claims
of loss of companionship or loss of consortium. 298 However, the court
held that the nature of the extramarital affair, because it was a
homosexual affair, "added virtually nothing of probative value," and
that "[t]he only effect, if not indeed the purpose of defense counsel's
repeated probing of the witness . . . concerning the homosexual
aspect of the alleged relationship was to appeal to homophobic
prejudices. "'29
In Roby v. Kingsley,"'0 a mother brought suit on behalf of herself
and her son, a teenager who sustained brain damage from a car
accident that occurred while hitchhiking in one of the defendants'
cars.3 O' The trial court admitted evidence of the teenager's prior
homosexual relationship, and the appeals court reversed on this
ground finding that "the evidence was irrelevant to his injuries and
2 See supra notes 286.93 and accompanying text.
' See Chamallas, supra note 287, at 466 (contending that "bias finds its way into the law,
not through explicit differential treatment.. . but through reliance on implicit hierarchies
of values and dichotomous thinking").
768 A.2d 1264 (Vt. 2000).
'7 Id. at 1266.
29 Id. at 1267-68.
Id. at 1268.
"o 492 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1986).
0' Id. at 791.
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could have been prejudicial."" °2 Moreover, the court found that
"[e]ven if [the evidence] were relevant it would be inadmissible since
its value would be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice."303
Finally, in Brandon ex rel. Estate of Brandon v. County of
Richardson,°4 the victim was murdered, and the mother brought a
wrongful death action. °5 There was evidence that the victim
suffered from a gender identity disorder in that she was a woman
who held herself out to be a man.30 6 The trial court reduced the
jury's award for loss of society, comfort, and companionship to
nominal or zero damages. 30 7  The appeals court noted that
"[e]vidence regarding the quality and extent of the parent-child
relationship may... be utilized in determining the amount of those
damages."308 The defendant argued that the nominal damages
award was appropriate because the relationship between the victim
and the mother was "strained and undeveloped" due to the gender
identity disorder, but the court held that the victim's "personal
problems are relevant only to the extent that they impacted her
relationship with [her mother] .,,o9
Thus, it appears as though the few courts that have considered
the issue reject statistical arguments that a gay life is somehow
worth less than a straight one, demanding evidence of an actual
negative impact before allowing such evidence in, and even then,
avoiding reference to the person's sexual orientation where feasible.
These decisions not only express a concern that the jury will misuse
the evidence to make its own value judgment on the victim's life
based on their personal prejudices regarding gays and lesbians, but
also reject the premise that stereotypes about gays and lesbians are
relevant indicators of their actual behavior.10
3 Id. at 792.
s Id.
624 N.W.2d 604 (Neb. 2001).
m Id. at 610.
Id. at 611.
" Id. at 625.
Id. at 625-26.
Id. at 626.
80 Cf. People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 71 (Cal. 1968) (holding that trial court erred in
admitting mathematical probability evidence to prove defendant's guilt based on personal
2003]
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I. RELEVANCE IN DOMESTIC RELATIONS MATTERS
The issue of a natural or adoptive parent's sexual orientation
sometimes arises in child custody disputes. In some states, such as
Florida, a potential adoptive parent's sexual orientation is relevant,
because a state statute bars gay people from adopting children,3 '
although in other states, it is not a relevant consideration." 2
Where a couple divorces, in part because one of the two is gay,
the issue of the gay natural parent's sexual orientation sometimes
plays a role in deciding custody of the couple's children. A few
courts find that the mere fact that a parent is gay is a relevant
factor that can be used to deny custody. 8' However, even these
courts typically provide that the parent's homosexuality alone
cannot be the sole or dispositive factor in making the child custody
determination. 14 Moreover, most courts hold that the parent's
sexual orientation, standing alone, is irrelevant, absent evidence
that the parent's conduct resulting from sexual orientation has a
negative impact on the children." 5 Because the fitness or character
of the parent is at issue in child custody cases, introducing evidence
of either parent's sexual orientation is not barred by the character
characteristics).
. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1997).
311 See, e.g., In re C.M.A., 715 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (citing In re Petition of
KM., 653 N.E.2d 888, 892 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)).
"' See, e.g., Morris v. Morris, 783 So. 2d 681,693 (Miss. 2001) (holding sexual orientation
of parent relevant to moral fitness, because homosexual conduct violates state sodomy
statutes); Pascarella v. Pascarella, 512 A.2d 715, 716-17 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding that
parent's homosexuality creates presumption of detriment to child); Bottoms v. Bottoms, No.
2157-96-2, 1997 WL 421218, at *2 (Va. Ct. App. July 29, 1997).
314 Morris, 783 So. 2d at 693 (holding that parent's homosexuality cannot be sole factor);
Bottoms, 1997 WL 421218, at *2 (holding that other factors, including parental conduct and
impact on children, also must be considered).
... See, e.g., Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 642 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) ('Sexual
orientation is not relevant to a parent's visitation rights. It is relevant only if it directly
harms [the child]."); D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286, 291, 293 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that
homosexuality, standing alone, without evidence of adverse effect on child, cannot be used as
basis for denying custody); Boswell v. Boswell, 721 A.2d 662, 672-73 (Md. 1998) (holding that
parent's sexual orientation is not relevant absent showing of actual harm to child from same-
sex relationship); T.C.H. v. K.M.H., 784 S.W.2d 281,282-85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
homosexual parent not per se unfit to have custody, and can be denied custody only where
evidence shows that parent's homosexuality harms child).
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inference rule, and the orientation can be proven by specific
instances of conduct rather than reputation or opinion evidence.1
1 6
The issue of a person's sexual orientation also has arisen when
a party is seeking an annulment. 7 or fault-based divorce, and states
as a ground that the other partner is gay. Most courts have
recognized homosexuality as grounds for annulling a marriage
(although often finding inadequate proof of the same),"1 8 but failure
to disclose a prior homosexual relationship has been held not to be
grounds for an annulment.19 Where the spouse has engaged in
extramarital homosexual conduct, most courts have held that this
falls within the definition of adultery and is thus grounds for
divorce, 2' although a few decisions hold that it does not fall within
the definition of adultery. 21 The latter courts will sometimes,
however, hold that such conduct falls within the definition of "cruel
and inhuman treatment," another typical basis for divorce. 22 A
persistent course of homosexual conduct by one of the spouses may
also constitute constructive desertion, which is yet another basis-for
divorce. 23 Moreover, one court has drawn a distinction between the
status of homosexuality, finding that not to be a ground for divorce,
816 See supra notes 77-79, 99-102 and accompanying text.
81 Unlike a divorce, an annulment establishes that the marriage never existed in law.
BLACIVS LAW DICTIONARY 89 (7th ed. 1999).
818 See, e.g., Sampson v. Sampson, 50 N.W.2d 764, 765-66 (Mich. 1952); Sophian v. Von
Linde, 253 N.Y.S.2d 496, 497 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964); Freitag v. Freitag, 242 N.Y.S.2d 643,644
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963).
SWoy v. Woy, 737 S.W.2d 769, 770, 773-74 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
See, e.g., Adams v. Adams, 357 So. 2d 881, 882 (La. Ct. App. 1978); S.B. v. S.J.B., 609
A.2d 124, 126-27 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992); R.G.M. v. D.E.M., 410 S.E.2d 564, 567 (S.C.
1991).
'2' See, e.g., H. v. H., 157 A.2d 721, 726 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959); Cohen v. Cohen,
103 N.Y.S.2d 426, 426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951).
See H. v. H., 157 A.2d at 726:
It is difficult to conceive of a more grievous indignity to which a person of
normal psychological and sexual constitution could be exposed that the
entry by his spouse upon an active and continuous course of homosexual
love with another. Added to the insult of sexual disloyalty per se (which
is present in ordinary adultery) is the natural revulsion arising from
knowledge of the fact that the spouse's betrayal takes the form of a
perversion.
Id.; see also Morris v. Morris, 783 So. 2d 681, 689-90 (Miss. 2001); M.V.R. v. T.M.R., 454
N.Y.S.2d 779, 783-84 & n.10 (N.Y. 1982); Steinke v. Steinke, 357 A.2d 674, 676 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1976).
'2' Richardson v. Richardson, 304 A.2d 1, 6-7 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973).
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and the conduct of homosexual adultery, which is a potential
ground, although it noted that many courts allow for divorce due to
one spouse's homosexual status under the rubric of "cruel and
inhuman treatment.3 24
J. RELEVANCE IN COURT MARTIAL PROCEEDINGS BASED ON "DON'T
ASK, DON'T TELL"
Evidence of sexual orientation has arisen in court martial
proceedings in which a servicemember is being discharged for
engaging in homosexual conduct. Although such discharges are for
homosexual conduct and not homosexual status, the courts have
held that evidence of the status-such as gay-oriented magazines
and videotapes and a gay pride button-is relevant because it
supports an inference that the person engages in homosexual
activity.325 A person facing such a discharge may rebut with
evidence of heterosexuality under Rule 404(a)(1),3 26 although such
evidence is viewed as equivocal, given that it is consistent not just
with heterosexuality, but also with bisexuality, which is likewise
prohibited. 27
K. THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF EVIDENCE OF HOMOSEXUALITY
Someone who is gay, or who believes in equal rights for gay
people, might find it troubling to try to block evidence of sexual
orientation from being admitted on the ground that it is "prejudi-
cial," as that somehow seems to connote that being gay is wrong,
embarrassing, or something to keep hidden. Yet to object to the
admission of evidence under Rule 403 on the ground that it is
324 M.V.R., 454 N.Y.S.2d at 783-84 & n.10. Much of this discussion, however, is somewhat
academic, given the widespread availability of no-fault divorce. Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon
Lohr, Marriage as a Contract, Opportunistic Violence, and Other Bad Arguments for Fault
Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 719, 722-23.
s2 Jackson v. United States Dep't of Air Force, No. 96-15949, 1997 WL 759144, at *1 (9th
Cir. Nov. 3, 1997).
See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
a United States v. Gagan, 43 M.J. 200, 201-04 (C.A.A.F. 1995); see also People v. Sellers,
230 P.2d 398, 399 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951) (allowing jury to weigh evidence regarding
defendants reputation in community as nonhomosexual).
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prejudicial is not a judgment about being gay, but rather a judgment
about the capacity of jurors.328 It is thus merely a realization that
"[t]here will be, on virtually every jury, people who would find the
lifestyle and sexual preferences of a homosexual or bisexual person
offensive," and that "our criminal justice system must take the
necessary precautions to assure that people are convicted based on
evidence of guilt, and not on the basis of some inflammatory
personal trait." '329 On the other hand, it is possible that the
potential bias of the jury may differ depending on where the jury is
drawn, such that what results in unfair prejudice before a jury in
Colorado Springs may not result in unfair prejudice before a jury in
San Francisco.330
One of the purposes of Rule 403 is to allow judges to exclude
evidence where the ostensibly legitimate purpose asserted for
proffering the evidence appears to be little more than a pretext for
getting evidence of a highly prejudicial nature before the jury.3 1
Thus, when a prosecutor seeks to admit evidence of the defendant's
sexual orientation in a child molestation case, the covert message
that the prosecutor is trying to send to the jury is something to the
effect of "this guy is a 'pervert,' and he's charged here with an act of
perversion, you know what to do. ' 332 Defendants also try to bring
into evidence the victim's sexual orientation in the hopes that the
jury will have less sympathy for the victim because of the jurors'
own prejudices against gay people. Thus, to protect the integrity of
the fact-finding process, judges must exclude evidence of sexual
"a See FED. R. EVID. 403.
3 State v. Ford, 926 P.2d 245, 250 (Mont. 1996); see also Blakeney v. State, 911 S.W.2d
508, 516 n.5 (Tex. App. 1995) (noting that being gay is "considered improper, immoral, and
highly offensive by segments of the population and hence testimony linking Appellant to such
conduct could have unduly prejudiced some of the jurors against the Appellant').
' See Doepel v. United States, 434 A.2d 449, 457 (D.C. 1981) ("WIfn a jurisdiction where
the elected legislative body has repealed a law making homosexual intercourse a crime, we
can scarcely infer widespread community prejudice against persons of such sexual orientation
[sufficient to justify excluding evidence of a party's homosexuality.]").
3" United States v. Di Tullio, No. CRIM. A. 87-286-01, 1988 WL 29316, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 24, 1988).
' State v. Taylor, 663 So. 2d 336, 340 (La. App. Ct. 1995); see also Blakeney, 911 S.W.2d
at 515 (noting that introducing evidence "could only serve to send to the jury the message that
all homosexual men are also molesters of little boys").
2003] 845
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
orientation where the stated reason for admitting the evidence is
merely a pretext for appealing to the jury's prejudices.
Such evidence, even if it has marginal relevance, may be
prejudicial for yet another reason. Evidence of sexual orientation
may, to the jurors, "seem much more relevant than it is, and
therefore may be prejudicial."333 In this sense, jurors might
overvalue the probative worth of such evidence, causing them to
ignore or undervalue other evidence that might be more salient in
making their factual findings.
Although Rule 403 suggests that a limiting instruction should be
employed where available in lieu of excluding such evidence or
ordering a new trial where the evidence is improperly brought
before the jury,334 the reality is that giving the jury such an
instruction is like trying to "unring" a bell that's already been
rung,"' and the only likely effect of a limiting instruction is to
emphasize rather than cure any potential prejudice of admitting the
evidence of the person's sexual orientation.3 6 Perhaps the best
solution, where exclusion of such evidence is not feasible or
desirable, is to allow for screening of jurors during voir dire so as to
exclude any who might hold prejudices against gay people. 3 7
L. THE POLITICS OF RULE 401
It is clear enough that courts determine whether evidence is
"relevant" under the materiality prong of Rule 401 by reference to
the underlying substantive law. But how is it that courts determine
whether something is "relevant" under the probative worth prong of
Rule 401? Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action more probable or less
I ERIC D. GREEN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 70 (3d ed. 2000); see also
State v. O'Key, 899 P.2d 663, 676 (Or. 1995) ('[Wihen the jury is likely to overvalue or be
misled into giving the evidence undue weight, the likelihood of exclusion under [Rule] 403 is
enhanced.").
83 FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
United States v. Millen, 594 F.2d 1085, 1088 (6th Cir. 1979).
• State v. Woodard, 769 A.2d 379, 383 (N.H. 2001).
See United States v. Phillips, 52 M.J. 268, 272-73 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
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probable than it would be without the evidence. 338' But how is it
that one judge decides that the fact that a defendant in, for example,
a child sexual assault case is gay has some tendency to make more
probable the accusation that the defendant sexually assaulted a
child of the same gender, while another judge finds just the
opposite?
Rule 401 does not set out any mechanical formula for determin-
ing whether something is "relevant." Thus, in determining whether
a piece of evidence is relevant in the sense of having probative
worth, each individual judge draws on her own experiences,
conceptions, and general knowledge of the universe and the people
in it to determine whether the evidence has probative value. 39
Thus, the judge's personal and political views about gays and
lesbians undoubtedly play a role in her decision whether to label
evidence of an individual's sexual orientation relevant or irrelevant,
FED. R. EVID. 401.
3" See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 401.03(2)(b), at 401-9 to 401-10.
Each judge brings to the determination of relevance a general knowledge
of the world and the meaning of words, and trial judges are allowed great
flexibility in drawing on personal experience to evaluate the factors on
which relevance turns. Rule 401, by furnishing no standards for the
determination of relevance, implicitly recognizes that questions of
relevance cannot be resolved by mechanical resort to legal formulae.
Thus, the judge's own experience and conceptions, rather than legal
precedents, will often furnish the basis for determinations.
Id.; see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 4.2, at 171 ("In ruling upon relevancy,
the court must draw on its own experience, knowledge, and common sense in assessing
whether a logical relationship exists between proffered evidence and the fact to be proven.");
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 401.04(1), at 401-14 ("Courts cannot employ a precise,
technical, legalistic test for relevance; instead, they must apply logical standards applicable
in every day life."); Vaughn C. Ball, The Myth of Conditional Relevancy, 14 GA. L. REV. 435,
461-62 (1980):
(Flor evidence to be relevant[, t]he relevancy proposition must be found
by the judge to be acceptableL and t]he judge must determine that the
connecting proposition is sufficiently probable that it would be reasonable
for a juror to use it in making a new and changed estimate of the
probability of the conclusion, after receiving the evidence. The judge may,
and usually does, decide this question by a form ofjudicial notice, drawing
on what he knows as a reasonable judge about the behavior of the
universe, including the humans in it .... If the judge finds the offered
generalization not acceptable ... the evidence lacks relevance because the
connection is lacking at the time of the offer.
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
thus explaining variations in the relevancy determinations across
judges and even by region of the country.
Moreover, it is possible that a judge may, in his own mind,
recognize that such evidence is "relevant" in the sense of having
some minuscule probative worth, but nevertheless may hold it to be
"irrelevant" because of the social norms and values that his decision
will project on society. 40 Thus, even if a judge believes there is
some probative value in showing that a defendant is gay or pos-
sesses gay-oriented magazines, he nonetheless may hold it irrele-
vant because of the stigmatizing message that a contrary holding
would send to society-that being gay has some relevance to
determining whether you are a child molesterer, or an unfit parent,
or the like. 4' Although Rule 403 remains at the judge's disposal to
keep out evidence with low probative worth and a high tendency to
prejudice the jury,142 holding the evidence to be relevant under Rule
401 but excludable under Rule 403 sends a very different message
to society than does merely excluding the evidence as irrelevant
under Rule 401. The former stigmatizes gay people by sending a
message that there is some truth to the link between the evidence
and the point that it is being offered to prove, but that it is being
excluded only because the jury may make improper use of the
evidence. The latter approach, on the other hand, refuses to even
credit the stigmatizing claim. While exclusion of evidence under
Rule 403 is concerned with the message that admitting the evidence
will send to the jury and a judgment about the capacity of the jury,
exclusion pursuant to Rule 401 is concerned with the message that
840 See GREEN ET AL., supra note 22, at 15-16:
[As the judge, you] might recognize the relevance of the evidence yet
nevertheless want to exclude it because you understand the superstition
and do not want a conviction (apparently) based upon it .... (MWe may be
led to conclude that the operative concept of relevance in the system is a
reflection of the underlying social, political, and economic interests the
system is serving.
Id.; Ronald J. Allen, The Myth of Conditional Relevancy, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 871, 877-82
(1992).
" Cf. Guam v. Shymanovitz, 157 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 1998) (expressingconcern that
ruling books about murder mysteries could be admitted to support inference that defendant
has propensity to engage in murder might have undesirable side-effect of compelling people
"to choose contents of their libraries with considerable care").
342 See FED. R. EVID. 403.
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will be sent to society at large. Thus, while some judges merge their
analysis of evidence under Rules 401 and 403, which rule they
ultimately employ to exclude the evidence makes an enormous
difference in the message that their judgment sends to society.
III. STATEMENTS ABOUT SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE
HEARSAY RULE
Assume that evidence about the sexual orientation of a victim,
party, or witness is relevant for one of the reasons discussed in Part
II of this Article3 43 and is not subject to exclusion under Rule 403 or
any of the categorical rules of exclusion set forth in Rules 404
through 412. How, exactly, does one go about proving someone's
sexual orientation? Perhaps one might seek to accomplish this by
calling a witness to testify that he heard the person say that he was
gay or make reference to a sexual encounter involving someone of
the same gender, by providing evidence that the person had a gay
pride bumper sticker on his car or gay pride button on his jacket, or
by soliciting testimony from a witness that he saw the person
marching in a gay pride parade or has heard that the person is gay
from other people in the community. However, if this is the manner
in which one wishes to prove a person's sexual orientation, one runs
up against another potential barrier to admissibility, namely the
hearsay rule.344
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, "hearsay" is defined as "a
statement, other than one made by the declarant 45 while testifying
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted."3 46 The hearsay rule provides that "[h]earsay is not
admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or
by Act of Congress.3 47
33 See supra notes 18-342 and accompanying text.
34 See, e.g., Gay v. Gay, 253 S.E.2d 846, 848 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Spell, 399 So.
2d 551, 555-56 (La. 1981); State v. McCauley, 272 So. 2d 335, 343 (La. 1973); Downey v. State,
731 P.2d 350, 351-52 (Nev. 1987); Harwood v. State, 961 S.W.2d 531, 538 (Tex. App. 1997).
" According to the Federal Rules, "A 'declarant' is a person who makes a statement."
FED. R. EVID. 801(b).
84' FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
847 FED. R. EVID. 802.
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The word "statement" is not limited to oral statements. The
federal rules define a "statement" as "(1) an oral or written assertion
or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person
as an assertion." 48 Because the definition of hearsay includes
written assertions, the hearsay rule excludes testimony about the
contents of bumper stickers, t-shirts, buttons, and tattoos, to the
extent that such evidence is being offered into evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. 49 Thus, it should exclude any of these
items that express in words that the bearer of the label is gay. It
should also exclude those written assertions that do not use words,
but instead use symbols, such as a pink triangle or a rainbow flag,
because these are intended to assert, through a symbol, that the
person displaying the symbol is gay."
FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
In addition, the best evidence rule might require producing the bumper sticker, tattoo,
or t-shirt itself rather than testimony about the same. See FED. R. EVID. 1002 ("To prove the
content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph
is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by Act of Congress."). However,
the federal rules further provide that a duplicate of a writing is admissible in lieu of
producing the original in most circumstances. See FED. R. EVID. 1003 C'A duplicate is
admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the
authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the
duplicate in lieu of the original."). Furthermore, a "duplicate" is defined as including a
photograph of an original writing. See FED. R. EVID. 1001(4) ("A 'duplicate' is a counterpart
produced... by means of photography."); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 10.5, at
1205 ('A 'duplicate' also includes a photograph of a writing, an inscribed chattel, or another
photograph."). Moreover, things such as cars with bumper stickers, t-shirts with mottos, or
people with tattoos might be viewed as inscribed chattels, and thus may not be viewed as
"writings," thus falling outside the best evidence rule. See United States v. Duffy, 454 F.2d
809, 812 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that shirt with laundry mark on it containing defendant's
name was not subject to beet evidence rule because it is inscribed chattel rather than
writing). And even if deemed to be a writing, if a tattoo were on a person who is now dead
and buried, and whose body is decomposed, production of the original likely would be excused,
thus allowing in testimony as to the contents of the tattoo. See FED. R. EviD. 1004(1) ('The
original is not required, and other evidence of the contents of a writing, recording, or
photograph is admissible if .... All originals are lost or have been destroyed, unless the
proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith.").
'5 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 8.7, at 797:
Sometimes people express and communicate by code words, symbols, or
behavior. Such codes may be set up by agreement or grow out of practice
or custom .... For hearsay purposes, such coded expressions should be
viewed as statements, which means they are hearsay if offered to prove
what they assert. This conclusion follows directly from the definition of
statement contained in FRE 801(a) that embraces all assertions and
conduct, provided that the declarant or actor has assertive intent. By
definition, coded expressions differ from standard nonverbal cues (like
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Moreover, as the second part of the definition of "statement"
indicates, it includes nonverbal conduct of a person, if intended by
the person to be an assertion.35" ' Thus, testimony that the person
was, for example, marching in a gay pride parade should fall within
the definition of "statement," since doing that is usually intended to
assert something, for example, that the person marching in the
parade is gay and proud of it. Indeed, even testimony that the
person was holding hands or kissing another person of the same
gender in public, to the extent that the person was trying to express
a public message about his sexuality, would fall within the defini-
tion of "statement."
Although the hearsay rule on its face appears to be a substantial
barrier to admitting into evidence much testimony about a person's
sexual orientation, there are several ways in which testimony as to
verbal and nonverbal assertions about a person's sexual orientation,
although falling within the definition of "statement" for purposes of
the hearsay rule, are nonetheless admissible.
A. OFFERINGTHE EVIDENCE FOR REASONS OTHER THAN TO PROVE THE
TRUTH OF THE MATTER ASSERTED
As the definition of hearsay indicates, a "statement" fits the
definition of hearsay only when the evidence is offered "to prove the
truth of the matter asserted." '352 Thus, "[i]f the significance of an
offered statement lies solely in the fact that it was made, no issue
is raised as to the truth of anything asserted, and the statement is
not hearsay. 3 53 There are several examples of ways in which a
nodding the head) in being essentially obscure (or at least ambiguous) to
ordinary observers. Sometimes the actor is trying to avoid being
understood by outsiders. Often there is no room to doubt that he has an
expressive and communicative purpose, as is usually true in cases of
written symbols, spoken words, and gestures, and the task is to decode
what is said.
Id.
3 According to the drafters, "It]he key to the definition is that nothing is an assertion
unless intended to be one," and that "[t]he rule is so worded as to place the burden upon the
party claiming that the intention existed; ambiguous and doubtful cases will be resolved
against him and in favor of admissibility." FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee's note.
312 FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
53 FED. R. EVID. 801(c) advisory committee's note.
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statement about a person's sexual orientation might be offered not
for its truth, but for some other reason.
One way a statement can be offered for a reason other than to
prove the truth of the matter asserted is when it is offered for
impeachment purposes. Thus, if a witness has made a prior
statement, and later gives testimony that is inconsistent with that
prior statement, the prior statement can be offered to impeach the
witness's credibility. The idea when offering the evidence for such
a purpose is that what is relevant is not the truth or falsity of the
statement, but rather the fact that there is inconsistency between
what the witness says at one moment and what he says at another
moment, and thus sheds light on his credibility as a witness.354 For
example, if the witness is asked on the stand if he is gay, and he
says that he is not, statements made by him to the
contrary-including statements implicit in his actions-presumably
could be introduced to impeach his credibility.355 However, because
such prior statements are not admissible for their truth under the
hearsay rule, and because they could be misused by a jury for their
truth where the truth of the statements is relevant, a party cannot
call the witness as his own witness-knowing that he will deny that
he is gay-so that he may introduce the prior statements purport-
edly to impeach him but in fact "as a mere subterfuge to get before
the jury evidence not otherwise admissible.3 56
A second way in which a statement can be offered for a reason
other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted is when the
words or symbols therein are used as identifying characteristics,
known as verbal objects. 57 Thus, for example, if a witness to a hit-
and-run accident testifies that the car that hit him had a rainbow
flag on it, or if a witness testifies that the person he saw running
from the scene of the crime had a pink triangle tattooed to his left
forearm, these uses of the evidence are not excluded by the hearsay
rule because the statements are being admitted not for their
3 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 8.17, at 823-24.
However, the ability to introduce extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness by
contradiction is subject to the collateral-matter rule. See supra notes 223-25 and accompany-
ing text.
m Whitehurst v. Wright, 592 F.2d 834, 839 (5th Cir. 1979).
8'7 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 8.19, at 825-26.
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"assertive" aspect, but instead as elements in a physical description
of the person who committed the crime or the car used to commit an
offense.358
A third way in which a statement can be offered- for a reason
other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted is when it is
offered to prove what effect the words had on the person who heard
or read them, in order to prove what the person knew at the time.3 59
Thus, for example, in the "true" self-defense cases discussed
above, 60 if the defendant had heard that the victim had previously
committed violent sexual assault against other males, that would be
relevant to his claim that he feared the victim based on what he had
heard about him. This evidence would assist the jury in determin-
ing whether he acted reasonably in killing the victim. In this
situation, the statement is not offered for the truth of the matter
asserted therein, but rather to show the defendant's knowledge at
the time of the incident. 6 1 Alternatively, evidence that the defen-
dant heard that the victim was gay might be used to provide a
motive for the killing in a hate-crime case, and such evidence would
not be offered into evidence to prove the truth of the victim's sexual
orientation, but merely the defendant's belief of it and thus his
possible motivation for committing the crime.6 2
B. STATUTORY NONHEARSAY AND THE HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS
Even if a person's statement about his sexual orientation is
offered into evidence for the truth of the matter asserted, one can
nonetheless circumvent the hearsay rule and admit such evidence
if the statement is either statutory nonhearsay or falls within an
exception to the hearsay rule. Rule 801(d) provides that eight types
358 Id.
a9 Id. § 8.18, at 824-25.
3o See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
36 Id. § 4.18, at 236-37; cf. Berry v. Commonwealth, 84 S.W.3d 82, 89 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001)
(finding testimony that victim's father told him that defendant was homosexual relevant and
admissible to show victim's state of mind); Applegate v. State, 904 P.2d 130, 137 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1995) (same).
"2 Cf. People v. Davis, 402 P.2d 142, 146 (Cal. 1965) (finding written note suggesting that
defendant's wife was involved in lesbian affair with victim relevant to showing defendant's
state of mind when he killed victim).
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of statements that fall within the formal definition of hearsay are
nevertheless "not hearsay." 3' Rule 803 sets forth a list of twenty-
three unrestricted exceptions to the hearsay rule.364 They are so
named because they apply without requiring a showing that the
declarant is unavailable; the rationale is that long-standing
experience has shown the statements in these categories, although
hearsay, are reliable. 65 Rule 804 sets forth a list of five restricted
exceptions to the hearsay rule, which apply only if the declarant is
"unavailable" 66 to testify as a witness.367 Finally, Rule 807 provides
a "catchall" exception for statements that do not fall within any of
the recognized exceptions, but that have equivalent guarantees of
trustworthiness.3 s  Several of these exceptions and statutory
nonhearsay categories are potentially available to admit declara-
tions of sexual orientation.
Perhaps the most significant of these is Rule 801(d)(2), which
provides that statements made or adopted by a party or made by a
party's agent or co-conspirator, when offered into evidence against
the party, are not hearsay. 69 The statement need not be against the
speaker's interest when made, because any statement made by a
party outside of court qualifies as an "admission" within the
FED. R. EVID. 801(d).
FED. R. EVID. 803.
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 803.02, at 803-12 to 803-13.
The definition of "[u]navailability as a witness" is set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence
804(a) and includes a witness who is exempted from testifying due to privilege, refuses to
testify despite a court order to do so, testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the
statement, is unable to be present because of death or physical or mental illness, or is absent
from the hearing and the proponent was unable to procure his attendance through process
or other reasonable means. FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
w7 FED. R. EVID. 804.
36 FED. R. EVID. 807.
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) provides:
A statement is not hearsay if... [t]he statement is offered against a party
and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a
representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has
manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a
person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the
subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a
matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the
existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
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meaning of this provision.37 Consequently, if the sexual orientation
of the defendant in a criminal case or a party in a civil case is at
issue, any statements the criminal defendant or civil party made
regarding his sexual orientation will fall within this provision and
be admissible.37' However, where what is at issue is the sexual
orientation of a nonparty-and a victim in a criminal case is not a
"party"3T-this provision will not be available.
A series of three unrestricted hearsay exceptions set forth in
Rules 803(1), 803(2), and 803(3), all of which evolved from the
doctrine of res gestae,73 at least theoretically might allow for the
admission of declarations of sexual orientation. Rule 803(1), the
exception for present sense impressions, provides an exception for
"[a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition made
while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or
immediately thereafter. 3 74  And Rule 803(2), the exception for
excited utterances, provides an exception for"[a] statement relating
to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under
the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.
37
Whether either of these exceptions would apply to declarations of
one's sexual orientation would depend on whether being gay is a
"condition" within the meaning of the exceptions. The rule nowhere
defines what is meant by "condition," nor is there any discussion of
the meaning of the word "condition" in the case law or treatises,
which focus instead on the word "event."371 With respect to the
present sense impression exception, to the extent that being gay is
a condition, one more or less continually "perceives" that condition.
Thus, no concern with the timing of the statement, a typical concern
with the present sense impression, 7 7 should exist. With respect to
370 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 8.27, at 866; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 21, § 801.30(l)(a), at 801-45.
37' State v. Lee, 569 So. 2d 1038, 1041 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
872 Exparte Dunaway, 746 So. 2d 1042, 1049 (Ala. 1999); Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841,
847 n. 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
171 William Gorman Passannante, Res Gestae, the Present Sense Impression Exception and
Extrisnic Corroboration Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) and Its State Counterparts,
17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 89, 89-90 (1989).
374 FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
37 FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
876 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, §§ 8.35-.36, at 904.16.
377 FED. R. EVID. 803(1), (2) advisory committee's note (noting that, for present sense
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the excited utterance exception, the declarant's statement as to his
sexual orientation would fit this exception, provided that sexual
orientation is a "condition" and the declarant was still under the
"stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.""' s Since self-
discovery of one's homosexuality certainly causes a great deal of
stress for many people, this situation might fit the exception.
Perhaps a clearer fit would be the third rule derived from the
doctrine of res gestae, Rule 803(3), the exception for statements
regarding then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition.
This rule provides an exception for "[a] statement of the declarant's
then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition
(such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and
bodily health)." '79 The exception is a specialized application of the
present sense impression rule, 8 ' and here we have the same
question: would one's statement that he is gay qualify as a descrip-
tion of a mental or emotional "condition"? The state of mind
exception has been interpreted by some courts as including state-
ments regarding love for a particular person, 38 1 so it would not seem
a stretch to include a statement of sexual orientation generally,
which in point of fact is an expression of love for persons of the same
gender. Moreover, at least one court has suggested that statements
about a person's sexual orientation might fall within this
exception.3 2
Another possible unrestricted exception is for statements made
for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, which provides an
impression, only "a slight lapse is allowable").
8 FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
8 FED. R. EVID. 803(3).
FED. R. EVID. 803(3) advisory committee's note ("Exception (3) is essentially a
specialized application of Exception (1), presented separately to enhance its usefulness and
acceptability.").
"' See, e.g., Montgomery v. State, 781 So. 2d 1007, 1019 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (noting
that exception applies to statement "I love you"); Fomby v. Popwell, 695 So. 2d 628,632 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1996) (noting that exception includes "[a] statement directly asserting or
circumstantially indicating the existence in the declarant of an emotion such as love"); State
v. Roe, No. 02CO1-9702-CR-00054, 1998 WL 7107, at *11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 1998)
(noting that exception covers "statements of love," such as "I love Karen"); Norton v. State,
771 S.W.2d 160, 168 (rex. App. 1989) (Bleil, J., concurring) ("Most commonly, the rule is
applied to a declaration as to hatred or affection.").
" Long v. Am. Red Cross, 145 F.R.D. 658, 662 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
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exception for "[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis
or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present
symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character
of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment."3" 3 Two examples might fit this
exception. First, because of the nature of sex between men, gay men
are susceptible to certain medical risks, and for their medical
doctors to better treat and advise them, it may be necessary for
sexually active gay patients to disclose their sexual orientation to
their medical doctors. Second, many people visit psychiatrists and
psychologists 84 to deal with various issues associated with their
sexual orientation, and disclosure of their sexual orientation to the
psychiatrist or psychologist is a necessary part of the treatment.
3 85
Of course, any use of this exception would have to be considered in
conjunction with any privilege that may exist for such communica-
tions,3 86 as discussed below.3 8
7
Another applicable exception is Rule 803(2 1), which sets forth an
exception for reputation3 8 testimony as to character. 39  When
someone testifies that a person has a reputation as being gay that
testimony is technically hearsay, because testimony about reputa-
'a FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
m See United States v. Newman, 965 F.2d 206, 210(7th Cir. 1992) (noting that exception
applies to psychiatrists and psychologists, and may even apply to social workers).
See, e.g., State v. Roberts, 622 A.2d 1225, 1233-34 (N.H. 1993) (holding admissible
under exception victim's discussions with his psychologist about his homosexual relationships
with defendant, reasoning that discussion was pertinent to treatment).
' See Rivera v. W. Jefferson Med. Ctr., 678 So. 2d 602, 612 (La. Ct. App. 1996)
(discussing healthcare provider/patient privilege and hearsay exception for medical
diagnosis); H.R. REP. No. 93-650 at 14 (1973) (noting that House Judiciary Committee
approves of exception "with the understanding that it is not intended in any way to adversely
affect present privilege rules or those subsequently adopted").
3 See infra notes 442-46 and accompanying text.
See 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1612, at 583-84 (1974):
Reputation ... is distinguished from mere rumor in two respects. On the
one hand, reputation implies the definite and final formation of opinion
by the community; while rumor implies merely a report that is not yet
finally credited. On the other hand, a rumor is usually thought of as
signifying a particular act or occurrence, while a reputation is predicated
upon a general trait of character; a man's reputation, for example, may
declare him honest, and yet today a rumor may have circulated that this
reputed honest man has defaulted yesterday in his accounts.
Id.
'a FED. R. EvID. 803(21).
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tion is a summary of the aggregate views in the community about
the person."' Rule 803(21) makes clear that, when reputation
testimony as to a person's character is permitted under Rule 404(a)
and Rule 405(a), such testimony is admissible notwithstanding the
hearsay rule,3 91 provided that the witness establishes a foundation
for having the necessary familiarity with the witness's reputation. 92
If a person wrote about his sexual orientation in, for example, a
diary or letter that is over twenty years old,"93 it might be admissi-
ble under Rule 803(16), which provides an exception for
"[s]tatements in a document in existence twenty years or more the
authenticity of which is established."94 A special provision provides
that such a document can be authenticated by showing that it "(A)
is in such condition as to create no suspicion concerning its authen-
ticity, (B) was in a place where it, if authentic, would likely be, and
(C) has been in existence 20 years or more at the time it is
offered."" 5
Evidence of a person's sexual orientation also might be admitted
via one of a series of six rather obscure exceptions to the hearsay
rule that deal with statements about personal or family records as
well as family, public, and religious records of marriages and other
similar events.89 These exceptions might provide an indirect means
of introducing evidence of a person's sexual orientation by introduc-
ing evidence of his having entered into a civil union or a domestic
partnership, or simply his being involved in a long-term relationship
with someone of the same gender.
The first of these is Rule 803(9), the vital statistics exception,
which provides an exception for "[riecords or data compilations, in
any form, of births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report
thereof was made to a public office pursuant to requirements of
"o MUELLER& KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 8.61, at 1000; WEINSTEIN& BERGER, supra
note 21, § 803.27, at 803-127.
' FED. R. EVID. 803(21) advisory committee's note.
'" See, e.g., Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 877 (9th Cir. 2002); State v. Lewis, 602
A.2d 618, 622 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992); State v. Frentz, 354 So. 2d 1007, 1010-11 (La. 1978).
m See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 8.58, at 994 (discussing ancient
document exception).
" FED. R. EVID. 803(16).
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8).
FED. R. EVID. 803(9), (11), (12), (13), (19); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(4).
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law."097  Vermont, for example, provides same-sex couples the
opportunity to enter into civil unions and requires that town clerks
maintain records of civil unions. 98 Such records could be viewed as
analogous to records of marriages, thus paving the way for admit-
ting such evidence under this exception. However, here one might
run into a potential problem with the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) 399 in federal court, which defines "marriage" as referring
only to "a legal union between one man and one woman as husband
and wife,"4 " although it is not entirely clear that DOMA applies to
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence.4"1 However, DOMA
would not present a problem in state courts, such as those in
Vermont, applying the analogous hearsay exception under state law,
except in those states that have enacted statutes similar to DOMA.
The second of these is Rule 803(11), the exception for records of
religious organizations.4 2 It provides an exception for "[s]tatements
of births, marriages, divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relation-
ship by blood or marriage, or other similar facts of personal or
family history, contained in a regularly kept record of a religious
organization."4 3 Because some religious organizations will perform
marriage or commitment ceremonies between people of the same
sex, records of such ceremonies should be admissible, except for the
potential problem with DOMA. However, the exception here is
broader than the vital statistics exception,40 4 and includes the
phrase "or other similar facts of personal or family history."4 5
Certainly, a marriage-like union between two persons of the same
sex should be viewed as a piece of "personal or family history," and
DOMA should thus pose no obstacle here.
's FED. R. EVID. 803(9).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5001-5012 (2000).
Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7; 28 U.S.C. §
1738C).
4w 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000) ('In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the
United States, the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife.").
,01 See infra note 484 and accompanying text.
4w FED. R. EVID. 803(11).
4W Id.
-' See FED. R. EVID. 803(9).
405 FED. R. EVID. 803(11).
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The third of these is Rule 803(12), the exception for marriage,
baptismal, and similar certificates, which creates an exception for:
[s]tatements of fact contained in a certificate that the
maker performed a marriage or other ceremony or
administered a sacrament, made by a clergyman, public
official, or other person authorized by the rules or
practices of a religious organization or by law to perform
the act certified, and purporting to have been issued at
the time of the act or within a reasonable time thereaf-
ter.
406
Although DOMA may pose a problem with respect to the word
"marriage," this exception, like the religious records exception, is
broader than that for vital statistics in that it also includes the
language "or other ceremony," which could be construed as including
a ceremony involving a same-sex union.
The fourth of these is Rule 803(13), the family records
exception.4 7 It provides an exception for "[s]tatements of fact
concerning personal or family history contained in family Bibles,
genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on family
portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like."40 8
There is no reason why any of these items, especially a genealogy,
could not make reference to a same-sex relationship, which ought to
be considered a statement of "personal or family history," in which
case this exception could apply.
The fifth of these is Rule 803(19), the exception for reputation
concerning personal or family history.4 °9 It provides an exception for
"[r]eputation among members of a person's family by blood,
adoption, or marriage or among a person's associates, or in the
community, concerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage, divorce,
death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage,
" FED. R. EVID. 803(12).
'm FED. R. EVID. 803(13).
4 Id. One state has broadened this exception to include statements concerning personal
or family history on tattoos. WASH. R. EVID. 803(a)(13).
4 FED. R. EVID. 803(19).
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ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history."""
Historically, this was allowed to show such things as reputation as
to a person's race when distinctions were made in the right to vote
and other rights based on race,41 so it is possible that it also could
include other characteristics, such as sexual orientation.
The sixth of these is Rule 804(b)(4), the exception for statements
of personal or family history, an exception that applies only if the
declarant is "unavailable" as a witness.412 It provides an exception
for:
(A) A statement concerning the declarant's own birth,
adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by
blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar
fact of personal or family history, even though declarant
had no means of acquiring personal knowledge of the
matter stated; or (B) a statement concerning the forego-
ing matters, and death also, of another person, if the
declarant was related to the other by blood, adoption, or
marriage or was so intimately associated with the
other's family as to be likely to have accurate informa-
tion concerning the matter declared.413
Rule 804(b)(4) differs from Rule 803(19) in that the former involves
testimony as to what an unavailable declarant said about his own
birth, marriage, or other similar facts of personal or family history,
while the latter is testimony about a person's reputed personal or
family history among members of that person's family or
associates.414 For similar reasons to those stated with respect to
Rule 803(19), this exception should cover statements regarding
sexual orientation because of its similar reference to "personal or
family history." Moreover, it reaches statements made by the
410 Id.
'4, 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1605, at 574-75 (1974); see also, e.g., Woolsey v. Williams,
61 P. 670, 672 (Cal. 1900) (applying exception to fact of enlisting in Army and being killed in
Civil War).
41 FED. R. EID. 804(b)(4).
41 Id.
"' WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 803.21[1], at 803-127.
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declarant regarding the personal or family history of another person
if the declarant was "intimately associated with the other's family."
Given this language, it is possible that this exception also could be
used to allow a witness to testify as to what one member of a same-
sex couple said about the other's personal or family history.
There is very little case law on what qualifies as "personal or
family history," although one case suggests that a person's sexual
orientation falls within the definition of that phrase. In Long v.
American Red Cross,415 a woman who received blood from the Red
Cross and her husband brought suit against the Red Cross after the
woman contracted HIV from the blood transfusion.416 One of the
plaintiffs' theories of negligence was that the Red Cross should have
asked questions about whether the donor was gay.417 Although the
donor had died and thus could not have testified as to whether he
would have answered such a question in the affirmative, if the
plaintiffs were told the donor's identity, they could ask his family
members whether he was reputed to be an "open homosexual,"
which would suggest that he might have been willing to answer
such questions." 8 The court noted that, although some of such
information from friends or family members would be inadmissible
hearsay, some might be admissible." 9 The court cited Rule 803(19),
the exception for testimony as to reputation concerning personal or
family history, as a possible means of overcoming the hearsay
problem.420
The final codified exception that might be applicable is the
exception for statements against interest, an exception that applies
only if the declarant is unavailable.42" ' It provides an exception for:
[a] statement which was at the time of its making so far
contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary
interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil
"l 145 F.R.D. 658 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
4,6 Id. at 659.
417 Id. at 661-62.
41s Id. at 662.
410 Id.
121 Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 803(19).
42' FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
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or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the
declarant against another, that a reasonable person in
the declarant's position would not have made the
statement unless believing it to be true.422
For this exception to apply, it is important that, at the time of the
making of the statement, the declarant must have been aware of the
fact that making the statement would be against his interest,
although absent evidence to the contrary, the courts usually will
attribute to a declarant the knowledge and interests of a reasonable
person.42
That said, there are three interests that might be implicated
when one makes a statement that he is gay. One is his pecuniary
interest, in that-especially in a state that does not protect against
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation-it may
cause the person to risk losing his job. 24 A second is penal interest,
because even though being gay is not illegal, in certain states same-
sex sodomy is. 25 And just as one can invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination to refuse to answer a question about his sexual
orientation because the answer might lead to a charge of sodomy,
answering here ought to be viewed as potentially incriminating and
thus against penal interest.42 However, the link in this case may
not be sufficiently strong to satisfy the requirement that it "so far
422 Id.
4" MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 8.72, at 1042; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 21, § 804.06, at 804-53.
424 See United States v. Hsia, 87 F. Supp. 2d 10, 14 (D.D.C. 2000) (quoting Gichner v.
Antonio Troiano Tile & Marble Co., 410 F.2d 238, 242 (D.C. Cir. 1969)) ("A statement is
admissible under Rule 804(b)(3) as being against pecuniary or proprietary interest 'when it
threatens the loss of employment, or reduces the chances for future employment.' "); United
States v. Grooters, 35 M.J. 659, 663 (A.C.M.R. 1992) (declining to find statement about
engaging in homosexual acts against interest where there was no evidence that it would have
adversely affected defendant's employment); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 8.73,
at 1049 ("In general, statements that tend to subject the speaker . . . to loss of job or
employment opportunity fit the exception.").
42 See Grooters, 35 M.J. at 663 (refusing to find statement that declarant engaged in
homosexual act against penal interest because such acts not illegal where performed). The
United States Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in a case challenging the
constitutionality of such laws. See Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. 2001), cert.
granted, 123 S. Ct. 661- (2002).
426 See infra notes 447-57 and accompanying text.
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tended to subject the declarant to... criminal liability. ' 417 In any
event, to the extent it was ever used against the person to prosecute
him for sodomy, it would likely come in under the admissions
doctrine of Rule 801(d)(2)428 anyway.
The Advisory Committee proposed including so-called statements
against social interest, or statements tending to expose declarant to
"hatred, ridicule, or disgrace,"4 29 but Congress deleted this provision
on the ground that it lacked sufficient guarantees of reliability.4 °
However, a minority of states recognize the exception for statements
against social interest,41 and at least one court has held that a
statement that one is gay or has engaged in homosexual acts is the
sort of statement that could fit the exception.432
One of the challenges to making use of the exception for state-
ments against social interest is that there can be difficulty in
deciding what constitutes the relevant community. A statement
that is for interest (or at least neutral) in one community could be
against interest in another. 3 Thus, for example, a statement that
0' FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
42 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
4 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee's note.
4 Pub. L. No. 93-595, H.R. Rep. No. 93-650, at 7089 (Nov. 15, 1973).
411 See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1230 (West 1995 & Supp. 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
4600) (1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 51.345 (2001); P.R. LAWS ANN. § 64(B)(3) (1983); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 908.045(4) (West 2000 & Supp. 2001); ARK. R. EVID. 804(b)(3); ME. R. EVID. 804(b)(3);
MONT. R. EVID. 804(b)(3); N.J. R. EVID. 803(c)(25); N.D. R. EVID. 804(b)(3); TEX. R. EVID.
803(24); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, Declarations Against Social Interest: The (Still)
Embarrassingly Neglected Hearsay Exception, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1427,1430 & nn. 11-12 (1996)
(listing jurisdictions that have codified or embraced against social interest exception).
' See, e.g., Purtell v. State, 761 S.W.2d 360, 368-69 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
" See Heddings v. Steele, 526 A.2d 349, 353 (Pa. 1987):
In Dovico, the Second Circuit approved exclusion of the hearsay statement
of one Gangi, a federal prisoner, that he had acted alone in committing a
drug offense for which both he and the defendant Dovico had been
convicted. The Dovico court first noted that this statement was not
against Gangi's penal interest as he had already been convicted. The
court also rejected the argument that the statement should have been
admitted as a statement against Gangi's social interest. The case
demonstrates the possibly unmanageable nature of a "social interest"
exception. Appellant asserts that both the admission of guilt and the
withholding of the information of Dovico's innocence were against Gangi's
social interest. But this assertion leaves many questions unanswered.
What is the relevant community: Gangi's group in prison; the whole
prison; prison generally; his friends outside prison; his community outside
prison; the reasonable community, etc.? Because Dovico and Gangi had
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one is gay may not be against interest in San Francisco, but may be
against interest in conservative Orange County, California. The
answer to this question will depend on a person's social circle and
geographic location, which makes it unworkable in practice.4"4 As
a practical matter in those states that recognize the exception, a
statement will be considered against social interest if a statement
imputing that conduct to the person would, if untrue and stated by
another person, be defamatory.43 Given that false imputations of
homosexuality appear to be viewed as defamatory everywhere,436 it
appears as though this might fit the exception in those states
recognizing this exception.
Finally, if the evidence at issue is found not to fit any of the
recognized hearsay exceptions, it is possible to have the statement
admitted under the residual exception, Federal Rule of Evidence
807."' The rule provides that a statement "not specifically
covered 43 8 by any of the exceptions set forth in Rules 803 or 804
been friends, and also because Gangi might have been attempting to
dispel the illusion that he was cooperating with the government, was the
statement so clearly against his social interests as to make it reliable?
Depending on the community selected and on the motivation of Dovico's
discerned, the declaration could be both for and against social interest.
Many difficulties would beset such a broadening of the exception. It would
be difficult to define any reliable "against social interest" exception, and
surely we could not recognize one so amorphous as that sought here,
without a complete abandonment of the hearsay rule.
Id.
4' See id.:
The Dovico opinion aptly illustrates the slippery nature of the proposed
exception for statements against social interest. Its use would require a
trial judge to first determine the habits, customs and mores of the
community within which the declarant lives. An utterance made by a
member of a motorcycle gang while in the company of his peers does not
tend to make the declarant an object of hatred, ridicule or disgrace in his
community whereas the identical statement proffered by a member of this
Court may subject him to social disapproval among his brethren.
Id.
4 Imwinkelried, supra note 431, at 1434-35 & 1435 nn.52-53.
4m See supra notes 248-59 and accompanying text.
43' FED. R. EVID. 807.
4' There is a dispute among the circuits as to what is meant by the phrase "not
specifically covered by Rules 803 or 804." See FED. R. EVID. 807. Under the majority view,
this means only that, if the statement fits one of the recognized exceptions, that exception
should be used instead of the residual exception, but if it is similar to a statement defined by
a specific exception but does not actually qualify for admission under that exception, it still
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may nonetheless be admitted if the court determines that it has
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness 439 to
evidence admitted under other hearsay exceptions, and "is more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts."440
However, Congress, in enacting this exception, intended that it be
used sparingly, 441 and the need to invoke it here is doubtful given
the possible fit with several of the recognized exceptions to the
hearsay rule.
IV. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE RULES OF PRIVILEGE
A. APPLICABILITY OF PRIVILEGE LAW TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE ABOUT
ONE'S SEXUAL ORIENTATION
Even if evidence regarding a person's sexual orientation is
relevant and not excludable as hearsay or under one of the categori-
cal rules of exclusion, the evidence nevertheless may be excluded if
it is protected by some sort of privilege. Consider the examples set
forth above in which a patient discusses his sexual orientation with
may be considered under the residual exception. See, e.g., United States v. Earles, 113 F.3d
796, 800 (Sth Cir. 1997); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 807.03(4), at 807-26 to 807-
27. However, under the minority view, a statement is "specifically covered" by an exception,
and thus cannot be considered under the residual exception, if it is similar to a statement
defined by an exception yet it narrowly misses being admissible under that exception. See,
e.g., United States v. Vigoa, 656 F. Supp. 1499, 1504 (D.N.J. 1987). See also WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 21, § 807.03(4), at 807-27.
439 See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 807.03(2)(b), at 807-14:
In determining the trustworthiness of hearsay offered under the residual
exception, courts consider such factors as: (1) the character of the
statement; (2) whether it is written or oral; (3) the relationship of the
parties; (4) the probable motivation of the declarant in making the
statement; and (5) the circumstances under which it was made.
Id.
440 FED. R. EVID. 807.
41' See Pub. L. No. 93-595, S. Rep. No. 93-1277, at 7066 (Oct. 11, 1974):
It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very
rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances. The committee does not
intend to establish a broad license for trial judges to admit hearsay
statements that do not fall within one of the other exceptions contained
in rules 803 and 804(b).
[Vol. 37:793866
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND EVIDENCE
his psychiatrist or psychologist, or discloses it to his physician.42
Such disclosures to a psychotherapist would be protected by the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, which is recognized in federal
courts and in all state courts. 443 And although no physician-patient
privilege is recognized on the federal level,444 most states recognize
such a privilege. 4 5 Thus, where the source of the evidence of a
person's sexual orientation is his physician or psychotherapist, it
may be possible to invoke one of these testimonial privileges to bar
admission of such evidence.446
Moreover, a party or witness may be able to invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination to avoid being questioned as to his own
sexual orientation. The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person
shall be... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself."447 The privilege can be invoked "in any proceeding, civil or
criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or
adjudicatory," 48 and can be invoked by parties as well as by
nonparty witnesses.449
Key to its application in this context is that it "not only extends
to answers that would in themselves support a conviction. . . but
likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of
evidence needed to prosecute the claimant."45 Thus, even though
being gay is not illegal, because some states still maintain sodomy
laws (a few of which are limited to same-sex sodomy), 451 an admis-
sion by a person that he is gay is a link in a chain that might lead
"2 See supra notes 383-87 and accompanying text.
"3 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-13 (1996).
4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 514.02, at 514-7. However, a federal court
adjudicating a state law cause of action must apply state privilege law. FED. R. EvID. 501.
45 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 514.11, at 514-10 to 514-11. The physician-
patient privilege normally survives death and may be claimed by the patient's personal
representative. Id. § 514.12(2), at 514-2.
4" See, e.g., State v. Ermatinger, 752 S.W.2d 344, 349-50 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
" U.S. CONST. amend. V.
' Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972).
49 McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924).
'o Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-88 (1951).
' The United States Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in a case challenging
the constitutionality of such laws. See generally Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex.
2001), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 661 (2002).
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investigators to evidence that would incriminate the person on
charges of sodomy.4"2
For the privilege to apply, the witness need only have "reasonable
cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer."4 53  It does not
apply, however, where the danger is of an "imaginary and unsub-
stantial character. . .. " It would thus not apply, for example,
where the statute of limitations has expired.45 5  However, the
privilege depends on the possibility rather than the likelihood of
prosecution, and thus can be invoked short of a showing that no
possibility exists, such as the running of the statute of limitations,
a grant of immunity, or double jeopardy.456 Yet so long as a sodomy
statute remains on the books, the witness should be able to invoke
the privilege, notwithstanding the fact that the statute, as a matter
of practice, is no longer invoked against consenting adults.457
"2 United States v. Colyer, 571 F.2d 941, 944-45 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Dagenais, 15 M.J. 1018, 1019-20 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1983); Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman
Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. CV93302072, 1995 WL 348181, at * 1 n.4 (Conn. Super. Ct. May,
31, 1995); Ellison v. State, 528 A.2d 1271, 1273 (Md. 1987); State v. Miller, 485 S.W.2d 435,
440-41 (Mo. 1972); see also Steffan v. Cheney, 920 F.2d 74, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting that
witness invoked privilege, but deciding case on other grounds); Neal v. United States, 177 Ct.
Cl. 937 (1966) (noting that person was warned of right against self-incrimination); cf. Payne
v. Payne, 366 A.2d 405, 409-10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976) (upholding husband's refusal to
answer question whether he had sexual relations with other women during his marriage,
reasoning that such answer might open him up to criminal charge of adultery); Martin J.
Siegel, For Better or For Worse: Adultery, Crime & The Constitution, 30 J. FAM. L. 45, 58-86
(1991).
" Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). The Supreme Court said, 'To
sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the
setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why
it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result." Id. at
486-87.
'0 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599 (1896).
4" Id. at 598.
'€ In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 609 F.2d 867, 872 (7th Cir. 1979) (citing In re
Master Key Litig., 507 F.2d 292, 293 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206,
1210-11 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135, 138-42 (2d Cir. 1958)); accord
United States v. Sharp, 920 F.2d 1167, 1171 (4th Cir. 1990).
17 See, e.g., State v. Miller, 485 S.W.2d 435, 440-41 (Mo. 1972); cf. Murphy v. Murphy, 36
Vs. Cir. 96, 99-100 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1995) (noting that privilege applies when witness is asked
about adulterous affairs even though adultery prosecutions in state are rare).
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B. APPLICABILITYOF THE SPOUSAL PRIVILEGES TO SAME-SEX COUPLES
A second question that arises with respect to testimonial
privileges has nothing to do with trying to prove an individual's
sexual orientation in court. Rather, it has to do with the applicabil-
ity of either of the two spousal privileges to same-sex couples. The
marital confidences privilege protects confidential communications
between husband and wife, and is recognized in the federal courts
as well as in virtually all of the states.458 The adverse spousal
testimony privilege blocks testimony by a potential witness against
her spouse about anything, including observations and
nonconfidential communications, and it is recognized on the federal
level and in some of the states.459 Could either of these privileges be
invoked to prevent a witness from testifying against her same-sex
partner?
The answer to this question requires an understanding of the
way in which privileges are developed at the federal level. In 1974,
Congress rejected a series of detailed privilege rules promulgated by
the Supreme Court, opting instead to allow privilege law to develop
on a case-by-case basis."' Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides
that "the privilege of a witness . . . shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." 61
As written, the rule thus "leave [s] the door open for change" based
on evolving social norms. 62
One factor to which the federal courts look in deciding whether
to recognize a new privilege, or to alter the parameters of an
existing one, are the trends in the states. Thus, in Trammel v.
United States, the Supreme Court opted to change the federal rule
regarding the adverse spousal testimony privilege to make the
witness-spouse rather than the defendant-spouse the holder of the
4' MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 5.32, at 456; see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
Ann. § 13-90-107(1)(a)(I) (West. 1997); O.C.G.A. § 24-9-21(1) (2001); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4502(b)
(Consol. 1978).
'9 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980); see also, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 970
(West. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 5.60.060(1) (1995).
46 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 501.02(1)(a), at 501-06.
46 FED. R. EVID. 501.
4"2 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980).
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privilege.6 3 The Court noted "[t]he trend in state law toward
divesting the accused of the privilege to bar adverse spousal
testimony."464  Similarly, the Supreme Court, in Jaffee v.
Redmond, 6 ' in deciding to recognize a federal psychotherapist
privilege, held:4 "
That it is appropriate for the federal courts to recognize
a psychotherapist privilege under Rule 501 is confirmed
by the fact that all 50 States and the District of Colum-
bia have enacted into law some form of psychotherapist
privilege. We have previously observed that the policy
decisions of the States bear on the question whether
federal courts should recognize a new privilege or amend
the coverage of an existing one. . . . Because state
legislatures are fully aware of the need to protect the
integrity of the factfinding functions of their courts, the
existence of a consensus among the States indicates that
"reason and experience" support recognition of the
privilege. 46 7
To date, there is little consensus among the states as to the
applicability of the spousal privileges to same-sex couples. Vermont
is the only state to recognize such a privilege for those who enter
into civil unions.46 8 And only one reported judicial decision has
expressly considered and rejected such a privilege for same-sex
couples.46
9
When federal courts decide whether to recognize a new privilege,
or to alter the parameters of an existing one, they also look to the
proposed privileges that were rejected by Congress in favor of Rule
501 back in 1974. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 505 provided
for a privilege of an accused not to have his spouse testify against
40 Id. at 40.
'64 Id. at 49-50.
"5 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
- Id. at 3.
46 Id. at 12-13 (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48-50 (1980); United States
v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 368 n.8 (1980)).
" VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(e)(15) (1989 & Supp. 2002).
"4 Greenwald v. H&P 29th St. Assocs., 659 N.Y.S.2d 473, 474 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
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him, named the "Husband-Wife Privilege," but contained no
privilege specifically for same-sex couples.47 Although the absence
of a privilege from the list of proposed rules does not mean that it
cannot be recognized under Rule 501, the absence of a privilege from
the list suggests that the privilege is not "indelibly ensconced in our
common law."47' However, this factor is hardly dispositive, and has
not stopped the federal courts from recognizing a psychotherapist-
patient privilege that covers social workers, 472 or a spousal commu-
nications privilege, 4" even though neither of those are found in the
proposed privileges.474
The rationale for the adverse spousal testimony privilege is "its
perceived role in fostering the harmony and sanctity of the marriage
relationship" by preventing marital dissension.4 75  A second
rationale is the repugnancy of requiring a person to condemn or be
condemned by his spouse.476 The rationale for the spousal communi-
cations privilege is to protect the privacy and trust of the marital
relationship and enable spouses to freely communicate and confide
in one another.4 " There is no reason why these very same policies,
which prevent domestic dissension and protect privacy, would not
support similar privileges for same-sex couples.
Although there have been no federal cases addressing this issue,
many federal and state decisions have refused to extend the spousal
privileges to unmarried heterosexual couples, including those who
are engaged but not yet married.478 Few of such decisions set forth
470 FED. R. EVID. 505 (proposed 1974), reprinted in PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE 81-82 (John R. Schmertz, Jr. ed., 1974).
47 United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 367-68 (1980).
171 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996).
... Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 45 n.5 (1980).
4 See FED. R. EID. 504, 505 (proposed 1974), reprinted in PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE 81-82 (John R. Schmertz, Jr. ed., 1974).
415 Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44.
4a 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 2228, 2241 (1961).
47' MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 5.32, at 456.
47S See, e.g., United States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509,514-15 (4th Cir. 1995); State v. Watkins,
614 P.2d 835,839-40 (Ariz. 1980); People v. Hunt, 184 Cal. Rptr. 197,205 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982);
People v. Delph, 156 Cal. Rptr. 422, 425-26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Holt v. State, 481 N.E.2d
1324, 1326 (Ind. 1985); Karlos v. State, 476 N.E.2d 819, 824 (Ind. 1985); State v. Kaufman,
331 So. 2d 16, 22-23 (La. 1976); State v. Williams, 688 So. 2d 1277, 1280-81 (La. Ct. App.
1997); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 661 N.E.2d 1326, 1329 (Mass. 1996); State v. French, 460
N.W.2d 2, 10 (Minn. 1990); People v. Suarez, 560 N.Y.S.2d 68, 70 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990);
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a detailed rationale, although one federal case reasoned that these
heterosexual couples are trying to obtain a benefit of marriage
without taking on the responsibilities that go along with it.47s Thus,
a distinction can be drawn between unmarried same-sex couples and
unmarried heterosexual couples, because same-sex couples are
unable to marry even if they want to, while no legal obstacle
prevents most heterosexual couples from marrying.48 °
To be sure, concerns may be raised about administering such a
privilege, since it is not as easy as just looking to whether or not the
couple has a marriage license.48' However, for same-sex couples, it
is simply a matter in some cases of asking if they have registered as
domestic partners or have entered into a civil union (if those options
are available), or asking them to provide evidence that they live
together and share basic living expenses.482 Moreover, the existing
spousal privileges for heterosexual couples are not quite as simple
as merely determining whether the couple has a marriage license,
for courts will sometimes look behind the license and deny the
privileges where they find the marriage to be moribund or a sham.483
The Defense of Marriage Act should not pose a bar to recognizing
such a privilege. The Act provides in relevant part that:
[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or
of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United
States, the word "marriage" means only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife,
and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.484
Weaver v. State, 855 S.W.2d 116, 120-21 (Tex. App. 1993).
479 United States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 515 (4th Cir. 1995).
' JenniferR. Brannen, Unmarried With Privileges? Extending the Evidentiary Privilege
to Same-Sex Couples, 17 REV. LITIG. 311, 318-20, 335 (1998).
"' Cf. State v. Watkins, 614 P.2d 835,840 (Ariz. 1980) (citing administrative difficulty as
rationale for not extending privilege to unmarried heterosexual couples).
' Brannen, supra note 480, at 337-40.
"3 MUELLER &KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 5.31, at 453; see also, e.g., Lutwak v. United
States, 344 U.S. 604, 614-15 (1953) (sham); United States v. Porter, 986 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir.
1993) (moribund).
44 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
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Rule 501 is not an act of Congress, nor is it issued by an administra-
tive agency. In any event, by simply recognizing a privilege that is
not called a marital privilege, but instead a same-sex partners
privilege, the rule need not use the terms "marriage" or "spouse,"
and thus the Defense of Marriage Act need not be implicated.
The fact that Vermont now has such a privilege for same-sex
couples that have entered into civil unions raises interesting
questions when causes of action grounded in Vermont law are filed
or removed to federal court. Although federal privilege law applies
when a case in federal court involves a federal criminal action or a
federal civil action, Rule 501 further provides that "in civil actions
and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as
to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a
witness, person, government, State or political subdivision thereof
shall be determined in accordance with State law."4" 5 Thus, in a
typical diversity case in federal court in Vermont, the federal court
would apply Vermont's privilege for same-sex couples. However,
consider a case in federal court in Vermont that has both federal
and state law claims. Assuming that federal law does not extend
the spousal privileges to same-sex couples, what would a federal
court do in this situation?
The Senate recognized, but did not resolve, what to do in a
situation in which there was both a federal and a state law claim in
the same case, noting that such a situation "might require use of
two bodies of privilege law," and suggesting that "[i]f the rule
proposed here results in two conflicting bodies of privilege law
applying to the same piece of evidence in the same case, it is
contemplated that the rule favoring reception of the evidence should
be applied."4 Thus, under the Senate's proposed solution, the
privilege granted by state law would be ignored. However, this
suggested solution was not adopted as part of the House-Senate
Conference Report.48 7
4' FED. R. EVID. 501.
4m S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 12 n.17 (1974).
48 Pub. L. No. 93-595, H.R. Rep. No. 93-1597, at 7100-01 (Dec. 15, 1974); see also
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 5.7, at 345 n.16.
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The Supreme Court in Jaffee noted, but did not resolve, what to
do in the situation in which evidence is privileged under state law
but not under federal law, and solved the problem at bar by
extending federal privilege law to make it consistent with state
privilege law."'8  The Jaffee court, in the context of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, reasoned that:
given the importance of the patient's understanding that
her communications with her therapist will not be
publicly disclosed, any State's promise of confidentiality
would have little value if the patient were aware that
the privilege would not be honored in a federal court.
Denial of the federal privilege therefore would frustrate
the purposes of the state legislation that was enacted to
foster these confidential communications.489
The same argument could be made with respect to Vermont's
privilege for same-sex couples. Denying the privilege in federal
court would undermine the state's promise of such a privilege,
suggesting that it should be extended not only to cases arising in
federal court that involve both federal and state claims, but also to
actions in federal court involving only federal claims.
Theoretically, the court could give the jury a limiting instruction
to consider a piece of evidence for the federal but not the state claim,
but in practice this would be confusing490 and probably would not be
that effective. In reality, federal courts in such situations have
tended to apply federal privilege law where a conflict between
federal and state law exists, thus effectively nullifying the state
privilege.9 1 Some courts, however, have held that the appropriate
solution is to sever or dismiss the state law claims and let those be
adjudicated in a state court before a different fact-finder.492
" Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 n.15 (1996).
48 Id. at 13.
'90 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 501.02(2)(c), at 501-16.
'9' WEINSTEIN &BERGER, supra note 21, § 501.02(2)(c), at 501-16 to 501-16.1; see also, e.g.,
Hancock v. Hobbs, 967 F.2d 462, 466-67 (11th Cir. 1992); Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d
136, 141 (2d Cir. 1987).
492 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 501.02(2)(c), at 501-17; see also, e.g., Research
Inst. for Med. and Chemistry, Inc. v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 114 F.R.D. 672, 675 n.2
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V. LAY AND EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
A. LAY OPINION TESTIMONY ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
Assume that a person's sexual orientation is somehow relevant
in a case and not subject to exclusion under the categorical rules of
exclusion, yet most of the person's statements about his own sexual
orientation are subject to exclusion under the hearsay rule and the
rules of privilege. Is it permissible for a witness who is familiar
with the person to testify that the person "looked" or "seemed" gay?
Consider in this regard the following testimony by a witness when
asked about an encounter with a teacher at a private religious
school:
[H]e didn't seem right . . .he looked like more of a
faggot .... To me he looked gay, the way he talked and
his motions with his hands, like he was very delicate.493
At issue in the case was whether the school was liable for
negligent hiring and supervision of the teacher, who was alleged to
have sexually assaulted a child.494 The plaintiff's theory was that
the teacher was "obviously" gay, and that the school was thus on
notice that he was a risk to children. 495 The court rejected the
evidence on relevancy grounds, refusing to give credence to a link
between homosexuality and pedophilia.4' Left out of the court's
opinion, however, was any discussion about whether a lay witness
is qualified to opine about a person's sexual orientation based on his
observations of a person.
Federal Rule of Evidence 701 sets forth the standard for when a
lay witness may testify in the form of an opinion, limiting lay
witnesses to giving only those opinions which are "(a) rationally
based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
(W.D. Wis. 1987).
113 Doe v. X Corp., No. CV930351397, 1997 WL66486, at *8 n.7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 30,
1997).
194 Id. at "1.
.. Id. at S1, *8.
" Id. at *8. See also supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
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understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a
fact in issue."497
The first limitation-that the testimony be "rationally based on
the perception of the witness"-is merely a restatement of the
requirement in Federal Rule of Evidence 602 that testimony be
based on the witness's personal knowledge.498 Rule 602 provides
that "[a] witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has
personal knowledge of the matter."'499 Personal knowledge has two
components to it, perception and memory.5" A witness cannot
testify to perceptions that he cannot remember, and he cannot
testify to memories that are not based on his own perceptions.5"'
Evidence to prove that a witness's testimony is based on personal
knowledge may consist entirely of the witness's own testimony. 1
2
In most cases, including the above example, the requirement that
the lay opinion testimony be based on the witness's own perceptions
is easily satisfied. The more significant hurdle, then, is the second
limitation that the testimony be "helpful to a clear understanding
of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.'"503
This limitation provides that whether a lay witness may give his
"opinion" on a matter or simply relate the bare facts to the trier of
fact depends upon the degree to which an "opinion" by the witness
would be helpful to the jury.5"4 This limitation thus sets forth a
preference for testimony that is more specific or fact-like in nature
"" FED. R. EVID. 701. The rule further requires that the testimony not be based on
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. Id. This
additional limitation is designed to prevent parties from evading the expert witness disclosure
requirement in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by calling an expert witness in the guise
of a lay witness. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee's note.
,9 FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee's note.
FED. R. EVID. 602.
Goo MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 6.5, at 487.
501 Id.
502 FED. R. EVID. 602. Rule 602 is "a specialized application of the provisions of Rule
104(b) on conditional relevancy." FED. R. EVID. 602 advisory committee's note. As such, it is
ultimately for the jury to decide whether the witness satisfies the requirement of having
personal knowledge, with the judge playing only a screening role, and allowing the witness
to testify so long as enough evidence of personal knowledge is offered to enable a reasonable
jury to conclude that he had it. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 1.13, at 54.
m FED. R. EVID. 701.
5o' MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 7.4, at 691-93.
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over testimony that is more general or opinion-like in nature; the
rationale of the limitation is that the trier of fact usually will be in
a better position to determine what happened if it is given more
detail.5 5 Moreover, testimony in the form of an opinion will not be
"helpful" if it represents too long of an inferential leap from the facts
observed.0 6
When testimony in the form of an "opinion" is preferable to
testimony in the form of "facts" is best demonstrated by the so-called
"collective facts" doctrine, which allows a lay witness to testify that
the person he observed seemed frightened, upset, or shocked, or use
other descriptive words that, in effect, are an "opinion" of a series of
more detailed facts that he observed and processed based on his
basic understanding of human nature. 7 The witness's "opinion"
that the person looked frightened, shocked, or upset is likely to be
more helpful to the jury than a bare reciting of the details that the
witness observed (if indeed it is even possible to articulate such
details). 8 Thus, the rationale behind the doctrine is that there is
no other feasible alternative by which to communicate that observa-
tion to the trier of fact. 9 It would be very difficult for a witness to
articulate, for example, what gasoline smells like, and we therefore
allow lay witnesses to testify that they smelled a gasoline-like odor,
even though this is in a sense an opinion.510 Indeed, the "[k]ey to the
[collective facts] doctrine [is that] the lay witness cannot verbalize
all the underlying sensory data supporting the opinion. 1 ' In
deciding whether to allow a lay witness to testify in the form of an
opinion, the judge asks himself whether lay persons commonly draw
this type of inference, and whether it would be practical for a lay
witness to articulate all of the underlying factual data.5 2
505 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 7.1, at 688. The rule recognizes that the
fact/opinion dichotomy is somewhat artificial, and is thus more of a continuum. FED. R. EVID.
701 advisory committee's note.
5 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 7.3, at 692.
7 Id. § 7.4, at 693-96.
' Id.
'o Clifford v. Commonwealth, 7 S.W.3d 371, 374-75 (Ky. 2000).
510 Id.
5" MICHAELH. GRAHAM, 2HANDBOOKOFFEDERALEVIDENCE § 701.1 n.15 (5th ed. 2001).
512 Id.
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The question, then, is whether a lay witness's opinion that a
person "looked" or "seemed" gay is "helpful" to the jury within the
meaning of Rule 701.513 A few courts have given at least qualified
support for allowing such testimony. One court has held that
"[h]omosexuality and its outward signs are matters of conversation
and also of frequent discussion in the press and periodical litera-
ture," and while conceding that "[i]t may be difficult for a witness to
testify respecting the particular trait of [homosexuality] with the
same degree of accuracy and certainty as possible respecting other
traits," the court concluded that "[t]his would affect the weight of
the evidence rather than its admissibility."5 4 Yet another court
held that a lay witness may testify that a person "comes across" as
gay, reasoning that:
while [a person's] propensity to engage in stereotypical
"homosexual" behaviors may indicate little or nothing
about his true sexual orientation, most lay people are
familiar with the social import of certain gestures,
speech patterns, and styles of walking and standing, and
are competent to give opinions about whether a given
individual engages in stereotypical "homosexual" behav-
ior, and thus "comes across" as homosexual or
bisexual." 5
But there are several problems with allowing lay witnesses to
opine as to a person's sexual orientation. As the above decisions
indicate,"" much of the testimony appears to be based on the
witnesses' observations of the person's speech and behavioral
patterns. Yet such an opinion is bound to be fraught with error.
One study on the accuracy of one's ability to detect a person's sexual
orientation based on observation of the person foundthat "[c]lose to
80% of [its] subjects were unable to identify accurately the sexual
orientation of the target.., beyond chance expectations," and that
8 See FED. R. EVID. 701.
5 O'Kon v. Roland, 247 F. Supp. 743, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
5 Griswold v. Fresenius USA, Inc., 978 F. Supp. 718, 722 (N.D. Ohio 1997).516 See supra notes 513-15 and accompanying text.
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no behavioral cue, such as speech or appearance, emerged as an
accurate predictor of sexual orientation."1 7 Another study found that
people, although able to detect sexual orientation of others at better
than chance levels of accuracy, were far from perfect, with the
typical person being correct only fifty-five to seventy percent of the
time."' Thus, the inferential leap from the observed facts to the
conclusion that a person seemed gay appears too long a leap to allow
a lay witness to take.
Moreover, even assuming that such a consideration goes only to
the weight rather than the admissibility of such evidence, and
assuming that stereotypical speech and behavior patterns have any
bearing on a person's sexual orientation, it is questionable whether
this is the sort of thing that would fall within the "collective facts"
doctrine. For when a person testifies that a person "looked" gay, he
usually is pointing to stereotypical speech and behavioral cues that
he can easily articulate. Indeed, in the example set forth above, the
witness based his opinion that the person was gay on "the way he
talked and his motions with his hands." '19 Thus, this is hardly akin
to such testimony as the smell of gasoline, the look of fright, or other
perceptions and sensations that are difficult to articulate in fact-like
form.
Consider in this regard a pair of recent cases where the court
approved of lay witness testimony that a person "sounded black."520
These courts considered such evidence admissible under the
"collective facts rule," reasoning that the witness's "inability to more
specifically describe or demonstrate 'how a black man sounds'
merely proves the reason for the collective facts rule, i.e., that it
would be difficult or impossible for the witness to give such a
description or demonstration."52' Although permitting such
s Gregory Berger et al., Detection of Sexual Orientation by Heterosexuals and
Homosexuals, 13(4) J. HOMOSExUALITY 83, 90-95 (1987).
"' Nalini Ambady et al., Accuracy of Judgments of Sexual Orientation from Thin Slices
of Behavior, 77(3) J. PERSONALITY & PSYCHOL. 538, 543, 544, 546 (1999).
"" Doe v. X Corp., No. CV930351397, 1997 WL 66486, at 08 & n.7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan.
30, 1997).
... United States v. Card, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1116-18 (D. Utah 2000); Clifford v. State,
7 S.W.3d 371, 374-76 (Ky. 2000).
"" Card, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 1116-18; Clifford, 7 S.W.3d at 374-76; see also Lis Wiehl,
"Sounding Black" in the Courtroom: Court-Sanctioned Racial Stereotyping, 18 HARV.
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testimony has been criticized as being only eighty to ninety percent
accurate, one court has held that such a consideration goes only to
the weight and not the admissibility of such evidence.522 But even
accepting the validity of these decisions, lay witness testimony on
sexual orientation still seems objectionable, both because the
accuracy rates are far lower than with racial identification, and
because the basic facts underlying opinion testimony on sexual
orientation can be articulated with relative ease, thus making it a
poor fit for the collective facts doctrine.
The dissent in one of the cases approving of lay witness testimony
that a person "sounded black" would have held that "[riace, that is
skin color, must be perceived by sight."528 Moreover, "[t]o say that
a person is capable of ascertaining another's race solely by hearing
his voice is tantamount to saying that one can 'hear a color' or 'smell
a sound' or 'taste a noise.' ",524 The same holds true for sexual
orientation, which also can be perceived by neither sight nor sound,
but rather is inside the person and cannot be detected unless the
person either self-identifies as such or engages in same-sex relation-
ships that would be indicative of his orientation.
There is another reason why allowing this testimony is objection-
able. In a recent article, Professor Lis Wiehl takes issue with the
cases allowing testimony that the perpetrator of a crime "sounded
black," reasoning that, aside from concerns about reliability, such
evidence should be excluded under Rule 403. Wiehl posits that
"statements referring to the race of an accused can move the jury to
decide the case on an improper basis,"525 and concludes that to allow
such testimony "is to embrace court sanctioned racial stereotyp-
ing."52 A similar concern applies to testimony regarding perceived
sexual orientation. To the extent that a person's sexual orientation
is somehow relevant, courts should not allow a party to rely on
inaccurate stereotypes to prove sexual orientation, as doing so only
reinforces the stereotypes. This reinforcement is akin to the way in
BLAcKLETTER L.J. 185, 190-95 (2002).
522 Card, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 1118.
62 Clifford, 7 S.W.3d at 378 (Stumbo, J., dissenting).
524 Id.
" Wiehl, supra note 521, at 185.
6 Id.
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which a court, by finding evidence that someone is gay to be
"relevant" to show a likelihood of sexually assaulting someone of the
same gender under Rule 401527 validates in society's eyes the
stigmatizing stereotype contained therein.
B. EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
Experts frequently testify about matters related to sexual
orientation. In child custody cases, for example, experts often
testify about the effect that a parent's sexual orientation has on his
children.528 And in criminal cases in which the defendant raises the
gay-panic defense, experts frequently testify about the syndrome.529
Federal Rule 702 sets forth three limitations on expert testimony:
the testimony must be helpful to the trier of fact, the witness must
be qualified to provide the trier of fact with that assistance, and the
proposed testimony must be reliable or trustworthy.
530
The helpfulness requirement generally excludes testimony that
is within the knowledge and experience of ordinary lay people,
5 31
matters committed exclusively to the trier of fact (e.g., assessing the
credibility of witnesses),53 2 or testimony that is essentially specula-
tive.533 As to the second requirement, having a formal education in
a given field, even without any experience, is sufficient but not
necessary to be qualified as an expert in that field, as one can
5" See supra notes 338-42 and accompanying text.
51 See, e.g., J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786, 793 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d
240,243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); In re J.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90,92 (N.J. 1974); Chicoine v. Chicoine,
479 N.W.2d 891,896-97 (S.D. 1992) (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).
" See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); People v.
Parisie, 287 N.E.2d 310, 314 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972); State v. Shelley, 373 N.E.2d 951 (Mass.
1978).
530 FED. R. EVID. 702; see also WEINSTEIN& BERGER, supra note 21, § 702.02(3), at 702-10.
5' WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 702.03(2)(a), at 702-33; see also FED. R. EVID.
702 advisory committee's note (noting that this involves "common sense inquiry whether the
untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible
degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized
understanding of the subject involved in the dispute").
52 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 702.03(3), at 702-38.
5"a MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 7.6, at 703.
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become qualified on the basis of experience alone without any formal
education or training.534
Much litigation regarding the admissibility of expert testimony
centers on the third requirement. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,585 the Supreme Court interpreted Rule 702 as
containing an implied requirement that trial courts exclude
scientific expert testimony that lacks reliability. 53 The Supreme
Court subsequently extended this requirement to all expert
testimony, scientific as well as nonscientific.53 7 In Daubert, the
Supreme Court set forth a nondefinitive checklist of the types of
factors that a trial court should take into account in determining
reliability, including: (1) whether the theory or technique can be
and has been tested; (2) whether it has been published and subject
to peer review; (3) the known or potential rate of error experienced
in application of the technique or theory; (4) the existence of
standards and controls for the application of the technique the
witness has applied in arriving at his or her opinion, and whether
the witness applied those standards and controls in the specific
application of the technique; and (5) whether the theory or tech-
nique is generally accepted in a definable relevant community of
experts.5" Other pertinent factors include:
(1) Whether experts are "proposing to testify about
matters growing naturally and directly out of research
they have conducted independent of the litigation, or
whether they have developed their opinions expressly for
purposes of testifying"; (2) Whether the expert has
unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise to
an unfounded conclusion; (3) Whether the expert has
adequately accounted for obvious alternative explana-
5 Id. § 7.5, at 697-98; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 702.04(I)(a), at 702-42 to
702-43.
5'3 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Id. at 590-91.
a Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-53 (1999).
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. While some states have adopted Daubert, see, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1349 (Mass. 1994), others have retained the so-
calledFrye general acceptance standard, which is in essence the fifth Daubert factor, see, e.g.,
People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 331 (Cal. 1994).
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tions; (4) Whether the expert is being as careful as he
would be in his regular professional work outside his
paid litigation consulting; [and] (5) Whether the field of
expertise claimed by the expert is known to reach
reliable results for the type of opinion the expert would
give. 5
39
However, no factor is dispositive, other factors may be relevant,540
and the trial court's determination of reliability is reviewed only for
abuse of discretion.54' Interestingly, no court has assessed the
admissibility of expert testimony about gay-panic syndrome under
Daubert, implicitly accepting its reliability.
Typically, experts giving "syndrome" testimony are barred from
saying: whether they think the subject is being truthful (as this is
an assessment of credibility committed exclusively to the jury and
is thus not "helpful"); whether he suffered from the syndrome; or
whether the syndrome operated in the case or explains what
happened.52 The syndrome most similar to gay-panic syndrome is
probably battered woman syndrome, which is used by battered
wives as a defense to explain why they used deadly force against
their abuser even when not under actual or imminent attack.53
Typically when such evidence is offered to support a claim of self-
defense, the experts are barred from testifying that the actions of
the defendant were the product of battered woman syndrome, that
she suffers from battered woman syndrome, or that battered woman
syndrome shows that her story is truthful.544 Thus, following
established precedent dealing with battered woman syndrome, an
expert testifying about the gay-panic defense should at most be
allowed to give the jury the background on the syndrome to the
extent it is deemed "helpful," but should not be permitted to give his
'" FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
540 Id.
"' Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997).
542 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 7.22, at 769; see also, e.g., People v.
Christel, 537 N.W.2d 194, 201 (Mich. 1995); State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Minn.
1989).
"3 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 7.22, at 770.
54 Id. § 7.22, at 771; see also, e.g., Christel, 537 N.W.2d at 201; Hennum, 441 N.W.2d at
799.
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conclusion as to whether the defendant in fact suffered from the
syndrome, leaving it to the jury to make that determination.545
Is it possible for someone to give "expert" testimony that someone
is or is not gay? There exists in the gay community a
concept-commonly known as "gaydar"-which refers to the
"apparent ability [of gays and lesbians] to recognize each other by
cues too subtle for heterosexuals" to detect.5 46 Presumably, another
gay person could "qualify" as an expert on the subject based on his
life experience in identifying other people of the same sexual
orientation. It is doubtful, however, that such testimony would pass
the Daubert test of reliability. 47 A recent study has found that gay
men and lesbians perceive sexual orientation slightly more accu-
rately than their heterosexual counterparts, yet it found that the
difference was not that large and was not consistently higher.5
48
Thus, the rate of error and the lack of sufficient acceptance in the
scientific community at this point are likely to be significant
barriers to the admission of such expert testimony.
VI. EVIDENTIARY SUBSTITUTES: JUDICIAL NOTICE AND
PRESUMPTIONS
A. JUDICIAL NOTICE
Federal Rule of Evidence 201 governs judicial notice of so-called
adjudicative facts,5 49 the facts of a particular case that relate to the
-parties, their activities, and their properties, or in other words, the
"who did what, where, when, how and with what motive or
intent.'' "W When a court takes judicial notice of a fact, there is no
" Cf. State v. Haynes, No. 4310, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 3811, at *4-5, *10-11 (Ohio Ct.
App. Sept. 21, 1988) (refusing to allow prosecution to offer testimony that timing in case
between unsolicited homosexual encounter and murder indicated that it was not result of gay
panic but instead anger-retaliatory killing, reasoning that it was for jury to make that
determination).
" Mary Coombs, Interrogating Identity, 11 BERKELEYWOMEN'SL.J. 222,232 n.57 (1995).
, See supra notes 535-40 and accompanying text.
848 Nalini Ambady et al., Accuracy of Judgments of Sexual Orientation from Thin Slices
of Behavior, 77(3) J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 538, 543, 545 (1999).
'4 FED. R. EvID. 201(a) & advisory committee's note.
5w WEINSTEIN &BERGER, supra note 21, § 201.02(1), at 201-8; see also FED. R. EVID. 201(a)
advisory committee's note.
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need for presenting formal evidence to prove the fact, and in civil
cases, the jury is instructed to accept the fact as conclusively proven
and parties are barred from offering evidence before the jury to
disprove the judicially noticed fact.551
Because of the inability to introduce counterproof once judicial
notice of a fact has been taken, the rule limits taking judicial notice
of adjudicative facts only in "clear cases" where the fact to be noticed
is "beyond reasonable controversy." '552 Thus, the rule provides that
"[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable
dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reason-
ably be questioned.""55
To be generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court, the fact should be part of the "common knowledge" of the
community554 or generally known by "well-informed persons" within
the court's jurisdiction.555 This includes facts covered extensively in
the news media, 5 6 as well as matters of geography, history, politics,
and economic conditions.557 Even if a fact is not of general knowl-
edge within the court's jurisdiction, it can be judicially noticed under
Rule 201(b)(2) if it "can be determined from unimpeachable
sources,"5 8 such as maps, dictionaries, encyclopedias, public records,
almanacs, and the like.55 9
In addition, courts sometimes take judicial notice of legislative
facts. In contrast to adjudicative facts, legislative facts are more
6' FED. R. EVID. 201(g); FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee's note; WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 21, § 201.02(2), at 201-9. In criminal cases, the court instructs the jury
that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed, due to a
concern about the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. FED. R. EVID. 201(g);
Pub. L. No. 93-595, H.R. Rep. 93-650, at 7080 (Nov. 15, 1973). Moreover, in all cases, a party
opposing the taking of judicial notice of a fact is entitled to an opportunity to be heard on the
propriety of taking such notice. FED. R. EVID. 201(e).
552 FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee's note; see also WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note
21, § 201.10(1), at 201-16 to 201-17.
55 FED. R. EVID. 201(b).
55 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 201.11(1)-(2), at 201-21 to 201-22.
' MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 2.6, at 86.
5 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 201.11(2), at 201-22 to 201-22.1.
55 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 2.6, at 87-88.
55 Id. § 2.7, at 89.
5 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 201.12(1), at 201-27 to 201-29.
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general and are not limited to the immediate parties. They include
facts that have relevance to the court in interpreting or extending
legislative enactments or in developing the common law.5"' One
example of a legislative fact is the Supreme Court's refusal in
Hawkins v. United States56 ' to discard the common law adverse
spousal testimony privilege based on the "fact" that allowing a
spouse to testify against another spouse would "destroy almost any
marriage."5 62 Another example arose in the Supreme Court's
decision in Brown v. Board of Education53 striking down separate-
but-equal based on the "fact" that it had a negative impact on
minority children. 4 No rule governs judicial notice of legislative
facts. 5 Thus, unlike judicial notice of adjudicative facts, courts can
take judicial notice of legislative facts even when they are not
indisputable, nor easily verifiable.566
In the area of child custody, the issue of judicial notice involving
a question of sexual orientation has frequently arisen. In several
cases, trial courts have denied a gay parent custody of his natural
child, taking judicial notice of the "fact" that a homosexual environ-
ment has an adverse effect on children, but such cases have been
overturned by appeals courts on the ground that this is not the sort
of thing that is beyond reasonable controversy and thus not the sort
of thing subject to judicial notice.6 7 In refusing to take judicial
notice, these courts viewed the question as one involving an
adjudicative fact, and found that it failed to satisfy the requirements
of Rule 201 or the state's equivalent rule.5'
Yet the line between legislative facts and adjudicative facts is
sometimes slippery, and therefore courts sometimes circumvent the
restrictions on noticing legislative facts by classifying the noticed
500 Id. § 201.51(1), at 201-85.
" 358 U.S. 74, 79 (1958).
562 FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee's note.
347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, aupra note 21, § 201.03(2), at 201-12 to 201-13 n.4.
5 FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee's note.
FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee's note; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, §
201.51(3), at 201-88.
' Maradie v. Maradie, 680 So. 2d 538, 541-42 (Fla. 1996); Bezio v. Patenauude, 410
N.E.2d 1207, 1216 (Mass. 1980); Doe v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 799, 805-06 (Va. 1981).
' Maradie, 680 So. 2d at 541-42; Bezio, 410 N.E.2d at 1216; Doe, 410 N.E.2d at 1216.
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fact as legislative."" Classifying a fact as adjudicative or legislative
requires distinguishing questions of fact from questions of law, as
follows: if classified as the former, it is an adjudicative fact, but if
classified as the latter, it is a legislative fact.
570
Consider, for example, a court that is asked to interpret whether
its state adoption laws allow for so-called second-parent adoptions
in which both partners in a same-sex couple are permitted to adopt
a child together. If, as in the above cases, the inquiry is whether the
parents satisfy a requirement that they are "fit" to further the "best
interests of the child,"5 71 the court would be making a factual finding
about the parent's fitness, an adjudicative fact subject to the
constraints of Rule 201.72 But if instead the court is interpreting
the language of the statute to decide whether the statute allows for
such adoptions as a matter of law, it is now dealing with a legisla-
tive fact, and can take judicial notice free of the constraints of Rule
201. 573
B. PRESUMPTIONS
A presumption is "[a] legal inference or assumption that a fact
exists, based on the known or proven existence of some other fact or
group of facts."574 Stated a different way, "if a basic fact (Fact A) is
established, then the fact-finder must accept that the presumed fact
(Fact B) has also been established unless the presumption is
rebutted." 75
N9 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.3, at 528 (1980) (noting that
many facts are not readily classifiable as either adjudicative or legislative); MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 21, § 2.3, at 78-79 (citing United States v. Gould, 536 F.2d 216 (8th
Cir. 1976)) (upholding trial court's taking judicial notice that cocaine hydrochloride was
derivative of coca leaves, hence Schedule II controlled substance, on ground that fact noticed
was legislative not adjudicative); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 201.51(3), at 201-88.
670 Greenfield v. United States, 341 F.2d 411,412 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (holding that whether
soda pop bottle is dangerous weapon is question of fact for jury); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 21, § 2.3, at 78 & n.29 (citing Green v. United States, 405 F.2d 1368, 1369 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) (holding that whether gun is deadly weapon is question of law for court)).
571 Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1214 (Mass. 1980).
572 See FED. R. EVID. 201.
578 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Caitlin, 622 N.Y.S.2d 835, 840-41 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1994).
67 BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 1203 (7th ed. 1999).
"" WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 301.02(1), at 301-7.
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Under Federal Rule of Evidence 301, unless Congress has
provided otherwise, in civil cases a presumption shifts only the
burden of production-or the burden of coming forward with
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption and thus to avoid a
directed verdict-and it does not shift the burden of persuasion, or
the "burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion,"
which remains at all times with the party on whom it was originally
cast. 576 For a civil presumption to be constitutional, there must be
some rational connection between the basic fact and the presumed
fact such that the inference of the presumed fact from proof of the
basic fact is not so unreasonable as to be purely arbitrary.
77
Rule 301 applies only where "not otherwise provided for by Act
of Congress. ''578 Thus, Congress can provide that a statutory
presumption shifts not only the burden of production, but also the
burden of persuasion, which trumps the default rule set forth in
Rule 301.
571
An interesting application of an evidentiary presumption
involving sexual orientation and the potential for courts to circum-
vent Rule 301 via the "otherwise provided" proviso is the United
States military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. Under that policy,
codified in a statute by Congress, a servicemember can be dis-
charged"' for engaging in homosexual acts," 1 marrying or attempt-
ing to marry someone known to be of the same gender,582 or stating
that one is gay and failing to rebut a presumption that then arises
that he or she engages in homosexual acts.58 Thus, although the
516 FED. R. EVID. 301; see also WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 21, § 301.02(2), at 301-9
to 301-11.
... Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 28 (1976); Tot v. United States, 319
U.S. 463, 467-68 (1943); Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City R.R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35,
43 (1910).
578 FED. R. EVID. 301.
17' Am. Coal Co. v. Benefits Review Bd., 738 F.2d 387, 390 (10th Cir. 1984); Ala. By-Prods.
Corp. v. Killingsworth, 733 F.2d 1511, 1515 (11th Cir. 1984).
'o Such discharges are considered civil and not criminal in nature, thus making the
analogy to the rule governing presumptions in civil cases an appropriate one. See, e.g.,
Thomassonv. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 948 n.18 (4th Cir. 1996); Selland v. Perry, 905 F. Supp. 260,
265 (D. Md. 1995).
68' 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1) (2000).
5 Id. § 654(b)(3).
68 See id. § 654(b)(2):
A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the armed forces
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statute is aimed at discharging those who engage in homosexual
acts and not merely those who are gay, it nonetheless contains a
rebuttable presumption that those persons who declare that they
are gay engage in homosexual conduct.584
The courts have held that there is a rational relationship between
the basic fact (statement regarding homosexual orientation) and the
presumed fact (homosexual conduct) so as to satisfy constitutional
concerns, reasoning that although the fit is not perfect, a perfect fit
is not required, and that the presumption certainly is a rational
one.
585
The other important question is whether this presumption
merely shifts the burden of production to the servicemember, or if
it also shifts to him the burden of persuasion. In other words, does
it shift to him only the burden of coming forward with some evidence
to rebut the presumption that he engages in homosexual conduct, or
must be actually prove that he has not engaged in such conduct?
Interestingly, the military rules of evidence do not contain a
provision analogous to Federal Rule of Evidence 301, 58 and are thus
silent on the issue.5 87 A Department of Defense Directive dealing
under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense if one or more
of the following findings is made and approved in accordance with
procedures set forth in such regulations[:] That the member has stated
that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect, unless
there is a further finding, made and approved in accordance with
procedures set forth in the regulations, that the member has demon-
strated that he or she is not a person who engages in, attempts to engage
in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts.
Id.
am Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 262 (8th Cir. 1996).
5W See, e.g., Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 1997); Able
v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280, 1296-97 (2d Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 930
(4th Cir. 1996); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
586 See FED. R. EVID. 301.
507 See UNITED STATE MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL pt. 111 (2000); see also WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 21, at T-29 (noting that military rules of evidence have no rule
comparable to Federal Rule of Evidence 301). Evidently, it was not enacted because the
members of the group drafting the military rules did not fully grasp their importance. See
Fredric I. Lederer, The Military Rules of Evidence' Origins and Judicial Implementation, 130
MIL. L. REV. 5, 19 (1990):
[P]resumptions were not codified as part of the [military] rules .... To
the best of my memory, presumptions were not codified, not because of
their inherent difficulty and complexity, but rather because members of
the Working Group failed to understand fully their importance. Instead,
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with the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy provides that, in cases
involving the presumption that a servicemember who declares his
homosexuality also engages in homosexual conduct, the burden of
persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence is shifted to the
servicemember.5 ' Thus, even if Federal Rule of Evidence 301
applied in military proceedings, it is possible that courts might
circumvent it by construing Congress as having "otherwise pro-
vided," as the Department of Defense directive appears to have
done.
the Working Group quickly accepted the decision of the framers of the
Federal Rules of Evidence not to codify presumptions in criminal cases
and refused to adopt Federal Rule 301 because of its application to civil
cases.
Id.
See Department of Defense Directive No. 1332.14, 1 E3.Al.1.8.1.2.2 (Dec. 21, 1993)
(amended Mar. 4, 1994):
A member shall be separated under this section if one or more of the
following approved findings is made .... The member has made a
statement that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual, or words to that
effect, unless there is a further approved finding that the member has
demonstrated that he or she is not a person who engages in, attempts to
engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in
homosexual acts. A statement by a Service member that he or she is a
homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect, creates a rebuttable
presumption that the Service member engages in, attempts to engage in,
has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts.
The Service member shall be advised of this presumption and given the
opportunity to rebut the presumption by presenting evidence demonstrat-
ing that he or she does not engage in, attempt to engage in, have a
propensity to engage in, or intent to engage in homosexual acts.
Propensity to engage in homosexual acts means more than an abstract
preference or desire to engage in homosexual acts; it indicates a likelihood
that a person engages in or will engage in homosexual acts. In determin-
ing whether a member has successfully rebutted the presumption that he
or she engages in, attempts to engage in, or has a propensity or intent to
engage in homosexual acts, some or all of the following may be considered:
Whether the member has engaged in homosexual acts; the member's
credibilityL;] Testimony from others about the member's past conduct,
character, and credibility[j The nature and circumstances of the mem-
ber's statement[;] Any other evidence relevant to whether the member is
likely to engage in homosexual acts.
Id.; see also id. I E3.A1. 1.1.8.2 ('See paragraphs E3.A1. 1.8.4.5. and E.A1. 1.8.4.6., below, for
guidance as to the burden of proof and when a finding regarding retention is required."); id.
E3.Al.1.8.4.5 ("rhe member shall bear the burden of proving throughout the proceeding,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that retention is warranted under the limited
circumstances described in subparagraphs E3.A1.1.8.1.2.1 and E3.A1..8.1.2.2.").
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Of course, the distinction between shifting the burden of
production and shifting the burden of persuasion probably means
the difference between the servicemember winning and losing in
most cases. The presumption, as interpreted by the Department of
Defense, has tilted the odds substantially against servicemembers
subject to discharge under the policy. Although Department of
Defense directives interpreting federal military statutes are entitled
to deference by the courts589 and legislative history evinces an intent
to shift the burden of persuasion to servicemembers,59 ° parties
facing discharge under the statute have open to them an argument
that the Department of Defense's interpretation of the statute is
incorrect in light of the traditional understanding that presumptions
shift only the burden of production and not the burden of persua-
sion.
ir See, e.g., Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280, 1298 (2d Cir. 1996); Thorne v. United
States Dep't of Defense, 916 F. Supp. 1358, 1366 (E.D. Va. 1996).
59 See S. REP. No. 103-112, at 294 (1993):
The committee intends that.., once the government introduces evidence
that the member has stated that he or she is a homosexual, the burden
shifts to the member and remains with the member throughout the
proceeding to demonstrate that he or she is not a homosexual as defined
in the statute (i.e., a person who engages in, attempts to engage in or has
the propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts) ....
W1f the member in rebuttal offers evidence to the effect that he or she
does not engage in homosexual acts or has a propensity or intent to do so,
that does not shift the burden to the government. Because the burden
remains on the member throughout the proceeding, the member bears the
burden of persuading the fact-finder by a preponderance of the evidence
that the rebuttal is more credible than the original statement (e.g., by
proving that the original statement was made in jest). If the fact-finder
determines that the evidence in rebuttal does not overcome the presump-
tion, the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a discharge.
Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 103-200, at 288 (1993):
This section would provide that the service member facing separation for
homosexual conduct would be afforded an opportunity to establish certain
facts to avoid separation. The facts to be established vary, depending on
whether the separation is for acts, marriage, or statements. However, in
all cases separation is required unless the service member establishes the
facts by a preponderance of the evidence.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Cases involving questions of sexual orientation present a
challenge when analyzed under the Federal Rules of Evidence, as
promulgated in 1975, when issues of sexual orientation were still
seldom discussed in public, let alone litigated. Yet, as challenging
as these questions are, many can be answered by reference to the
basic policies that underlie each of the rules of evidence. Thus, for
example, when asking whether the rape-shield rule applies to bar
admission of evidence of a person's sexual orientation, one need only
look to the policy underlying the rule-to prevent putting the victim
on trial-to determine that evidence of the victim's sexual orienta-
tion should be excluded under that rule. Or, when asking whether
communications between same-sex couples should be protected by
the spousal privileges, one need only look to the policies underlying
the spousal privileges, namely protecting privacy and the sanctity
of the relationship, to determine that such conversations should be
privileged.
Moreover, in their role in interpreting the rules of evidence,
courts should be mindful of the fact that their decisions to admit or
exclude evidence project social norms onto society. Thus, courts
should take care not to reinforce inaccurate stereotypes of gays and
lesbians by crediting as relevant arguments that are based on such
stereotypes.
Finally, courts should not turn a blind eye to the fact that
assertions of ostensibly legitimate purposes for proffering evidence
of a person's sexual orientation are often little more than a pretext
for trying to get information before the jury that will play to the
jurors' preexisting prejudices, leading them to decide the case on an
improper basis. To safeguard the integrity of the fact-finding
process, courts should employ the discretion given to them in Rule
403 to guard against such unsavory litigation tactics.
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